- In mid-December, West African heads of state will meet to discuss the imminent withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from the regional bloc ECOWAS. Crisis Group experts explain the importance of the breakaway and the dilemmas the two parties face at this pivotal moment
What is happening?
In September 2023, military-led governments in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger established a new defence and security cooperation body, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES, according to its French acronym). A senior official from the alliance told Crisis Group that it was “modelled on NATO”, establishing a non-aggression pact and mutual assistance in the event of attack on a member state. The formation of the bloc came as a direct response to the threat of military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a fifteen-member regional bloc that opposed a military coup that took place in Niger in July 2023 and overthrew the democratically elected government. Niger’s coup was the sixth seizure of power by the military in three years in West Africa, marking a fresh peak of political upheaval in a region that has suffered large-scale jihadist violence for over a decade.
The unusually harsh economic and financial sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on Niger, alongside the threat of military intervention if the generals did not restore constitutional order and reinstate Mohamed Bazoum as president, reflected rising frustration in the bloc with the state of affairs in the Sahel. Coups in Mali (2020 and 2021), Guinea (2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022) angered ECOWAS member states. Over the past two decades, ECOWAS has maintained a zero-tolerance policy for military coups and anti-constitutional power grabs among its member states.
But instead of bringing Niger’s army to heel, the sanctions backfired. Sudden food and medicine shortages and an economic slowdown fuelled an outpouring of anti-ECOWAS sentiment on social media. Many in Niger blamed the regional bloc for their hardships. The military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso, already under ECOWAS sanctions following their respective coups, sided with their Nigerien counterparts in opposing the regional bloc. In January 2024, the three governments simultaneously announced they would pull out of the bloc.
What does the alliance between the three Sahelian states involve?
The new alliance has adopted far more ambitious goals than defending the three states from sanctions. Military leaders in the three countries – Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, Assimi Goïta of Mali and Abdourahamane Tiani of Niger – signed a confederation treaty in July 2024, establishing a more expansive framework for defence and security cooperation. The alliance has also seen them coordinate their diplomatic positions vis-à-vis foreign powers. In August, the three countries jointly accused Ukraine of supporting rebel groups in northern Mali, charges that Kyiv has rejected.
Creation of the AES has enabled these military regimes to at least partially insulate themselves from outside pressure for a return to civilian rule. ECOWAS, as well as Western states, initially pressed the military regimes to hasten the transition. All three governments have said they are disposed at some stage in the future to return power to civilians, but have put off taking the steps to do so. Mali’s government has postponed elections twice, with the latest delay an indefinite suspension. Ouagadougou pledged to hold polls within five years, whereas Niger’s authorities promised a return to civilian rule after a three-year transition. There are, however, no indications that these regimes will relinquish power in the near future. External pressure to compel them to do so has weakened. These leaders also face very little internal pressure, in part because they have strong popular support, but also because of the governments’ clampdowns on politicians and civil society.
The three regimes … say they want to eradicate terrorism, assert their sovereignty and defend their territory against foreign threats.
The three regimes have much in common. They say they want to eradicate terrorism, assert their sovereignty and defend their territory against foreign threats, including any attempt by ECOWAS to intervene militarily in Niger. They have expelled ambassadors from France, the former colonial power in all three states, and largely stalled development cooperation with other Western countries while strengthening ties with Russia, Turkey and Iran. Moscow sells all three regimes military equipment, has deployed about 1,000 fighters to Mali through the Wagner Group/Africa Corps and sent security advisers to Burkina Faso and Niger. All three have embraced plans for a federation between themselves, though it is unclear how that will work in practice.
Although ECOWAS lifted most of its sanctions on Niger and Mali in February 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger confirmed in July that their decisions to leave the bloc are irreversible and with immediate effect. The ECOWAS treaty, however, stipulates that countries have to give one year’s notice before their withdrawal becomes effective. That period will end on 28 January 2025. Unless there is some sort of agreement before then, their departure will become official.
What are the implications of the three countries’ exit from ECOWAS?
If confirmed in January 2025, the withdrawal will likely have serious economic, diplomatic and security consequences. First, over its nearly 50 years of existence, ECOWAS has facilitated the free movement of people and goods, with citizens of its fifteen member states carrying an ECOWAS passport. The withdrawal of the three Sahelian states is likely to disrupt these flows. Millions of Burkinabés, Malians and Nigeriens live in other ECOWAS member states — and, to a lesser extent, the reverse is also true. The three countries’ exit creates uncertainty about their residency status.
The effects of withdrawal on trade and other economic activities also remain in the air. Traditionally, the three Sahelian nations have relied on their neighbours’ infrastructure to import essential goods such as fuel, electricity, food and manufactured products, as well as to export minerals. While this trade is vital for the health of their economies, it also represents a major source of revenue for West African coastal states. Economic ties between the AES countries have been modest by comparison, although the three governments have announced plans to boost them.
Exiting ECOWAS does not on its own spell the end of trade relations between the two blocs, although it could mark the onset of more unstable economic ties. States within the two blocs for now remain connected through various bilateral and multilateral agreements. For instance, Senegal and Mali have a bilateral agreement that facilitates the latter’s access to the port of Dakar. The three Sahelian countries are also members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, a currency union comprising eight ECOWAS member states using the CFA franc that guarantees the free movement of people and goods, and offers favourable customs tariffs among member states. But the Sahelian military regimes appear to be considering an exit from that union, too. Their bloc has announced plans to establish an investment bank and a stabilisation fund to foster price and financial stability. A senior official in Niamey told Crisis Group that these are the first steps toward establishing a central bank and, eventually, a common currency.
The military regimes have rebuked ECOWAS for not providing enough support in their fight against jihadist groups.
On the security front, the military regimes have rebuked ECOWAS for not providing enough support in their fight against jihadist groups. The threat posed by these outfits is also of great concern to their southern neighbours, some of which have experienced deadly militant incursions.
Sahelian criticism of the bloc and efforts to curb jihadism in the region has some merit. For the most part, ECOWAS as an organisation has played a limited role in various sub-regional counterterrorism initiatives. Western actors, with boots on the ground and money to support regional security mechanisms have dominated the agenda, often relegating ECOWAS to a backseat role. For example, the G5-Sahel – a plan launched in 2014 to promote cross-border collaboration between troops from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Chad – suffered from insufficient funding and perceptions of heavy French influence. Nigeria, rather than ECOWAS as a whole, led the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which targeted Boko Haram and its affiliates in the Lake Chad Basin. Ghana spearheads the Accra Initiative, a platform that brings together regional heads of state and intelligence officials with the aim of enhancing counterterrorism efforts.
Cooperation under the MNJTF and the Accra Initiative now stands at a low ebb, partly due to the ongoing standoff between the two blocs. Meanwhile, intelligence sharing and cross-border military operations between Sahelian states and their coastal counterparts have generally been lacklustre. ECOWAS’s threat to intervene militarily in Niger with troops from coastal countries further eroded trust, damaging these cross-border collaborations.
These faltering efforts at security collaboration are unlikely to gain anything from the withdrawal from ECOWAS. But the three Sahelian states are adamant that their turn to a tougher coordinated military approach with one another is essential. The armed forces of the three already work together regularly, albeit in relatively low-key ways so far, for example by sending each other equipment or carrying out joint operations. Their chiefs of staff announced in November 2024 that they have established a joint military force that will soon launch large-scale operations, with the aim of at least partially replacing the G5-Sahel (Mali withdrew from the G5-Sahel in 2022, and Niger and Burkina Faso followed suit in 2023). Unlike the G5-Sahel, which relied heavily on external funding and French support, the three Sahelian states claim complete control over their joint security campaign.
The command over counterterrorism now exercised by the three countries’ militaries has shown few signs of reducing levels of violence.
Even so, the command over counterterrorism now exercised by the three countries’ militaries has shown few signs of reducing levels of violence. The year 2023 was the deadliest on record for the region, and 2024 is on track to surpass it. Civilian casualties, in particular, remain alarmingly high. On 24 August, Burkina Faso experienced what was likely one of the largest massacres in its history when militants gunned down hundreds of people digging a defensive trench outside Barsalogho, 150 km north east of Ouagadougou. The following month, in Mali, jihadists killed dozens of people during an attack on a military training school and the international airport in the capital, Bamako.
More broadly, the exit is a huge blow to a regional integration project that has lasted half a century, and which, despite its shortcomings, has become the best performing and most economically integrated of all African regional blocs. Its efforts to regulate agriculture and pastoralism, as well as to curb money laundering and financial crime, have strengthened regional economic stability. Withdrawal of the three countries risks breaking up this shared regulatory environment, weakening cooperation and reducing the region’s capacity to address critical challenges such as a lack of electricity and environmental degradation. In the eyes of the Sahelian trio’s leaders, Western influence in ECOWAS has been excessive and is itself a betrayal of the pan-African cause. But the division of West African countries and people into separate and potentially antagonistic blocs does little to serve ideals of African unity that the new governments in the AES claim to hold dear.
What have diplomatic efforts achieved since the announcement of the AES withdrawal?
The two blocs have not used the one-year delay to negotiate the terms of their separation. Instead, ECOWAS’s efforts have focused on trying to prevent the divorce, but to limited effect so far. In July 2024, the ECOWAS heads of state chose President Bassirou Diomaye Faye of Senegal as dialogue facilitator, in collaboration with President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo. Faye was chosen for the job after he won an election in March and laid out a possible path between the region’s two blocs, asserting the importance of sovereignty while also advocating for change via democratic means. Faye, his prime minister Ousmane Sonko, as well as special envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, have visited the Sahelian capitals to meet with military leaders. Meanwhile Nigeria, which chairs the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State — the highest decision-making body comprising the presidents of member states — sent its army chief to Niger in August to discuss military cooperation and Niamey’s potential return to ECOWAS. Few details of this shuttle diplomacy have been shared, while in public tensions between the two blocs remain high.
Despite this diplomatic push, military leaders of the three Sahelian countries have insisted their countries’ exit is irreversible and have downplayed its potential impact. Among other things, they have voiced confidence that the cross-border movement of people and goods between countries in the two blocs will continue despite the exit. Moreover, a senior official involved in organising Niger’s withdrawal told Crisis Group that, given strong public backing for the move, reversing course would entail a high political cost, especially since Nigerien officials give little credence to the notion that exit from ECOWAS will have harmful consequences.
On the other hand, ECOWAS leaders want the three Sahel countries to stay, though not at any cost. An exit is no doubt the most serious challenge ECOWAS has faced since its inception. In essence, the bloc can either uphold its founding principles and risk regional fragmentation, or extend an olive branch to breakaway states, making concessions to military regimes that have little regard for democratic values. This dilemma appears to have left both the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and its executive body, the Commission, in an uncomfortable position.
How should West African governments deal with the tensions between the two blocs?
Perhaps the last chance for the two blocs to make preparations and avoid a potentially messy divorce will come in the ECOWAS summit in mid-December. The bloc’s heads of states should publicly recognise the seriousness of the crisis facing their organisation and offer an exceptional postponement of the three countries’ exit. As the facilitator of dialogue between the blocs, President Faye could use the additional time to convince both sides that the standoff has gone too far, and that they should seek a compromise in earnest.
Two possible options might then be pursued. The most ambitious, though less plausible, is to try to reverse the withdrawal. If this is the preferred course of action, President Faye could first convince ECOWAS heads of states to signal their intent, potentially by lifting the suspension of the three countries and then intensifying rapprochement efforts with the three Sahelian countries. ECOWAS leaders could also consider endorsing the AES confederation as a bulwark against regional insecurity. Meanwhile, ECOWAS heads of states could also take advantage of the threat of rupture to pursue internal reform. Specifically, the regional bloc’s leaders could revise its 2021 Additional Protocol for Good Governance to replace harsh sanction against coups with incentive-based approaches that encourage member states to comply with principles of good governance.
President Faye could make the case that the three Sahelian states are unlikely to achieve their development and security objectives outside ECOWAS.
At the same time, President Faye could make the case that the three Sahelian states are unlikely to achieve their development and security objectives outside ECOWAS, and that their decision to leave could hurt their already fragile economies and their citizens’ freedom of movement. In the medium- and long-term, such difficulties are likely to cost them popular support, especially among those who have businesses or close family members elsewhere in West Africa.
Faye, however, should keep in mind that reversing the withdrawal remains a long shot. For months, diplomatic efforts have focused on this goal, to no avail. If preserving ECOWAS proves impossible, the second option is for the facilitator to work toward negotiating a smooth separation that minimises the impact of the withdrawal on the people of the region.
To this end, the facilitator could first push for an agreement that grants the three Sahelian countries a special status, allowing free movement of people and goods. Both blocs might consider signing a multilateral trade agreement and seeking way for imports and exports to move without hindrance. ECOWAS signed similar agreements with Mauritania, which was a member before leaving the organisation in 2000. If a smooth exit is the preferred way forward, Faye could also encourage bilateral agreements between countries in the two blocs to avoid reinstating visas between them. The three Sahelian states could also meet ECOWAS half way by agreeing to move more quickly toward elections and the restoration of constitutional rule, addressing one of the bloc’s main concerns about the proliferation of coups.
In addition, Faye could try to convince both parties of the need to safeguard security cooperation, particularly in terms of intelligence sharing. This could be done not only through the Accra Initiative and the MNJTF, but also through specialised institutions in ECOWAS, such as its group on money laundering. Finally, he could push for the continuation of ongoing development projects and programs funded through the bloc until they are completed.
ECOWAS is at a critical juncture as it faces the prospect of an acrimonious rift between coastal and Sahelian countries. The bloc’s summit in Abuja this month will determine how it is preparing to handle the separation and whether it can avoid letting the current political dispute entrench a lasting divide. Heads of states from ECOWAS should ideally use the summit to orient the bloc toward a strategy that either preserves regional unity or paves the way for an exit of the Sahelian states that entails the least harm possible to public security and well-being, while leaving the door open to these countries’ swift return. With the Sahelian states showing few signs of pragmatism in public, it will not be an easy task.
@International Crisis Group (ICG)
