By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd)
These views are adapted from an interview I granted to Arise News today (Thursday June 25, 2026) on the new State Police Bill. As often the case with television interviews, time constraints meant many important issues could only be mentioned briefly and no enough time to push through all my thoughts. Having reflected further on the publicly reported provisions of the bill, I offer these additional observations.
The bill is significant because it moves Nigeria away from the old over-centralised policing model. But it does not create a fully decentralised system either. What we appear to be heading towards is a semi-decentralised, middle-road policing model, broadly similar in philosophy to arrangements in Canada and Germany, where federal and sub-national police structures coexist within a national framework.
WHAT THE BILL GETS RIGHT
First, under Section/Clause 17, the bill reportedly provides for a State Commissioner of Police to head the State Police Service. The reported provision states: “The State Police Service shall be headed by a Commissioner of Police appointed by the Governor of the State, subject to confirmation by the State House of Assembly.” This introduces an important democratic check but in my opinion, it still needs some tweaking.
Second, Section 17(6) reportedly provides that any Governor’s directive to the State Commissioner of Police must be lawful, written, and of a general policy nature relating to public safety and public order. This creates an audit trail and reduces the risk of informal political interference and prevents secret verbal instructions.
Third , Section 17(7) reportedly protects citizens, political parties and groups from being targeted merely for criticising the government. The bill expressly prohibits a State Commissioner of Police from arresting, detaining, investigating, or deploying force against any person, political party, or group merely because they criticize the government. This is perhaps the strongest safeguard and directly addresses one of the biggest fears surrounding state police that State Police could become a governor’s coercive tool.
Fourth, Section 17(8) reportedly allows questionable or unlawful directives to be reviewed, while preserving the jurisdiction of the courts.
Fifth, Section 17(10) reportedly protects the State Commissioner of Police from arbitrary removal. Removal must be for stated cause, with fair hearing, and requires serious institutional approval, including two-thirds support of the State House of Assembly.
Sixth, the bill reportedly permits Federal Police intervention in states only under exceptional circumstances, such as breakdown of public order, inability or unwillingness of the State Police to act, threat to national security, serious human rights abuses, administrative or financial collapse of the State Police, or request by the Governor.
This is necessary. State Police should not mean the Federal Government becomes helpless when policing collapses in a State.
WHAT THE BILL MUST STILL FIX
That said, I still see several issues requiring strengthening.
The first gap is the absence of a clearly established independent State Police Service Commission in each State. From the reports available so far, , there is no indication that the bill creates an independent State Police Service Commission for each State. In fact, the current wording appears to go in a different direction. According to the version reported after Senate passage:
• The Governor appoints the State Commissioner of Police.
• The appointment is made on the recommendation of the National Police Council.
• The appointment is subject to confirmation by the State House of Assembly.
• The Commissioner must satisfy national minimum standards prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.
The bill also replaces references to the former Federal Police Service Commission with a single Police Service Commission, but the reports do not indicate that it establishes 36 independent State Police Service Commissions.
This is one area where I think the bill could still be improved. I would have preferred the Constitution to establish, or at least mandate, an independent State Police Service Commission in every state, responsible for: recruitment; promotions; discipline; transfers; complaints; recommending Commissioners of Police; and insulating the police from partisan control. Without such a body, there is a risk that too much authority over personnel management remains concentrated in the executive, even with the involvement of the National Police Council and State House of Assembly.
One point I also find interesting is that the Senate version now says the Governor appoints the Commissioner on the recommendation of the National Police Council, not on the recommendation of a State Police Service Commission. That raises an important constitutional question: How will the National Police Council practically vet and recommend Commissioners for 36 separate state police services while also overseeing the Federal Police? It may become over-centralized and administratively cumbersome.
The bill is still referring issues to the National Police Service Commission. I recommend that such a Commission should be created and made responsible for recruitment, promotion, discipline, complaints, professional standards and personnel management. The Commission itself must be genuinely independent and broadly representative so that it does not become another political instrument.
The second issue is appointment of the State Commissioner of Police. I would not recommend a simple model where the Governor merely appoints and the House confirms.
My preferred model is: Independent State Police Service Commission headhunts, vets and shortlists three qualified candidates → Governor selects one from the shortlist → State House of Assembly confirms.
If I were drafting the law, I would make this one improvement: such that only qualified a nominees proceed to the Governor and State House and gives each party a meaningful gatekeeping role rather than making it a mere rubber stamp. This preserves executive responsibility but prevents the office of State Commissioner of Police from becoming purely political. This mirrors good governance practice by ensuring no single institution controls the entire process.
Closely related to this is operational independence. The law should expressly impose a statutory duty on the State Commissioner of Police to refuse any unlawful or unconstitutional directive, and should guarantee that such refusal cannot itself constitute grounds for suspension, removal, disciplinary action or any other adverse consequence. That protection is essential if the safeguards requiring directives to be lawful are to have real practical effect.
Third, the bill should provide national minimum standards as a federal responsibility. These should cover recruitment, training, promotion, equipment, salary and welfare benchmarks, discipline, use of force, human rights compliance and operational doctrine. Professional standards on recruitment, training, promotions, discipline, forensic capability, intelligence, and equipment should remain subject to national minimum standards to prevent 36 different policing systems from emerging.
Fourth, expensive national policing capabilities should remain federal or nationally coordinated. These include major police training academies, forensic laboratories, DNA and biometric databases, criminal intelligence systems, cybercrime platforms, police aviation, bomb disposal, specialised tactical support and national criminal records.
Fifth, funding must be addressed. From what has been publicly reported, the bill does not appear to establish a dedicated funding mechanism or equalisation fund for state police. Instead, it adopts the principle that states wishing to establish police services will be responsible for funding and operating them, subject to national standards .
The key funding-related implications are:
• Each state decides whether to establish a state police service. It is not mandatory.
• A state police service cannot commence operations until it is established by a law of the State House of Assembly and certified as meeting national minimum standards.
• If a state police service becomes unable to function because of financial or administrative challenges, the Federal Police may intervene. This is a significant safeguard built into the bill.
This is where I believe the legislation still has a gap. Simply saying that states will fund their own police could produce uneven policing across Nigeria:
• Wealthier states (for example, Lagos, Rivers, Delta) could build well-equipped, well-trained police services.
• Fiscally weaker states could struggle to pay salaries, procure equipment, or provide adequate training.
That would create inequality in citizens’ access to security, depending on where they live.
I would recommend adding a constitutional or statutory provision establishing a State Police Equalisation Fund,
Funding is arguably the single biggest challenge to state policing. A state police service without sustainable funding could become poorly trained, poorly equipped, vulnerable to corruption, and ineffective. The solution is not one measure but a package of safeguards. I would recommend the following:
1. Federal Equalisation Fund
o Establish a State Policing Equalisation Fund, financed by the Federation Account.
o Allocate grants using an objective formula based on population, land area, crime burden, poverty, and internally generated revenue (IGR).
o This ensures poorer states are not left behind.
2. Minimum National Funding Standards
o Require every state to meet a statutory minimum funding level for salaries, training, equipment, communications, and welfare.
o States unable to meet the standard receive conditional federal support.
3. Conditional Federal Grants
o Federal funding should be linked to performance and compliance.
o States that fail to meet training, human rights, audit, or accountability standards should risk suspension of discretionary grants.
4. Shared National Services
o Expensive capabilities should remain centrally provided or shared, such as:
National forensic laboratories
DNA databases
Fingerprint and biometric systems
Criminal intelligence databases
Police aviation
Cybercrime capability
Major training academies
o This avoids every State duplicating costly infrastructure.
Poorer states should not be condemned to inferior policing. Nigeria needs a State Police Equalisation Fund, financed from the Federation Account and allocated using objective criteria such as population, land area, crime burden, poverty level, IGR and compliance with national policing standards. The Federal Government would continue funding national policing functions, while states fund routine policing, supplemented by an Equalisation Fund for fiscally weaker States.
This achieves three objectives:
• No Nigerian receives inferior policing simply because they live in a poorer State.
• States remain responsible for their own police services.
• National standards and interoperability are maintained across all 36 States and the FCT.
Without such an equalisation mechanism, there is a real risk that wealthier States like Lagos, Rivers, and perhaps Kano could develop highly capable police services, while poorer states struggle to pay salaries and maintain basic operational capacity, creating significant disparities in public safety.
Sixth, intervention of federal police in States. Based on the text of the bill that has been reported publicly, the Federal Police cannot intervene at will. It may intervene only under specified constitutional conditions. The reported triggers for federal police intervention are:
1. Actual or imminent breakdown of public order or public safety that the State Police is unable or unwilling to contain.
2. The Governor requests federal intervention.
3. The State Police Service is unable to function effectively, including because of administrative, financial, or similar challenges.
4. Threats to national security.
5. Serious human rights abuses, partisan intimidation, or other unlawful conduct by state policing authorities.
The bill also places procedural safeguards on federal intervention:
• It must be authorized in writing by the President.
• The authorization must specify the grounds, geographic area, functions, and duration of the intervention.
• Within 48 hours, notice must be given to the Governor, the Speaker of the State House of Assembly, the National Police Council, and the National Assembly.
• Any intervention beyond the period prescribed by law requires Senate approval, and it remains subject to judicial review.
In my assessment, these provisions are, in principle, well designed. They recognize that while policing is decentralized, national security remains a federal responsibility. The inclusion of presidential authorization, notification requirements, Senate oversight, and judicial review reduces the risk of arbitrary federal takeover.
The key challenge will be defining terms such as “unable or unwilling,” “threat to national security,” and “serious human rights abuses.” These triggers must not be left vague. If undefined, they may become tools for political conflict between Federal and State Governments. If those thresholds are not carefully interpreted in subsequent legislation or by the courts, they could become areas of political dispute between federal and state governments.
Overall, this aspect of the bill appears to strike a reasonable balance between state autonomy and the need for the Federal Government to act when a state’s policing system has broken down or poses a threat beyond the state’s capacity.
Seventh, the bill should specify a fixed tenure for the State Commissioner of Police — preferably one non-renewable five-year term — while retaining the safeguards against arbitrary removal.
CONCLUSION
In essence, it would appear that beset by security many Nigerians are calling for a move to a fully decentralised police model. It is also moving away from the old centralised model.
What is emerging however, is a semi-decentralised policing system — a middle road between Abuja-controlled policing and fully autonomous State Police.
That is the right direction.
But to work, it must be supported by independent State Police Service Commissions, merit-based appointment of Commissioners, operational independence backed by statutory protection, national standards, fair funding, clear federal intervention triggers, and strong safeguards against political abuse. Otherwise, Nigeria may simply transfer the weaknesses of the old system from the federal level to the states.
ONE FINAL THOUGHT
One question the ARISE TV anchor asked me has remained on my mind because, unfortunately, time did not permit a proper answer. She asked: “What about the State Houses of Assembly? Given the widespread perception that many State Assemblies are little more than rubber stamps for their Governors, can they realistically be relied upon as an effective constitutional check?”
It is an important question, and I do not pretend to have a complete answer. The architecture of the bill assumes that State Houses of Assembly will perform their constitutional oversight role independently—confirming appointments, approving removals where required, and generally acting as a check on executive power. However, if in practice a State Assembly simply endorses every gubernatorial decision without meaningful scrutiny, then one of the bill’s principal safeguards could be significantly weakened.
Ultimately, no constitutional design, however elegant, can be stronger than the institutions responsible for operating it. Laws can create checks and balances; only political culture, institutional independence, constitutional fidelity and public accountability can make those checks effective.
That, perhaps, is the biggest challenge the State Police project must ultimately overcome—not merely designing good institutions, but ensuring they function as intended.
I will be remiss if I dont add that this is an experiment out of Nigerians frustration about security driven by a desperate search for better security. Just as their many advocates for this experiment there are an equal number of sceptics. I would say 40% of Nigerians support the experiment, 40 % remain sceptical . 20% say “Lets just see”.
Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd), a private Security Sector Reform/Governance practitioner, is of Conflict Security & Development Consult Ltd
