Who is winning the battle for the Red Sea? If I were taking bets right now, I’d have some of my money on the Houthis, for they seem to be retaining the initiative. That’s based on current results, and one cannot really imagine they will be able to continue preventing over 60 per cent of all shipping from using the waterway dividing Africa from Asia.
This month it is one year since the first drone or missile was fired at a merchant ship sailing innocently through the now infamous Bab al-Mandab Strait. That’s the narrow point at the lower end of the Red Sea after which it becomes the Gulf of Aden. This is conveniently close to the Yemen coast from where the Houthis are able to fire off Iranian-supplied missiles and drones almost at will.
Who are these Houthis?
Who are these Houthis? The Houthi movement is a Zaydi Shia Islamist militant organisation enjoying the backing of Iran, which by force of arms has wrested control over a large part of Yemen, including the capital of Sanaa and most of the coast facing the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
In recent years the Houthi movement successfully held off attempts of overthrowing it by the combined military forces of neighbouring Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Despite the Houthis having occupancy of the capital and control over much of the economically productive regions, the movement lacks international recognition and the government it overturned remains, at least on paper, the recognised legal authority of Yemen.
Among the weapons used against merchant shipping are waterborne drones – smallish semi-submerged motorised vessels loaded with high explosives and used to target ships sailing even some distance from the Yemen coast. Such craft have been used in the Black Sea with devastating effect by the Ukrainians, effectively chasing what remains of the Russian Black Sea fleet to the far corners of that enclosed sea.
Off the Yemeni coast over a hundred ship attacks have been recorded in the past 12 months, with two vessels sunk and four seafarers killed. Some of the vessels were set on fire. Another two were highjacked and taken to Yemeni anchorages with their crews detained on board.
Cape of Good Hope
The result of this year-long naval activity, ostensibly targeting ships with an Israeli interest although making no guarantee that other shipping remains safe, is that the majority of vessels that ordinarily would travel via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, have been forced to sail the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.
That requires another ten to 14 days of sailing time, with commensurate added expense, for which someone has to pay! At a guess it isn’t the shipping companies, who as in the days of the Covid-19 pandemic, are suddenly anticipating strong and rewarding year-end results. Increased tariffs are once again bearing surprising fruit.
As just one example, Maersk is reporting a 41% increase in revenue and that’s in spite of having to re-route all of its Asia-Europe-Asia ships south via the Cape of Good Hope. And that means increased bunker consumption and overall operating costs.
Suez Canal
Between 10 and 12 per cent of total global trade by volume goes – or went – through the Suez Canal, which automatically includes the Red Sea. By way of interest, 22 per cent of the canal traffic is made up of container ships. Car carriers also number around the 20 per cent mark while oil products including crude oil vessels account for another 25 per cent. That’s around two thirds of the total shipping that would ordinarily use the shorter route.
Most of those vessels are now avoiding the Red Sea and the Suez Canal is suffering.
It’s important to highlight containers, cars and oil products, because the ships that carry these commodities are among those that now lead the way in diverting around the Cape.
The big loser in all this is probably Egypt, the owner of the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal Authority (SCA), effectively the Egyptian Government, has seen revenue plummet and no solution in sight. Other ships are still using the canal, which is physically unaffected, but the numbers are seriously down.
According to Egyptian reports, the SCA has lost an estimated $6 billion in revenue since the Red Sea crisis began. Foreign Minister Badr Abdelaty revealed this last week following his meeting with the Secretary-General of International Maritime Organization (IMO), Arsenio Dominguez.
US Navy
When the Houthis fired their first missiles and drones towards Israel in October 2023, US Navy ships played an early and decisive role in assisting Israeli defences. In addition, the US and its allies quickly formed a coalition of naval forces to provide a naval presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to intercept missiles as they were fired from Yemeni positions.
The naval ships were soon heavily involved in assisting merchant ships that were being targeted by Houthis around the Bab al-Mandab Strait and later in the Gulf of Aden. Details of the size and identity of the naval forces haven’t always been forthcoming but at one stage it was quite significant.
Aircraft too came into the equation, involving missions over Houthi-held Yemeni territory which were aimed at reducing the Houthi’s ability to target passing ships or to target Israel. Though claiming to be successful, a number of ships risking the journey through the Red Sea or even those operating in the Gulf of Aden en route to nearby Djibouti, continue to come under Houthi attack.
In January this year President Joe Biden said the air and naval strikes against Houthi launch and storage facilities would continue to protect the free flow of international commerce. Regardless of this, the attacks on international shipping have continued through the year.
Israel and Gaza
According to the Houthis these attacks will continue until Israel abandons its invasion of Gaza (and that now includes Israel having to abandon raids into parts of southern Lebanon).
There are conflicting reports suggesting the interest of the international naval forces is starting to wane over what happens in southern Red Sea. While no such announcements or intentions have been made, it will only add to the concerns of those whose ships continue using the shorter route.
Of course, it could be that any reduction of the naval forces may simply be in proportion to the decreasing number of ships running the gauntlet of missiles and drones.
On the other hand many see the ‘allied’ response as being defensive and not sufficiently offensive towards the Houthis as the latter continue firing off their missiles and directing their drones. That’s despite the US and UK air forces in the region having undertaken numerous raids across Yemen in an effort to degrade the Houthi ability of continuing their attacks.
The latter remains a difficult task. The Houthi’s don’t require sophisticated launch pads or airfields for their drones or even some missiles. They don’t require expensive or noticeable equipment or facilities to handle the launches. Supplies of missiles and drones can be easily stored or transported without drawing much attention.
How long will this go on before once again the Red Sea and Suez Canal can be considered safe shorter routes on the long journey between South-East Asia and Europe or the eastern seaboard of North America? It’s anybody’s guess at the moment. There no end in sight in Gaza, and no reason to think the Houthis will abandon their support for their compatriots in Hamas or Hezbollah.
Will US and European nations continue providing naval cover for commercial shipping wanting to sail the length of the Red Sea? It seems maybe not. The EU’s mission Aspides commander indicated recently that Aspides lacks the ships and resources necessary to respond.
Which is surprising considering the extent to which most of those same European nations have continued their support of the EU NAVFOR naval forces guarding against piracy and smuggling in the wider Middle East area.
Shipping companies meanwhile have accepted that the diversion of their ships around the Cape will have to continue well into 2025.
German frigate
But it’s not only merchant ships that are avoiding the gauntlet. A German Navy frigate, no less, has been instructed to divert.
What was a surprise this past week concerns the German Navy frigate, FGS Baden-Württemberg (F222), returning from the far-off Pacific, which will not risk the crossing of the Red Sea and is instead taking the longer route around South Africa.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius issued instructions for the frigate and the fleet auxiliary Frankfurt-am-Main to avoid the shorter and much cheaper route into the Mediterranean because the ship lacks suitable long-range defences.
Nor were there any suitable escorts to accompany the German ships through the dangerous waters.
This is the same ship that in September helped tweak the Chinese whiskers by sailing provocatively through the Taiwan Strait! Minister Pistorius was again the person to make that announcement on 14 September 2024.
Originally written by Terry Hutson for Africa Ports & Ships
