Coup plotters led by the head of presidential guards, Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, held to power after ousting democratically-elected president Mohamed Bazoum, leading the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to impose heavier financial sanctions on the Niger junta and entities supporting them, and ordering its armed forces to prepare for military action.
The development follows the failure of a diplomatic mission involving the African Union, ECOWAS, the United Nations and the United States to resolve the political impasse in Niger. But Nigerian human rights lawyer, Femi Falana, has said that ECOWAS needs the United Nations’ authorisation before intervening in restoring democratic rule in the military-held Niger Republic.
In the Sahelian region, the recent coup in the Niger Republic has triggered swift disapproval from both Nigeria and ECOWAS, and there is a fear that if overlooked, it could lead to a growing trend of coups in the region. This move aligns with ECOWAS’ past involvement in member states facing political instability.
Notably, in 2012, the community’s troops played a pivotal role in restoring President Alassane Ouattara to authority in Côte d’Ivoire after his removal by former President Laurent Gbagbo. Similarly, in 2017, the union’s forces contributed to resolving Gambia’s political crisis when President Yahya Jammeh resisted relinquishing power after an electoral defeat.
The Niger junta leaders’ rationale for addressing security challenges contrasts starkly with the convictions of Nigeria and ECOWAS, who view the coup as a disregard for the populace’s will and a catalyst for escalated security apprehensions within the region.
ECOWAS boxed itself into a tight corner when its messaging was predominantly saturated by threats of using force to reverse the status quo. It simply incentivised the coup leaders to dig into their positions, turn the message on its head and establish a domestic legitimacy they did not have in the first 24 hours of the coup.
Even at that, any military action by ECOWAS had a tiny window of success; the more the saga dragged on, the more advantage General Tchiani’s government got. ECOWAS slammed sanctions to ensure maximum pressure to gain quick concessions, but these have not yielded the expected outcomes. The ECOWAS’ no-fly zone has hardly been respected, although commercial flights have been affected. Sanctions are meant to deter and reverse bad behaviour, but the risk is that they can go south and harden the target’s resolve, turning a situation into a victim with the David-vs-Goliath scenario that ordinary people can latch onto.
At worst, alternatives can be created, and in Nigeria’s case, the foundation for such exists. The long-existing agreement between Niger and Nigeria, as regards the free flow of the Niger River into Nigeria, is at risk. Under the agreement, Niger would not construct any dam, and in turn, Nigeria would export electricity at a lower cost to Niger. Last week, in a bid to squeeze the junta, Nigeria cut off electricity supplies to Niger. This is potentially counterproductive.
As of 2021, Niger’s government under Mr Bazoum had flouted the deal by building the Kandadji Ecosystems Regeneration and Niger Valley Development Programme, also known as Kandadji Dam, funded by international partners including the World Bank, Africa Development Bank and the French Development Agency. On paper, the new junta could accelerate the development of the dam to reduce dependence on and punish Nigeria in return.
Though that is not practical now, since its major funders have collaborated to suspend aid and cooperation, it creates an opportunity for other funders from China or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to step in. That may also not go well if the US leans in on both. Given how the junta leaders have been impervious to diplomacy, a change of track is perhaps needed. In international negotiations, zero-sum outcomes lead to more problems.
Peace, sometimes, involves making deals with the devil, even if you have to use a long spoon. Currently, the international community’s emphasis has been on reinstating Bazoum, which, to the coup leaders, is a fundamental red line. This is a problem that creates an opportunity: the coup leaders have burnt the bridge with ECOWAS and the AU. The latter two have to think smart. At this point, the junta is more likely to talk to the Kremlin, whose approval they seek.
It may make sense for the Kremlin to mediate in the standoff by offering Bazoum a safe exit while elections are immediately held. The military leadership could also be offered immunity from recriminations while Hausa’s dominance over the military and the presidential guard is maintained. In return, Wagner forces can stay off Niger while select conventional Russian businesses have sanctions lifted by the US and its allies.
One such could be Sberbank, a state-owned bank sanctioned by the US Department of Treasury in 2022. This is better than a military confrontation that could leave everyone involved indefinitely worse off. However, for ECOWAS, that military option appears more realistic than talks. The meeting of heads of state in Abuja, yesterday, which authorised the chiefs of defence staff to deploy “a standby force” raises the spectre of war a little higher.
In the earliest sign that this looming intervention will not be like what the subregion has seen before, the military coalition to be deployed is called a “standby force,” a departure from the previous operations in which such deployments are named “ECOWAS Monitoring Group.” This time, however, the circumstances are different, and so is the name.
For an ECOWAS breathing down a direct military intervention with sovereign forces of a country twice the size of the countries it has deployed to in the past, the stakes become immensely higher, and the reality of a stalemate at the end of the first month might turn out even more devastating than a loss. The other way to look at Thursday’s event is via the lens of brinkmanship — with ECOWAS tightening the noose around Niger and raising the threshold for military intervention, the coup plotters may be more amenable to the diplomacy that ex-Kano Emir Sanusi Lamido Sanusi brings to Niamey.
This stands out because the date for the deployment of the standby force is not exactly given, and as a result, there is still room for diplomacy. A step back from the precipice can only be guaranteed if back channels come through. For now, for a region grappling with a security situation that has seen Islamic State affiliates appoint a new, reinvigorated caliph in the Sahel, the combatants will not only be walking into a slaughter by their own weapons, but every other person will bear the brunt.
In whichever way a military intervention ends, there will be only one clear winner in the short to medium term: the hundreds of armed groups who would be handed territories on a platter. But should the West African union’s intervention prove successful in Niger, there can be a reinstatement of constitutional norms, the liberation of President Bazoum from detention, the apprehension and legal action against the coup instigators and the fortification of democratic principles within Niger.
Copyright © 2023 SB Morgen Intelligence, All rights reserved, Friday, August 7, 2023
