By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd)
The newly approved 2026 salary structure for Nigeria’s military personnel represents an important and overdue acknowledgement of the sacrifices made by the men and women in uniform. For a country confronting insurgency, banditry, maritime insecurity, and multiple internal deployments, improving the welfare of service personnel is not merely a financial decision — it is a strategic national security investment.
The proposed starting point of ₦300,000 for a Private, rising to ₦2.5 million for a Major General, is therefore commendable in principle. However, when examined through the lens of international military pay structures, the incremental jumps between some ranks raise several structural questions. The key issue is not the absolute figures alone — it is the pattern of progression from one rank to the next.
WHAT GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE FOR MILITARY PAY TYPICALLY LOOKS LIKE
The military profession is an international profession where good practices are shared and borrowed. Across most professional armed forces — including those of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many NATO and Commonwealth countries — military pay progression follows three consistent principles:
a. Predictable incremental progression: Salary increases between adjacent ranks typically fall within a 10–20% band.
b. Larger jumps only at major responsibility transitions: More substantial increases usually occur at key command thresholds (for example, from Colonel to General).
c. Avoidance of distortion gaps:A pay structure must avoid sudden disproportionate jumps that may distort morale, career incentives, or internal hierarchy.
For example, Typical Increment Between Ranks in the US military is 10–18%; UK 2–20%; Canada 10–15% and Australia 10–18%
These systems aim to preserve professional continuity, career predictability, and morale across the rank ladder.
HOW THE NIGERIAN STRUCTURE COMPARES
Let us examine the percentage jumps between ranks in the proposed structure.
NCO CADRE:
Private → LCpl +N50,000 ie 16.7% increase.
LCpl → Cpl +N50,000 14.3%
Cpl → Sgt +N60,000 15%
Sgt → Staff Sgt +N50,000 10.9%
Staff Sgt → WO +N90,000 17.6%
WO → MWO +N80,000 13.3%
MWO → AWO +N210,000 30.9%
OBSERVATION: Most increments in the NCO cadre are within the global 10–18% range, which is good practice.
HOWEVER, the jump from Master Warrant Officer to Army Warrant Officer (≈31%) is unusually high. This needs to be adjusted.
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS CADRE
2Lt → Lt +N70,000 ie 13.7% increase
Lt → Capt +N110,000 -19%
Capt → Major +N80,000 – 11.6%
Major → Lt Col +N80,000 -10.4%
Lt Col → Col +N120,000-14.1%
Col → Brig Gen +N530,000 -54.6%
Brig Gen → Maj Gen +N1,000,000 -66.7%
OBSERVATION:
The increments in the Officers cadre remain globally consistent until Colonel.
HOWEVER, the transition to general officer ranks introduces very sharp jumps:
Colonel → Brigadier General: 54%
Brigadier General → Major General: 67%
These jumps are significantly higher than international norms, where the transition into general officer ranks typically ranges between 20–30%. This needs to be adjusted.
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION REALITIES IN THE AFN TODAY
Beyond the mathematical structure of pay progression, the AFN must also confront a quiet but emerging recruitment and retention challenge.
Until recently, a Private earned about ₦130,000, a figure that was widely regarded as inadequate considering the risks, discipline, and sacrifices required of military life. One of the consequences of such low entry pay has been difficulty attracting recruits from economically advantaged states, particularly Rivers, Lagos, Ondo, and several South-Eastern states. (I noticed and heard this first hand last week when I accompanied the NA Department of Civil Military Affairs to Imo and Abia States on a sensitization workshop to encourage youths in the SE to join the NA as currently very few are joining from the SE states, Rivers, Lagos and Ondo particularly )
For many young people in these states, the economic opportunity cost of joining the military is simply too high. A young person hustling in the commercial economies of Lagos, Port Harcourt, Aba, or Onitsha may earn more — and with far less personal risk — than what a recruit previously earned in uniform.
This dynamic may appear minor in the short term, but it carries long-term strategic implications for national security. A professional armed force in a diverse federation like Nigeria must remain broadly representative of all regions and ethnic groups. If economic incentives unintentionally skew recruitment patterns, it may gradually affect the multi-ethnic character of the armed forces, which has historically been one of its greatest institutional strengths.
In that wise, encouragingly, the new ₦300,000 entry pay significantly improves the attractiveness of military service and may help address this imbalance.
However, recruitment is only one side of the manpower equation.
Retention is the other.
THE EMERGING RETENTION CHALLENGE WITH GEN Z OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS
Another development increasingly observed across the services is voluntary exit among mid-career personnel. In earlier generations — particularly for many of us who joined through the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) or as Depot NCO entrants — the prevailing mindset was to remain in service until the highest possible rank, whether General officer or Master Warrant Officer to proudly wear the AGOGO and bash soldiers heads with the big stick .
Today, however, a different pattern is emerging. Increasing numbers of Captains, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and mid-level NCOs are:
a. seeking voluntary retirement
b. transitioning into the private sector, or
c. in extreme cases, abandoning service through AWOL or desertion when formal exit mechanisms are slow or restrictive.
d. Dragging the services to civil court to challenge HTACOS mandatory service years -and one court decision has answered that prayer.
This trend suggests a growing retention problem.The reasons are not difficult to understand. Officers and NCOs at these ranks possess valuable technical, managerial, and leadership skills that are highly attractive to sectors such as:
oil and gas, private security and logistics, maritime and aviation sectors, international organisations and NGOs.
If military compensation and welfare packages are not sufficiently competitive, the armed forces risk losing experienced personnel precisely at the stage when they become most professionally valuable.
Retention challenges are not unique to Nigeria; many militaries face them. But the usual response globally is to introduce mid-career incentives, such as:
enhanced allowances, retention bonuses, shorter engagement periods with options to renew , housing schemes, education benefits for families, improved medical and pension systems.
Without such measures, the AFN may inadvertently become training grounds for talent that later migrates to better-paying sectors.
WHY LARGE JUMPS CAN CREATE STRUCTURAL PRESSURES
I return to the disproportionate gap between MWO/AWO, Col/Brig and Brig/Major General. Sharp incremental jumps between ranks do not only create accounting distortions; they can also produce institutional pressures inside the officer corps.
When the financial gap between Brigadier General and Major General becomes excessively wide, the system unintentionally generates intense pressure to secure promotion to the two-star level. If we are honest with ourselves, we have already seen some of these pressures manifest over the years.
One consequence has been the emergence of a top-heavy officer corps, with an unusually high number of Major Generals relative to the number of command appointments available. In order to accommodate promotions, the system sometimes responds by creating additional commands, institutions, and headquarters structures that may not always correspond to operational necessity.
Another effect has been what some observers describe as “star creep” — the gradual expansion of general officer ranks beyond what the organisational structure originally required.
Even after retirement, the consequences can linger. Many will recall periods when tensions emerged between officers who retired as Colonels or Brigadiers and those who retired as Major Generals, tensions that at one point contributed to the formation of a separate One-Star Retired Officers Association.
While such developments have multiple causes, it would be difficult to deny that large financial and status gaps between the one-star and two-star ranks contribute to these dynamics.
A pay structure should therefore aim not only to reward responsibility, but also to avoid incentives that unintentionally encourage excessive competition, politicisation of promotion processes, or post-service resentments within the officer community.
In short, the question we should honestly ask is: Are we learning the lessons from our own institutional experience on DSA? Are we doomed to repeat past mistakes ?
MY SUGGESTED STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS (Without Reducing Existing Figures)
We should not critique without proffering solutions. In giving recommendations , importantly, any adjustment should not reduce the already approved higher figures. Instead, the goal should be to rebalance the ladder by adjusting the ranks immediately below them, thereby smoothing the progression.
a. WO → MWO → AWO
Current:
WO: ₦600,000
MWO: ₦680,000
AWO: ₦890,000
Problem:
The MWO → AWO jump (≈31%) is disproportionately high.
Suggested Possible adjustment (without reducing AWO):
WO ₦600,000 (retained as is)
MWO ₦740,000 – ₦760,000 (adjusted upwards)
AWO ₦890,000 (Retained as is)
This spreads progression more evenly across the senior NCO leadership tier.
b. COLONEL → BRIGADIER GENERAL
Current:
Colonel: ₦970,000
Brigadier General: ₦1,500,000
Gap: 54.6%
Suggested adjustment (later):
Colonel ₦1,150,000 – ₦1,200,000 (Adjusted upwards)
Even at current proposed Brigadier General ₦1,500,000 this brings the increase Col/Brig closer to 25–30%, which aligns better with international practice.
c. BRIGADIER GENERAL → MAJOR GENERAL
Current: Brigadier General: ₦1,500,000
Major General: ₦2,500,000
Gap: 66.7%
Suggested adjustment (retain Maj Gen figure):
Brigadier General ₦1,850,000 – ₦1,950,000 (Adjusted upwards)
Major General ₦2,500,000 (Retained as is)
This preserves the prestige of the two-star rank while avoiding an excessive pay cliff.
So now for the problematic areas in the Officers cadre we have:
Col- ₦1,150,000 – ₦1,200,000 (Adjusted upwards)
Brigadier-General- ₦1,850,000 – ₦1,950,000 (Adjusted upwards)
Major-General – Major General: ₦2,500,000 (Retained as is)
With these adjustments, all increments between adjacent ranks fall within the global standards of between 10-20%. Fair to the country. Fair to all. No covetousness. No After service bad blood.
THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE REFORM
We must commend the decision to increase military pay. Despite the concerns above, several aspects of the new structure are highly commendable:
a. Entry-level pay improvement (₦300k Private)
b. Stronger NCO progression
c. Recognition of senior enlisted leadership (WO cadre)
d. Overall compression ratio still within acceptable range
The ratio between lowest and highest ranks (1:8) is actually within global norms, where many militaries operate between 1:7 and 1:12.
MY HUMBLE FINAL POLICY REFLECTION
The proposed 2026 salary reform as announced should therefore be seen as a strong foundation rather than a finished structure. A periodic review by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), in consultation with the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters, could help refine the incremental progression, especially at the senior officer level.
Military pay structures must balance three strategic objectives:
a. Fair compensation for sacrifice
b. Predictable career progression
c. Institutional stability
FGN has taken an important step in the right direction. With honest advice from MOD and the Service Chiefs and with the suggested modest adjustments to the upper-rank increment gaps, and with sustained attention to recruitment incentives, retention strategies, and welfare improvements, the structure could evolve into a globally competitive military compensation framework worthy of Africa’s largest armed forces.
Those who defend the nation deserve nothing less.
Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd) is a Security & Defence Analyst/Conflict Security & Development Consult Ltd
