According to a bipartisan committee set up by Congress to study the risk of a looming global war, whoever wins the U.S. presidential election in November will face the most challenging strategic situation since 1945.
The Commission on U.S. National Defense Strategy – set up by Congress in 2022 – issued its report just under a month ago. It warned bluntly that the coming years “include the potential for near-term major war”, perhaps simultaneously with China, Russia and others, and for which the U.S. was “not prepared today”.
The report was drawn up by former California Congresswoman Jane Harman; Eric Edelman, a U.S. former undersecretary of defense and ambassador to Turkey and Finland; retired U.S. General John M. Keane and five other former senior officials and think-tank insiders.
It calls for root and branch reform of both the Pentagon and wider government structures, as well as more resources for defence and a national conversation about the risks.
Those dangers, it argues, are now even more serious than during the first years of the original Cold War, with many more moving pieces.
Whether either side in U.S. politics wishes to engage with that in an election year remains another question.
While U.S. officials talk of China preparing its military to invade Taiwan by 2027 and the need to support Ukraine and deter Russia from further European land grabs, both U.S. presidential contenders have kept their messaging big, bold and mostly focused on domestic issues.
With the Democratic National Convention in Chicago this week, the Kamala Harris campaign has looked to project her candidacy as one of optimism and inclusion – a United States capable of tackling its own problems while continuing to lead the other democracies of the world.
For Donald Trump and the Republicans who share his vision, in contrast, America is already unravelling, facing tough choices that include prioritising pushing back immigration and rolling back the long-term U.S. commitment to its allies.
Not all decisions, of course, can wait for the next president. Within the Pentagon and U.S. military commands, planning is already well underway for the major military exercises of 2025, which for the first time will see significant forces moving from the U.S. mainland to support simultaneous drills in both Europe and the Pacific.
In Europe, such exercises – inspired by similar 1970s and 1980s Cold War annual military movements known as “REFORGER” – have been underway since 2020, planned together with NATO’s annual drills and scaled up substantially following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Next year’s U.S. military posturing in the Pacific will be coordinated particularly with Australia as part of the biennial “TALISMAN SABRE” joint exercise with Washington traditionally run in June, July or August. The U.S. Air Force element will be known as “REFORPAC” in reference to the Europe Cold War drills.
ONGOING UNKNOWNS
But the Commission on U.S. National Defense Strategy report suggests such manoeuvres may not be enough, at least unless the U.S. and allies also ensure they have the industrial and human capacity ready to fight a simultaneous war with several enemies at once.
How the next administration might do that, of course, remains another question.
Before and after the 2022 Ukraine invasion, Joe Biden‘s administration stressed its commitment to protecting European NATO members. Biden has also been the most outspoken U.S. president in recent history in suggesting he would use U.S. military force to defend Taiwan, going well beyond the deliberately obtuse language of “strategic ambiguity” more normally used by prior presidents and U.S. officials.
Multiple sources report that the Biden administration went out of its way from late 2022 to communicate to Russia that use of any tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would prompt an immediate and massive U.S. conventional attack on Russia’s military.
If true, that acts as a reminder that U.S. military might can still act as a powerful deterrent on occasion – albeit not enough to stop the more limited fighting still seen in Ukraine.
Without that U.S. deterrent, it seems unlikely that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government would have risked its current offensive into Russian territory.
The authorities in Kyiv, however, pointedly appear to have kept Washington in the dark about their planning, complaining that doing anything else would have likely led to immediate leaks to the Washington Post and New York Times.
An American reputation for being unable to keep secrets does not augur particularly well for a more dangerous coming era.
Ukrainian officials and analysts say they have learnt much from Israel, which has made a point of ignoring U.S. calls for restraint in the Gaza war and beyond – and left the U.S. military having to respond to Iranian-backed missile attacks in the Red Sea, Iraq and Syria.
For now, America’s allies and adversaries alike are working to ensure that they are ready to deal with either of the very different candidates for president.
That contrasts with earlier in the summer, when – following Biden’s disastrous debate performance and the assassination attempt on Trump – a victory by the latter was seen as largely inevitable. Replacing Biden with Harris and the resulting shift in polls overturned those short-lived assumptions, with clarity on the result now unlikely until November’s votes are counted.
AWKWARD QUESTIONS
For now, the official Democratic foreign policy platform is simply that of Biden. But there is talk that Harris might want to bring in a new set of advisers, potentially with different policies. Nor is it clear that she would definitely follow Biden’s choices and approaches as outlined above.
Trump says he wants to impose a peace settlement on Ukraine if he wins – although the Kyiv government has suggested it would rather see a deal struck with others such as China, and that its current offensive is in part designed to shape that outcome if needed by seizing Russian territory to trade.
Some suspect a Harris administration might also ultimately pursue a peace deal. That would alarm those in Europe who worry that Putin will rearm once the Ukraine war is over, and may wish to test or ideally break the NATO alliance by grabbing territory from an eastern member of NATO.
The Democratic party’s policy handbook for 2024 triggered headlines earlier this week for listing Europe before Asia.
But behind the scenes, the Biden administration has been upfront in warning European partners that the U.S. is shifting focus towards the Pacific, while a new generation of Democrat foreign policy thinkers also argue that Washington must be more careful about what it commits to.
Elbridge Colby, a Pentagon official in the 2017-21 Trump administration often touted as a senior figure if the Republicans win again, has spent much of the year reinforcing the argument that Washington must prioritise confronting China, if necessary pulling resources from Europe – but also warning that America’s Asian allies including Japan and South Korea should also do much more.
Critically, that includes pressure on Taiwan itself – which spends 2.5 percent of gross domestic product on defence, not much for a country that might face China within years.
Taiwan this year increased its conscription period to a year and has purchased new weapons, but is still seen as not well prepared for war.
“If Taipei fails to invest in the island’s defences … America’s hands will be tied,” Colby warned in an article in the Taipei Times in May, warning that an unready Taiwan might be “no longer defensible”. If so, he wrote, the U.S. might reluctantly be forced to re-prioritise confronting and containing “China’s hegemonic ambitions after Taiwan falls”.
Such discussions are arguably healthy, perhaps even vital. But they bring with them real risk.
If America’s exposed allies are too reliant on the United States, they may not do enough to deter attacks and that may spark a conflict. But if suggestions the U.S. will hold back become too strong, U.S. adversaries may choose to chance their hand by striking – as Russia did in Ukraine in 2022.
America’s next president will confront that reality soon after taking office. We do not yet know enough to truly judge how either candidate is likely to respond.
@Reuters
