Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes: The self-serving stances of all the great powers make it more likely that the world will be marked by more miscalculations, conflict and hubris
Even as Ukraine faces extraordinary devastation, a new world disorder is becoming apparent. The United States has to do the balancing act of providing a strong response to Russia. But it is also hemmed in by the fact that it is dealing with an armed nuclear power and needs to avoid direct confrontation. Whether this balancing act can be pulled off remains to be seen. Europe is now caught between its desire to send a strong message to Russia and sanctimonious moralising. But its credibility is impugned because it is simply not willing to pay even the minimal economic price for a strong stand.
Russia in the meantime has made a classic mistake. It is one of the great mysteries of international politics that despite their terrible record at winning asymmetric wars, powerful countries continue to think they can win. Post World War II history is full of examples of conflict between a seemingly strong power and a weaker adversary resulting in immense losses for the former, if not full defeat. Andrew Mack’s classic study “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” had made this point as early as 1975.
Seemingly weak adversaries can do surprisingly well for a number of reasons: The fraying of political will of the stronger power, greater ideological cohesion, international support for the weaker power, the practical difficulties of waging war or constraints on the use of certain kinds of weapons. One of the arguments that used to be made for the possible strength of weaker adversaries is that they have degrees of freedom: They can engage in guerrilla warfare, insurgency or even targeting civilians. But one of the striking things about modern wars is that none of the great powers have shown much restraint in the tactics they use: The Russians are as ready to use any tactics necessary, as the devastating destruction of Mariupol suggests.
Ivan Arreguin-Toft, in How the Weak Win Wars, had argued statistically, that since 1950 the percentage of wars that seemingly stronger powers win was dropping to less than half. But if you consider significant wars from Afghanistan to Iraq, the illusion of power is even more striking. Countering guerrilla warfare, insurgency, urban warfare, civil rebellion or even a war against gang lords has not proven easy for any state. Power is a necessary instrument for defence. But there is something surreal about the hubris of states that, time and again, get misled by metrics of power. If there is one lesson that all great powers need to draw, it is this: How elusive notions of power can feel when confronted with seemingly weaker enemies.
The only definition of a superpower in the contemporary world is not that it is a power that can achieve its objectives by force. It is that it can, to a certain degree, absorb the costs of failure, as the United States has, and Russia has been unable to. Russia may eventually terrorise and bomb Ukraine into submission. It has not been clear from the start what Putin’s eventual political objective was. Even the Russians themselves are admitting to high casualties. Russia finds itself in a Ukraine with a fourth of its population displaced, cities devastated, its adversaries to the West more united, its economy deeply hurt. After this, any agreement may be a face saver, but hardly a victory.
The rest of the world, meanwhile, is smelling an opportunity and a space for new equations seems to open up. India and China are a case in point. India and China’s equivocation on Ukraine is appalling. Taking a stand against Western hypocrisy, and looking out for one’s interests are worthy causes. But if the stand against Western hypocrisy, say, in Iraq and Afghanistan, is itself not to be even more hypocritical, then a clear-cut condemnation of Russia is warranted. No one is against countries looking after their own interests, and it would be imprudent to merely brandish principles. But here is the core point for both India and China.
What kind of world order do they want to build, which also serves their self-interest? “Exposing Western hypocrisy” is a trope that the West’s own actions have invited. But it is not a serious answer to the question of the kind of world we want to build. Nor is the argument that both India and China are giving — that condemnation serves no purpose and they are using less public channels to get their message across to Russia. There is absolutely no evidence that that message is meant to put serious pressure on Russia, while there is a lot of evidence that Russia seeks to exploit the schism between the rest and West for its own advantage.
The India-China dyad is interesting at the moment. Speculation about a visit to India by Wang Yi has heightened expectations. Is there an unintended silver lining here? India’s actions on Russia might just convince China that all talk of India being in the American camp was always premature. This is not a bad reputation to have in this context. China will, for the moment, try and secure some détente with India in the face of recent tensions. A détente with India will also be a trophy against US claims of more global support. How credible this opportunity is and how much India can trust Xi remains to be seen.
But the crucial question in relation to the Ukraine crisis is this. China has been equivocal in its public statements on how much it will support Russia; it recognises the potential liability of Putin, but the prospect of a pro-Chinese regime in Russia (all the better if weaker) and a weakening of America is very tempting. Could India and China, the two important states with stakes in Russia, get across a unified message to Russia? Or will they both cynically fish in troubled waters, not contributing to pressure on Russia or making the world safer?
So an America understandably losing capital outside the West because of its hypocrisy, a Europe still speaking in forked tongues, a Russia that would rather see the world and its own citizens suffer, and India and China using western hypocrisy as a cover for displaying an outright cynicism is not a good portent for a world order. Putin may not yet survive his blunder. Ukraine will almost certainly pay an impossibly high price for Putin’s hubris. But the self-serving stances of all the great powers make it more likely that the world will be marked by more miscalculations, conflict and hubris, rather than a dampening of conflict and more cooperation.
This column first appeared in the print edition on March 23, 2022 under the title ‘The New World Disorder’. The writer is contributing editor, The Indian Express
