On 25 February, Nigerians went to the polls in highly anticipated presidential and National Assembly elections that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) kept on schedule despite a volatile and challenging environment. Fundamental freedoms of assembly and movement were largely respected, yet the full enjoyment of the latter was impeded by insufficient planning, insecurity and the prevailing Naira and fuel shortages. Abuse of incumbency by various political office holders distorted the playing field and there were widespread allegations of vote buying. Media provided an extensive coverage of the three leading campaigns, while disinformation interfered with voters’ right to make an informed choice on election day. The EU EOM is continuing its observation of the ongoing collation and tabulation of results throughout the country.
INEC’s operational capacity was hampered by the ongoing fuel and Naira shortage. Insecurity prevented it from accessing some Local Government Areas (LGAs), notably in the South. Attacks on INEC premises, including just days before polling, hindered preparations in affected areas, while instilling fear in voters.
Overall, stakeholders had expressed confidence in INEC’s independence, professionalism, and voter information efforts, but this decreased ahead of elections. INEC lacked efficient planning and transparency during critical stages of the electoral process, while on election day trust in INEC was seen to further reduce due to delayed polling processes and information gaps related to much anticipated access to results on its Results Viewing Portal (IReV).
In the lead-up to elections, the widely welcomed Electoral Act 2022 introduced measures aimed at building stakeholder trust, however leaving some important gaps in terms of accountability and INEC’s power to enforce the law. Weak points include a lack of INEC empowerment to enforce sanctions for electoral offences and breaches of campaign finance rules. Positively, INEC benefited from more timely financing than for previous contests. Other new provisions also aimed to enhance transparency of results.
The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the IReV for the 2023 elections was perceived as an important step to ensure the integrity and credibility of elections. However, delayed training of technical personnel, an inadequate mock testing exercise, and a lack of public information on the election technologies diminished expectations and left room for speculation and uncertainty.
During the early stages of collation, presidential result forms from polling units were not displayed on the IReV, while Senate and House of Representative results were slowly published. Presidential election result forms started to be uploaded after 10 pm on election day, raising concerns and reaching only 20 per cent by noon on 26 February. Later the same evening, INEC explained the delay with “technical hitches.”
Among 93.4 million registered voters, 9.5 million additional voters were registered ahead of the 2023 polls, of whom two-thirds were youth following mobilisation efforts during the registration period. Yet, the collection of permanent voter cards (PVC), a requirement to vote, was negatively affected by poor institutional planning. Two days before elections, INEC stated that 93.3 per cent of PVCs were collected.
Without an independent audit of the voter register, quality and inclusiveness could not be assured.
Following contentious candidate registration processes there were18 contestants for the presidential office and over 4200 for 461 national assembly seats. They were selected in party primaries that reportedly lacked transparency and inclusiveness, marked by very chronically low levels of participation of women and youth. This compounded an overall stark lack of legal measures for inclusion and barriers to participation which do not align with international standards.
The conduct of contesting parties and candidates, as well as some gaps in the law, led to a spate of pre-election court cases, with some matters not finalised ahead of elections. During the pre-election period, EU EOM interlocutors criticised various court rulings for being too technical, some leading to belated primary re-runs, others to substitutions of perceived legitimate candidates, thereby eroding public trust, exposing intra-party conflicts, and contributing to a volatile campaign environment.
The campaign was highly competitive, and contestants conducted rallies nationwide, but the Naira cash and fuel scarcity reduced activities and attendance. Political parties denounced unequal campaign conditions due to interference of opponent governors. Reports of vote and PVC buying were also frequent.Internal party conflicts weakened the presidential campaigns of PDP and APC with personal accusation obscuring issue-based messages shortly before the elections. There was a lack of prosecution of electoral offences and a significant increase in violent incidents closer to elections, including attacks on candidates, reportedly, aimed to disturb the elections and suppress voter participation, particularly in the South-East.
Media offered an extensive campaign coverage, despite economic hardships, institutional pressures, and electoral violence. Prime-time newscasts focused on the Naira swap, and APC and PDP animosities, granting both parties equitable exposure, although mostly negative in tone. Politicians used polarising rhetoric on air and conspiracy theories, originating online, were frequently discussed in the most popular talk shows. Analytical reporting on party policies was scant. Lead contestants could not be compared directly, as APC and PDP rebuffed presidential debates, undermining voters’ right to an informed choice.
Social media was actively used by political actors as a campaign tool. However, the platforms were misused to spread harmful content, including disinformation on key electoral processes; the measures the platforms took to protect electoral integrity were insufficient. Misleading information also came from political actors and contributed to a blurred information environment for voters.
Online and offline media joined forces with civil society and fact checkers to safeguard the integrity of the pre-election information environment. Real-time fact checking of gubernatorial and other contestants’ debates strived to hold candidates accountable, while various formats of voter information, raised voter awareness and helped to counter electoral insecurity, complementing INEC efforts.
Civil society organisations observed and scrutinised different aspects of the election, issued several pre-election reports, at times probing INEC’s operational preparedness, offering voters a non-partisan assessment of election preparations. Over 144,800 citizen observers monitored election day proceedings.
BACKGROUND
This is the seventh general election since the restoration of democracy in 1999 and the second transition
of power after a completed second term. The outgoing President Muhammadu Buhari committed to
credible elections and a smooth handover of administration establishing a transitional council ahead of the
polls. Buhari’s term ends on 29 May.
On 25 February, Nigeria voted its president, vice-president and the two chambers of the National
Assembly. The National Assembly elections, comprising 109 Senate and 360 House of Representatives
seats, were held on a first-past-the-post basis. The presidential national constituency election used a
modified first-past-the-post system, decided based on whoever wins the overall highest number of votes
and obtains a minimum 25 per cent of votes in at least two-thirds of all states plus the Federal Capital
Territory (FCT). If no candidate passes this threshold, then a second round follows within 21 days, between
the candidate with highest overall first round vote and the candidate with a majority of votes in the highest
number of states.
Unlike the two-way races in previous elections, there were three leading presidential candidates, in a field
of 18, in close competition. These were Bola Tinubu of the incumbent All Progressives Party (APC),
former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar of the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and Peter Obi
of the Labour Party. A fourth contender, particularly strong in Kano State, was Rabiu Kwankwaso of the
New Nigeria Peoples Party.
The lead-up to the elections was marked by intra-party conflicts, negatively impacting the electoral
environment with narratives, particularly by prominent APC members, about plots to manipulate the vote
or sabotage the elections. Several PDP party members and candidates were expelled shortly before polling
day for alleged anti-party activities. There was widespread non-compliance by candidates and parties with
their own party rules, contributing to the influence of money in politics and social disillusionment.
The elections took place in a complex security situation with insurgencies in the North-East zone, banditry
and terrorism in the North-West, ongoing farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt, secession agitations
in the South-East, and increased cases of political abductions and killings across the southern parts of the
country. In addition, the economic crisis exacerbated by a Naira cash and fuel scarcity made for an
extremely challenging election environment.
The Naira swap policy implemented amid the campaign with
the stated purpose, among others, to tackle the illicit influx of money into the campaign, precipitated acute
economic hardship leading to protests, social unrest and increased political tensions and added to insecurity and uncertainty. The Supreme Court became entangled in a high-profile state-led challenge to the federal
government Naira re-design policy, raising heated debate about the court’s jurisdiction and independence.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
The recently revised electoral legal framework lays an adequate foundation for conducting democratic
elections. Nigeria has subscribed to the main international and regional standards for democratic elections.
However, most such instruments have not been fully embedded in domestic law. Important legal gaps
persist regarding commitments on equality of the vote and the conduct of political parties and candidates.
Reforms are also direly needed to guarantee full inclusion, transparency, and legal stability.
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution (as amended) positively enshrines basic rights on political participation
including freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and the right to a legal remedy. It also anchors
the electoral system, INEC oversight, candidate eligibility, registration, dispute resolution and the timing
of polls. However, some key timelines, such as scheduling for various elections and results challenges, are
unduly tight and overlapping, thus leaving INEC logistical arrangements vulnerable to court processes.
Positively, the new Electoral Act 2022 includes trust-building measures, notably by extending timeframes
for election planning and introducing public access to key election day results data. However, the law and
regulations were not always easily accessible, nor through INEC’s website. Procedures for adopting INEC
regulations are not clearly set out in the law. Key regulations issued late, leaving space for uncertain
implementation such as in the 2022 political party primary conventions and campaign finances.
Uncertainties also flow from re-scheduling of polls following a candidate’s death and problematic rules
for re-scheduling elections if polling is postponed due to insecurity, overvoting, or technology failures.
Electoral disputes are handled mainly by courts, with ad hoc election tribunals established for results
challenges. The courts are broadly accessible for addressing pre- and post-election disputes, including
rights of appeal. Courts decisions are frequently reported in the media but access to decisions is challenging
as judgments are not always publicly available. Most electoral offences are also handled by the lower
courts, but enforcement is weak partly due to gaps in law. An INEC backed draft law to address electoral
offences has yet to be adopted by the National Assembly.
The 25 February general elections involved 470 constituencies, most suffering an enduring inequality of
the vote due to outdated constituency delimitations, as the last census data is from 2006. INEC’s
constitutional mandate to review delimitations at intervals of not less than 10 years requires approval of
the National Assembly, adding political and practical constraints. Stakeholders doubted a census planned
for 2023 will happen, further delaying the overdue constituency delimitation.
ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION
Prior to elections, stakeholders expressed confidence in INEC’s independence, professionalism, and voter
information efforts, but this deteriorated as election day approached notably in Kano and Lagos. On
election night, trust in the institution was seen to diminish due to information gaps and INEC’s failure to
promptly respond to stakeholder disquiet over logistical and security lapses and later the failure of public
access to presidential results on the IReV. INEC’s communication approach was characterised mostly by
delivery of general information through stakeholder consultations and press conferences frequently lacking
detail.
Public information about key electoral procedures and precise data was not readily available,
including the safeguards for the integrity and reliability of the BVAS, the process of collecting PVCs, voter
registration updates, and the rationale of court orders changing candidate lists. Publication of such
information would have notably enhanced the transparency and certainty of the process.
dINEC faced a hostile environment for election organisation on several fronts. Notably, its staff and offices
were subjected to violent attacks in several parts of the country, at times impeding its operations. Since the
28 February 2022 notice of elections, 16 attacks on INEC facilities and staff have been recorded, mostly
in the South-East including in the last weeks before the elections.
A timely budget disbursement was foreseen in the 2022 electoral law reforms, enabling deployment of new
technologies for voter registration, verification of voters, and transmission of results. Also, INEC
substantially increased the number of polling units countrywide. Nonetheless, important challenges
emerged including shortages of fuel and Naira affecting the smooth transport of materials and deployment
of some 1,000,000 ad-hoc staff. Yet, INEC repeatedly assured that it had the necessary resources.
Financial limitations were apparent prior to election day as EU EOM observers reported a shortage of training
materials, limited capacity to grant accreditations, and inadequate monitoring of the campaign. On election
day, these resulted in delayed dispatch of materials, lack of staff, late openings, and unsuitable premises.
Inadequate planning impacted several schedules, notably the voter registration exercise and the production
and distribution of PVCs. While there were several options for some 6.7 million voters to locate their
polling units, but there was a lack of timely information.
There was also delayed and deficient training of poll workers resulting in poor staff performance on election day, lack of timely information to voters on their reallocated polling units causing confusion election day, and the inadequate operation of new technological solutions for voting and results. Also, little effort was devoted to responding to recurrent problems, such as vote buying, which goes hand-in-hand with illegal campaign financing.
INEC collaborated on voter education with civil society, state agencies, media outlets and influencers to
spread its messages, for example, regarding the functioning of the BVAS and IReV, electoral offences,
and voting procedures. Despite such efforts, there was widespread public confusion and misinformation as
to the differences between manual collation of results and real-time transmission of the results forms for
public scrutiny.
VOTER REGISTRATION
There was a total of 93,469,008 eligible registered voters, an increase of 9.5 million compared to 2019,
among whom 76.6 percent are youth aged 18 to 34, and 50.82 per cent are female. Voter registration ran
from June 2021 and ended July 2022, although the law foresees a continuous process up to 90 days before
elections. As Nigerian citizens must attain 18 years at the time of registration, any eligible person turning
18 from the cut-off date was effectively disenfranchised.
INEC improvements to voter registration included online applications, though physical attendance was
required twice subsequently for capturing biometric data and PVC collection. Subsequently, more than 2.8
million double/multiple, underage, and fake registrations were removed. While this was a positive
development, it also exposed controversial disparities in the figures from the states in the north and in the
south. Overall, despite INEC efforts, the clean-up process reportedly lacked transparency.
The voter register included a considerable number of deceased voters and emigrated people, as well as
migrated but not transferred voters, due to the absence of systematic recording of birth, death, and
migration. It is widely acknowledged that there are underage persons registered. There has never been an
audit of the voters register. While not mandated by law, such an exercise could enable assessing the
accuracy of the register, including the biometric data and inclusiveness. Political parties received the
electronic copy for the voter register on the 11 January.
By law, only voters who present a PVC can vote. Collection started on 6 January and ended on 5 February
after INEC twice extended the deadline. Of the 93 million registered voters, some 87 million collected
their voter card, 93.3 per cent of the total. INEC did not disclose how many of the 9.5 million newly EU Election Observation Mission registered collected their card. Data was also not broken down to polling unit level. EU EOM observers noted that, at times, PVC collection was negatively affected by poor logistics, incorrect designated
collection offices, and excessively long queues at understaffed collection points. There were also reports
of proxy collection and PVC buying.
ELECTION TECHNOLOGY
Public enthusiasm for the 2023 election was strengthened by the introduction by INEC, for the first time in a
general election, of new technology for voter verification and electronic transmission of results forms. BVAS
was used for biometric facial and fingerprint voter verification and for scanning and uploading the forms. INEC
used the IReV portal for publication of results to enhance transparency and trust and to minimise malpractices.
Hardware and software specifications of BVAS, test results, audits, basic procurement details, protocols
and guidelines for specific operations and functionality were not made public. Functionality and specifics
of the transmission of the results forms were also unclear, without details publicly available, apart from
information found in late published manuals, lessening transparency, trust, and certainty.
INEC missed the opportunity to substantively test operational issues connected with its technology before
election day. On 4 February, it conducted an inadequate mock exercise in 436 polling stations testing the
functionality of the BVAS. EU EOM observers and other stakeholders noted that the timing of the mock,
the small size of the sample, low voter participation, and missing guidelines diminished the practical value
of the exercise, while exposing some technical problems with biometric recognition and transmission of
results. Further, the mock was run only by INEC professional staff and not by election day poll workers.
There was delayed recruitment and training of key technical support staff as well as of polling staff
handling BVAS. On election day, a BVAS offline option to upload results forms, in case of weak internet
connection, was largely unused, which contributed to issues with the transmission of the results forms. EU
EOM observers noted that the number of accredited voters was not always sent from BVAS regularly after
the closing. Further, scans of presidential elections results forms were often impossible to upload, unlike
House of Representatives and Senate at least partly.
Delays and frictions in the IReV portal prevented smooth access to view the scans. Assurances from INEC
that system was adequately prepared and tested were undermined by the systems’ performance, thus
contributing to diminishing public trust and confidence in results processing.
REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES
The right to stand is unduly restricted, with candidacy based solely on mandatory political party
membership contrary to international and regional commitments. There were over 4200 contestants for the
presidential office and 461 national assembly seats. Candidates emerged through the 2022 party primary
elections, required by law to be monitored by INEC. Primaries were marred by an uncertain regulatory
environment and allegations of vote buying among delegates, leading to high-visibility monitoring by a
specialised investigation and prosecution service, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC), at some conventions, but with scant information on any follow up prosecutions. There was also
widespread non-compliance by candidates and parties with their own party rules. A high number of court
battles ensued over who to register as the official candidate with INEC.
Only one woman candidate contested the presidential race. Youth also were largely underrepresented as
candidates, while persons with disability were almost entirely absent.
CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT
The five-month long election campaign took place in a competitive and highly charged political
environment. The three key presidential candidates conducted rallies in almost all 36 states and the Federal
Capital Territory. Overall, the contestants were able to campaign with freedoms of movement and
expression broadly respected. However, political parties complained of unequal access to public venues,
billboards and other forms of outdoor advertising, due to state governments of opposing parties restricting
access. EU EOM observers recorded denials of access to opposition candidates to state-owned stadiums
and school premises, selectively imposed excessive venue fees, as well as systematic destruction of
campaign materials across the country. EU EOM observers also noted a particularly constrained campaign
environment in Rivers State with the governor imposing campaign rules that were more restrictive than
INEC regulations. The Electoral Act prohibits the use of state apparatus to the advantage or disadvantage
of any political party or candidate.
The Naira cash and fuel scarcity negatively impacted the campaign environment. Related protests and
social unrest, mostly in South-West and South-South, intensified shortly before the elections adding to
insecurity. At least nine people were killed and many injured in clashes between police and protesters. The
APC suspended campaign activities in Lagos, Oyo, and Ondo, citing the cash and fuel crisis. Yet, EU
observers reported continued campaigning in all states, albeit with a significant decrease in the number of
rallies and attendance. All leading parties were able to conduct their final large-scale rallies.
Intra-party conflicts within PDP and APC and realignment processes across all parties resulted in
defections and statements of dissolved party structures, especially in the Labour Party (LP), making
headlines shortly before the elections. Both APC and PDP campaigns, including online, used abusive
language at rallies, with mutual personal accusations perceived in the Nigerian context as a form of hate
speech, while widespread political conspiracy theories eclipsed issue-based campaigning. The Labour
presidential campaign relied more on its strong support among social media users, particularly youth, and
dominated the campaign online.
Interlocutors and observers indicated involvement of religious institutions in the campaign and reference
to ethnicity at rallies. In violation of the law, campaigns took place in places of worship, as exposed by
media and on social networks. Some Christian and Muslim clerics canvassed for candidates based on their
faith, which is an offence.
A National Peace Accord was signed by the presidential candidates under the auspices of the National
Peace Committee (NPC) on 29 September 2022. However, the NPC and EU EOM observers reported lack
of adherence to the pledge, and mainly because of widespread impunity. There were reports of campaign
violence related to inter party clashes and attacks, including at large-scale presidential rallies. Assassination
attempts and attacks on campaign offices and candidates contributed to a particularly volatile campaign
environment in Imo, Rivers, Enugu, Ebonyi, Osun and Cross River states. On 23 February, coordinated
violent attacks against all three leading parties reportedly took place in Enugu East senatorial district
resulting in seven people killed, including the LP senatorial candidate. Subsequently, INEC postponed
elections in the district to 11 March. EU EOM observers witnessed attacks on rallies by organised gangs,
reportedly hired by parties, and confirmed that vigilantes were deployed as security in the campaign. The
deployment of vigilante groups, reportedly also used to intimidate political opponents, was successfully
opposed in court by some opposition parties. Based on observers and media reports, at least 68 people were
killed in election-related violence since the official start of the campaign on 28 September. On 22 February,
a further peace agreement was signed and aimed at the post-election environment.
The rules on campaign spending are reasonable in scope, but institutional weaknesses, underpinned by
inadequate resources and gaps in the law, led to mixed levels of financial accountability by political actors
and third parties. EU EOM observers noted that INEC endeavoured to monitor campaign spending with
modest human resources. INEC also teamed up with other state bodies to tackle illicit money in the
campaign. Days ahead of elections the EFCC reportedly seized some 32 million Naira in funds seemingly
intended for vote buying. On election day, teams of officers of the EFCC also visited polling units in efforts
to deter corruption and made arrests in at least three states.
EU EOM observers noted widespread allegations and accusations of corrupt practices, including vote
buying and buying of PVCs. The currency shortage also fed allegations of attempts to financially suffocate
political campaigns and of illegal hoarding of currency, the latter confirmed in media reports of the arrest
of banking officials. Meanwhile, official spending by political parties in traditional media and online was
scant. In the broadcast media, it was attributed to a positive new requirement for outlets to record and
report all revenues from political advertising as well as mandatory pre-approval of all campaign ads by the
advertising regulator. Some 84 per cent of all political ads on TV and radio were for APC and PDP, who
also were the main spenders on social media. According to Meta Ad Library, during the campaign only
about NGN 13,500,000 (EUR 27,000) was spent on political ads by contestants or third parties.
MEDIA
Media offered an extensive coverage of the campaign, despite economic hardship, institutional pressures,
and electoral violence. However, with stories about the Naira swap, and APC and PDP mutual and
intraparty mudslinging dominating the newscasts, little space was left for scrutiny of contestants’ policies.
Alarming and divisive conspiracy theories, circulating online, shaped political discussions on TV and
radio, and distorted the information environment to the detriment of voters. Positively, many outlets
engaged in fact-checking, promoted voter information, and probed INEC’s election preparations.
Media freedom continued to be constrained by systemic drawbacks. Those include federal government and
governor interference and pressure on news outlets, symbiotic relationships between politicians and some
media houses, as well as unpunished harassment of and threats to journalists. Over the last eight months,
at least 17 journalists who made critical comments on politically sensitive topics offline or online, were
detained or questioned by police for inciting disturbance, for defamation or for similar, vaguely defined
offenses, which do not conform to Nigeria’s regional and international commitments.
With a few exceptions, broadcast media, as monitored by the EU EOM, equitably divided news coverage
between the APC and PDP. Meaningful visibility was given also to LP and NNPP. The overall tone was
negative for the two lead parties, as up to 70 per cent of political news stories were built on direct quotes
of APC and PDP officials who derided each other. Talk shows on TV and radio focused on hardships or
political animosities, with contestants shunning questions on their policies. While lively, such coverage
did not stimulate an issue-based debate and, coupled with confusing and malign content that migrated
across all media platforms, reduced voters’ informed participation in the elections. Voters could not
compare lead presidential candidates directly, as APC and PDP rebuffed public debate offered by media.
President Buhari was given a positive coverage within the news across all media monitored, primarily
praising his legacy through newly inaugurated infrastructure projects, but rarely alluding to his
endorsement of Tinubu. The share of news about the president was 35 per cent on state-run NTA, around
20 per cent on all monitored radio stations and about 12 per cent on private TVs.
While no actions were taken against APC and PDP candidates who used inflammatory language during
rallies, National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) disproportionately penalised two national TV stations
who quoted those party officials in their broadcasts. NBC’s sanction did not allow for a due process, unduly
impeded media freedom and fostered self-censorship at editorial level. EU EOM observers reported
journalists abstain from critical reporting, fearing retribution from the governor in at least 20 states.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS
There was a rapid migration of information between all social media platforms, as well as the dominant
messaging app WhatsApp, all of which political camps actively used to spread their messages. However,
the vibrant online environment has not translated into a greater voter awareness; the EU EOM found that
only one in ten posts by key contestants were related to their electoral programme. In addition, influential
members of lead parties regularly spread unverified or even false information targeting the opponents,
while critical reporting was at times also referred to as ‘fake news’ by some political actors. This worsened
an already opaque information environment, marred by a plethora of misleading content.
Harmful content, reportedly produced by political camps as well as various individuals to gain financial or
other benefits, targeted actors across the political spectrum, sometimes including INEC or the mainstream
media. False narratives constructed based on ethnic or religious sentiments were effectively conveyed
using simple images/videos. Overall, dangerous ethnic-based language, perceived as a form of hate speech
in the Nigerian context, appeared in comments sections on various platforms. Few female candidates
actively campaigned on social media, in part due to fear of widespread, gender-based online harassment.
Social media platforms put in place some measures to prevent abuse, including flagging frequently
forwarded content (WhatsApp) or giving selected state authorities and some fact-checking organisations
access to report content for faster verification (TikTok and Meta). However, the level of capacity devoted
to verification of malicious content appeared insufficient, while notably Twitter’s engagement on
information integrity has been negligible. The Nigerian FactCheckers coalition, 12 separate civil society
and media organisations, tackled the large amount of false on-line content and contributed to raising
awareness of the dangers of disinformation.
In recent years, the Nigerian authorities put forward several legislative initiatives with the potential to curb
internet freedom, but these have not been enacted and the online environment is still largely unregulated,
although some state agencies have stronger powers with implications for the online environment. On the
other hand, freedom of expression in the media and on the internet is restricted by vague legal provisions,
such as “cyberstalking” in the 2015 Cybercrime Act, with penalties of up to three years in prison, and
disclosure of “classified matters” included in the Official Secrets Act. This promotes self-censorship or
pushes authors of articles critical of those in power to publish anonymously under a hidden identity online.
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND OTHER MARGINALISED GROUPS
Political inclusion and participation among marginalised groups remain a significant challenge although
INEC made some positives effort, notably for persons with disabilities. Other legal restrictions impair
participation of marginalised groups and contrary to international commitments. For example, the right to
stand depends on mandatory political party membership and minimum educational qualifications.
Women accounted for less than 10 per cent of candidates, a continuing decline since 2010, underscoring a
lack of affirmative action at odds with the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women and constitutional guarantees for equality. The defeat of proposed laws for inclusion in
2022 marked another setback for women’s political rights. Ahead of these elections, at least two women
candidates, including one for governor, faced unsuccessful efforts by their parties to exclude them.
Incentives for women to contest party primaries free of charge were not followed by genuine supports, as
those availing of such opportunities often faced criticism from their own party for not contributing to party
funds. Impediments from abuse and intimidation, including on-line, are widely reported. EU EOM
observers also noted that women candidates face significant challenges campaigning due to financial
constraints and social resistance. INEC states that over 60 per cent of its staff are women, however key
decision-making posts are overwhelmingly occupied by men. Among 36 RECs only three are women.
The courts have in recent years vindicated the right to vote of persons in detention, but this has not been
acted upon. INEC took positive steps to improve outreach and voter education as well as enhancing
facilities for voting for persons with disability.
INEC has a legal duty to ensure, as far as possible, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are not
disenfranchised. There is a lack of reliable data on IDPs, though estimates vary from 1.1 to 3 million IDPs,
many dispersed in the population. INEC issued a brief framework document for voting by IDPs, though it
lacked detail for assuring effective implementation. Ahead of elections, a lack of planning was evidenced
in reports of non-distribution of PVCs to large numbers of IDPs, notable in Benue state. Additionally, EU
EOM Observers reported inconsistent procedures for polling units and voter awareness for IDPs.
CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION
A high number of civil society organisations observed different aspects of the election and issued several
pre-election reports contributing to awareness. CODE deployed some 7,000 accredited observers, Yiaga
some 4,000, and the Situation Room and the CDD approximately 5,000. Yiaga is conducting a parallel
vote tabulation for the presidential election. The CLEEN Foundation monitored the role of the security
services in elections. Kimpact plans to conduct a specific post-election observation of election petition
tribunals. Election day observation was also conducted by various religious entities. International observer
groups included ECOWAS, the African Union, the Commonwealth, and NDI/IRI.
VOTING, COUNTING AND TABULATION
The EU EOM observers assessed that the atmosphere during the voting was overall peaceful. There was
late opening in almost all polling units observed, mainly due to delayed arrival of sensitive materials and
polling staff. Most opened within two hours of the designated time. In several locations, particularly in the
South-South and South-East, voting started as late as five hours after scheduled opening or not at all.
Positively, EU EOM observers noted that voters queuing after 2.30 pm were allowed to vote.
Generally, voting went smoothly in most locations observed. Both PDP and APC were well represented,
while, the LP had up to half as many agents present. Voters, who were reassigned to a new polling unit,
had difficulties in identifying correct polling unit. In 100 of 240 observed polling units, the layout did not
sufficiently protect secrecy of the vote; in more than half the voters did not mark the ballot in secrecy.
BVAS was not functioning properly in 25 of 240 polling units observed. Observers reported that facial as
opposed to fingerprint recognition was mostly used, similarly to the mock exercise. EU EOM observers
reported that key polling procedures were not always followed. In 32 of observed polling units, the voter
register was not always ticked. Observers reported underage voting in Sokoto and Kano.
The EU EOM observed that counting was undertaken in full public view. However, the overall conduct
was negatively assessed by observers in 9 of 37 observations. It evidenced poor attention to procedures for
completion of forms and for packing and sealing of sensitive materials. In 16 of 37 observed polling units,
staff had difficulties understanding and completing results forms. The figures in the results forms did not
reconcile in 9 out of 37 of observations. In 24 out of 37 units, the results were not posted publicly and in
22 of 37 units, the form was not uploaded using BVAS.
Both, security agencies and media recorded violent attacks on polling units, and harassment of voters in at
least 16 states, with Lagos, Kano, Rivers, and Imo reportedly being most affected. INEC cancelled elections
in seven polling units in Kogi and suspended voting in 141 units in Bayelsa, while audio-visual materials
in media and online indicated a much larger scale of no voting or disruptions due to security problems and
extremely late dispatch of election materials. On 26 February, voting continued in some polling units in at
least six states. INEC did not provide comprehensive information on how many polling units had no or
delayed voting, nor did it offer a clear solution on how to ensure the right to vote nation-wide.
On elections night, EU EOM observers witnessed chaotic, disorganised, and tense conditions at generally
overcrowded collation centres. In many instances collation officers were not on the site as polling staff
arrived, many with incomplete forms, non-transmitted data, and sensitive material not properly packed.
Many collations centres at ward level were not opened at all, particularly in the South-South and South-
East where presiding officers were sent directly to the LGA collation centres. The EU EOM is continuing
its observation, while noting improvements in the organisation of the collation.
While the collation was ongoing, the presidential result forms from polling units were not on the IReV
portal, though Senate and House of Representative results were slowly published. Presidential election
result forms only started to be uploaded after 10 pm on election day raising concerns, with the total number
of forms reaching only 20 per cent by noon 26 February and several were illegible. Only later the same
evening, INEC explained the delay with “technical hitches.”
ELECTORAL DISPUTES
The Courts face significant financial resource challenges as well as numerous vacant judicial offices, while
being overburdened by high volumes of election related cases. Before election day, some court decisions
were made at the expense of electoral justice leading EU EOM interlocutors to criticise various rulings as
too technical, some entailing belated primary re-runs or substitutions of perceived legitimate candidates.
Such cases exposed the judiciary to allegations of political interference and poor decision-making eroding
public trust.
By 23 February, there were at least 1250 pre-election cases, among them at least 600 in the Court of Appeal
and at least 80 appealed to the Supreme Court, underlining a highly litigious electoral environment. Most
cases involved aspirants and political parties disputing aspects of the 2022 primary processes. Court orders
led to the inclusion to the candidate lists of at least 30 Senate and 22 House of Representative candidates.
Many groundless and vexatious actions were also initiated by aspirants.
Positively, recent legal reforms moved original jurisdiction on pre-election cases from the state to Federal
High Courts (FHC) in efforts to curtail conflicting decision-making. However, as cases kept emerging,
appeals stacked up in the higher courts close to elections and not all such matters could be completed ahead
of polls, thus leaving ongoing uncertainty for multiple candidates.
