The Algerian’s army’s downing of a Malian drone has plunged the two countries into a diplomatic crisis, amid growing political fragmentation in West Africa and the Maghreb. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts analyse the causes of this dispute and assess the risks of escalation.
What is happening between Algeria and Mali?
On 1 April, the Algerian Ministry of Defence announced that its army had destroyed an “armed reconnaissance drone” near Tin Zaouatine, a town on Algeria’s border with Mali, the previous night. According to Algiers, the drone had flown more than 2km into Algerian airspace. Later that evening, the Malian army said one of its aircraft had crashed near Tinzawatène, Tin Zaouatine’s twin city on the Malian side of the border, adding that it was launching an investigation into the incident.
On 6 April, after the investigation had reached preliminary conclusions, the Malian government denounced a “hostile” and “premeditated” action by Algeria. Bamako said the drone had been on its way to carry out a strike on armed groups “that have claimed responsibility for terrorist acts”, claiming that the incident proved that Algiers “sponsors international terrorism”. Subsequently, the College of Heads of State of the Confederation of Sahel States (AES) – which includes Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – issued a communiqué condemning the incident as a “hostile act” directed at all the AES countries. Algeria rejected these accusations. In a statement published on 7 April, the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the downed aircraft had taken “an offensive trajectory”, claiming that the drone flight was the third such Malian incursion into Algerian territory since August 2024.
The Tinzawatène region is known as a refuge for fighters from the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA).
The Tinzawatène region is known as a refuge for fighters from the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), a separatist coalition of groups from northern Mali that signed the Algiers peace agreement with Bamako in 2015 and whose main stronghold, the town of Kidal, was recaptured by the Malian army in November 2023. In the hours following the incident, before Algeria confirmed that it had downed the drone, the FLA claimed responsibility, saying the aircraft belonged to the “terrorist junta in Bamako”.
The affair quickly turned into a diplomatic crisis. On 6 April, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso recalled their ambassadors from Algiers. The next day, Algeria retaliated, withdrawing its ambassadors posted in Bamako and Niamey, and postponing the arrival of the ambassador who had been due to take up the post in Ouagadougou. Algeria closed its airspace to Malian aircraft, and Mali did the same for Algerian planes. Bamako has also withdrawn from the Joint Military Staff Committee, a cooperation mechanism comprising Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Set up in 2010 to combat terrorism, the committee has rarely been active since then.
Tensions have spread to the populations of the two countries. On 11 April, over a thousand people gathered in Bamako and across Mali to protest what they called “Algerian aggression”. On social media, accounts supporting one country or the other are engaged in an aggressive campaign combining misinformation with nationalist one-upmanship and, in some cases, calls for violence.
Why have relations between the two countries deteriorated to such an extent?
Mali and Algeria, which share a 1,400km border, have long considered each other “brothers” in the struggle against French colonisers. There are strong cultural and economic ties between people on the two sides of the border. Since the 1990s, Algeria has led several efforts to mediate between Bamako and rebels in northern Mali. The most recent process led to the signing of the Algiers peace agreement in 2015. Finally, the jihadist groups that have been operating in Mali since the 2000s emerged in the wake of the Algerian civil war. To this day, they retain links with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, whose command is based in Algeria.
But over the last two years, relations between the two neighbours have soured to a worrying degree. First, the implementation of the Algiers agreement has fuelled tensions. The Algerian authorities have criticised Bamako for its lack of commitment and its slowness in fulfilling key provisions of the peace agreement, notably those relating to governance, economic development and the integration of former rebels into the regular army. In Algeria’s view, the agreement was duly and difficultly negotiated and signed by the government and a number of Malian armed groups, under the aegis of several states and multilateral organisations, including Nigeria, Chad, the African Union (AU) and the European Union. Conversely, Bamako believes that Algiers and the other international mediators imposed the agreement’s terms on the Malian authorities, without giving them room to negotiate better ones.
In 2019, convinced that the agreement had benefited separatist armed groups more than the Malian state, the government of late president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta raised the prospect of revising it by organising a national dialogue. The military, which took power in 2021 after a double coup, felt even more aggrieved by the results of the accord. In November 2023, the Malian armed forces sought to shift the balance in the country’s north, recapturing Kidal with the support of Russian paramilitaries from the Wagner Group.
The reconquest of Kidal not only led to Mali’s withdrawal from the Algiers peace agreement in January 2024, but also highlighted two divergent visions for resolving Mali’s crisis. Since 2021, Bamako has defended the principle of “endogenous solutions”, with the aim of freeing the country from the undue influence of foreign and multilateral actors. By the end of 2023, the Malian authorities took a new turn by labelling all the armed groups opposed to the state, whether separatists or jihadists, as “terrorists”, thereby putting an end to official discussions with several of these groups. Algiers, on the other hand, believes in a political solution to the Malian crisis. It draws a distinction between the separatist movements that have signed the 2015 agreement and the jihadist groups. With this distinction in mind, Algeria hosts a number of leading figures from Mali whom it considers essential to resuming dialogue and finding a lasting solution to the conflict. These include Alghabass Ag Intalla, an influential FLA member, and Imam Mahmoud Dicko, a firm supporter of dialogue with armed groups who is considered an opponent of the current government in Bamako.
In Bamako, many influential activists accuse Algeria, both publicly and privately, of fuelling instability in Mali.
The presence of these Malian political figures in Algeria is another source of tension. The Malian authorities see Algiers’ willingness to host them as a hostile act, tantamount to support for opposition forces or “terrorist” groups. In Bamako, many influential activists accuse Algeria, both publicly and privately, of fuelling instability in Mali. In their view, Algeria got rid of its terrorism problem by pushing jihadist groups into northern Mali and other Sahelian states in the late 1990s. They believe that Algiers has kept in contact with some of these groups so that it can act as a mediator and maintain its status as a regional power. They ascribe the failure of Mali’s peace processes first and foremost to Algerian interference, which they compare to the meddling of the former colonial power France. Opposition to France is a highly salient political issue in Mali in part because – from 2013 to November 2022, when Operation Barkhane ended – France was the government’s chief external partner in fighting Islamist militants. It withdrew from that role under heavy criticism for failing to curb the jihadists’ expansion.
In theory, Algeria could have taken advantage of France’s departure after Operation Barkhane’s end to reassert a role as a regional power player, but instead it seems to be on the road to being marginalised in the Sahel. Mali has put a new security architecture in place with its new allies – Russia and the AES member states – which renders military cooperation with Algiers less important. Meanwhile, the Algerian government is annoyed by the presence of foreign troops – French soldiers yesterday, Russian paramilitaries today – close to its borders, which it sees as a direct threat to its national security. Moreover, the resumption of hostilities between the Malian army and the separatists, in addition to exposing local civilians to the risk of atrocities, is increasing the risk of an influx of Malian refugees into Algeria. Renewed hostilities also reduce Algeria’s potential to be a mediator of Mali’s conflicts, a role which until recently seemed to naturally fit the country.
Algiers is also facing competition from other powers. Algerian diplomats and journalists have been raising questions in particular about Morocco’s ties with the Malian authorities. They see a link between Bamako’s repeated accusations against Algeria, namely that Algiers supports jihadist groups, with comments made in Moroccan media describing Kabylia – the majority-Berber area of Algeria – as an “occupied region”. In their view, the change in Mali’s political outlook reflects Rabat’s greater clout over Mali’s transitional authorities as well as the strengthening of security cooperation between the two countries, demonstrated by the first meeting of the joint Malian-Moroccan military commission, held in Bamako in February. Though relations with Morocco are rarely discussed in Mali, the issue is critical in Algeria, where many analysts believe that Algiers is losing ground to Rabat in the Sahel. At the same time, Türkiye and Iran are seeing their regional role grow in the economic and military sectors. Türkiye, for example, has become the main supplier of drones to the Malian army. Along with Morocco, Türkiye is also exercising religious influence through Sufi orders.
What are the risks and potential consequences of an escalation between Algiers and Bamako?
If today’s diplomatic tensions persist, and dialogue breaks down, the threat of military escalation between Algeria and Mali cannot be dismissed. As the Malian army continues to pursue armed groups in northern Mali, notably using drones, the lack of coordination between the two countries increases the risk of cross-border incidents or accidental strikes on civilians or military personnel travelling in these regions. In July 2024, during a confrontation with the FLA, Mali carried out strikes causing the death of several civilians, including Nigeriens, Chadians and Sudanese panning for gold.
Deteriorating relations between Bamako and Algiers have also darkened the (already dim) prospects of resuming dialogue between the Malian authorities and the FLA, further diminishing the chances of lasting stability in Mali. Given its historical role in various peace processes, Algeria has considerable leverage over a number of separatist groups in Mali’s north. By withdrawing from the agreement negotiated by Algiers, and openly accusing Algeria of supporting terrorism, Bamako is closing the door to renewed dialogue under the auspices of an influential mediator. With a negotiated political pathway blocked off, various separatist factions might choose instead to escalate on the battlefield, allying with jihadist groups or resorting to tactics that expose civilians to greater risk, for example the use of improvised explosive devices.
Finally, the friction between Algiers and Bamako comes against a backdrop of increasing political fragmentation in West and North Africa, exacerbated by disputes between the AES and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and by renewed tensions between Morocco and Algeria. These divisions are not good for anyone – except, perhaps, the jihadist groups in the region. The militants could take advantage of weaker cooperation among states to expand, endangering the Sahel’s stability even further.
How can tensions be defused?
Whether in counter-terrorism, economic development, management of cross-border migration or humanitarian aid for displaced people, Algiers and Bamako have too many shared concerns to turn their backs on each other for long. These joint interests serve as a reminder that, despite the current tensions, diplomacy remains the most realistic way to avoid a prolonged rupture that could have disastrous consequences for the entire region.
Leaders of both countries should seek to resume dialogue, rather than continuing to trade the sort of vitriol that has exacerbated cross-border tensions, of which the downing of the Malian drone is the most serious consequence to date. Bamako should recognise that Algeria is not just acting as an interfering foreign power, but has a vital interest in stabilising the borderlands. For its part, Algiers would do well to reconsider its approach, which Bamako has often chafed at, especially as the Malian government is now determined to exercise sovereignty throughout the country’s territory.
Given the current tensions, and despite the sovereignist rhetoric deployed by both governments, which are often wary of foreign interference, an outside facilitator could prove indispensable in initiating a détente and restoring direct talks between Algiers and Bamako. As the AES countries have withdrawn from ECOWAS, and frictions remain between those two organisations, the AU appears well placed to play this role. Angolan President João Lourenço, in his capacity as AU chair, should quickly take up the issue and appoint a high-level facilitator.
South Africa could … play an important role, given Pretoria’s longstanding balanced relations with both Algiers and Bamako.
To this end, the AU could turn first to Ghana and South Africa. Since taking office in January, Ghanaian President John Mahama Dramani has made numerous gestures aimed at engaging the AES countries, inviting them to his inauguration ceremony and appointing a special envoy for the region. In March, he toured the AES countries, emphasising his desire to establish cordial, constructive relations with Ghana’s Sahelian neighbours. South Africa could also play an important role, given Pretoria’s longstanding balanced relations with both Algiers and Bamako. Pretoria also has a legacy of pan-African engagement, which is likely to strike a chord with both Algerian and Malian leaders. The involvement of a Ghanaian or South African representative would help establish a neutral forum, at a safe distance from the region’s conflicts, and create more favourable conditions for constructive dialogue.
Meanwhile, external partners with proven influence in Bamako and Algiers, such as Russia, and/or extensive experience in international mediation, such as Qatar, could throw their weight behind these African efforts. Their involvement would lend further credibility to the process and provide additional evidence of their own commitment to helping find African solutions to African problems.
On the security front, enhanced cooperation between Mali and Algeria appears more urgent than ever. The Mali-Algeria Joint Cooperation Committee, a body established in 2005 to facilitate bilateral discussions, particularly on security matters, could serve as a framework for renewed dialogue. With such a long border between them, the two countries have little choice but to develop more effective means of cooperating in counter-terrorism and regulating cross-border flows of people and goods. Establishing a joint framework for exchanging information would help reduce tensions, while demonstrating the willingness of both sides to work together in addressing the many common challenges they face.
@International Crisis Group (ICG)
