Isah Mohammed Shambo
In recent months, Nigeria’s national security architecture—its structure, operations, and outcomes—has become a central theme in public discourse. This heightened scrutiny is both necessary and justified, given the paradox between the early security gains recorded under the current administration and the alarming resurgence of violence and instability across multiple states.
Although commendable progress has been made in dismantling the command structures of bandit and terrorist networks and improving inter-agency intelligence coordination, these efforts are increasingly undermined by recurrent attacks, mass casualties, and the widespread destruction of livelihoods. Nowhere is this breakdown more glaring than in the persistent ethno-religious conflicts devastating Benue and Plateau states. The recent heinous killings in Benue stain our national conscience and must not be without consequence.
Likewise, those responsible for the ethno-religious profiling that led to the murder of 13 wedding guests in Plateau State must be brought swiftly to justice. Such atrocities not only destabilise communities but also erode public confidence in the state’s capacity to ensure justice and protect lives. Government pronouncements must be matched by decisive action, without consequences, words are rendered meaningless.
Equally troubling is the increasing frequency and intensity of attacks on security personnel and operatives of quasi security outfits members of the Nigerian Armed Forces, state-backed vigilante groups, regional security outfits, and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) continue to suffer heavy losses. In the North West, armed bandits have intensified their offensives, while Boko Haram and its splinter groups persist in their insurgency across the North East.
The recent ambush and killing of military personnel in Niger State is particularly alarming and should serve as a red line for the military high command. A more robust and coordinated counter-response to armed non-state actors is now imperative. These developments highlight the dual crises confronting Nigeria’s internal security: the expanding operational audacity of violent nonstate actors and the mounting strain on overstretched national security agencies.
As conversations about the future of Nigeria’s internal security intensify, two dominant perspectives have emerged. One supports the decentralisation of security through community-based defence initiatives, while the other advocates for the legal right of responsible citizens to bear arms for self-defence. Within this context, prominent voices have re-entered the national debate.
A few months ago, retired General T.Y. Danjuma, former Chief of Army Staff and Minister of Defence reaffirmed his earlier call for legalised civilian armament, first made in 2022, as a practical response to deepening insecurity. Following the recent killings in Benue State, Senator David Mark, also a retired senior military officer and former Senate President, joined the call, framing self-defence as a survival imperative.
On the other hand, Mr. Adeola Oluwatosin Ajayi, Director General of the Department of State Services (DSS), has championed a structured, community-based security approach as a more sustainable and cohesive solution. The Nigeria Governors’ Forum has also reiterated its longstanding call for the establishment of state police, citing the limitations of a centralised security system in responding to local threats.
What unites these differing approaches is a shared recognition of the urgent need to overhaul Nigeria’s security framework. There is an emerging consensus that decentralizing security operations through citizen participation and localised enforcement could enhance responsiveness and effectiveness. With conventional agencies overstretched and often under-resourced, the structured integration of community-based actors into the national defence ecosystem is no longer optional; it is essential.
This national dialogue demands a clear redefinition of what constitutes Nigeria’s first line of defence. That redefinition must align with emerging security dynamics and the lived realities of citizens. While human rights concerns, extortion, and procedural misconduct by some local security actors cannot be ignored, these issues must be contextualised against the significant contributions many of these groups have made.
In unfortunate cases such as the tragic burning of 16 travellers in Uromi, reportedly mishandled by a local vigilante group.These incidents underscore the urgent need for training and oversight. Yet, despite these failings, the role of community-based security outfits in mitigating Nigeria’s complex security threats remains indispensable. From the CJTF in the North East, to vigilantes in the North-Central and state-sponsored outfits like those in Zamfara and Katsina, including some states in South East and South West, many members have risked and lost their lives to defend their communities.
These sacrifices have often come without formal remuneration or national recognition. In practice, these groups already function as the de facto first line of defence in many states, a fact made evident by their casualty rates and the high-risk environments in which they operate.
To fully leverage their potential while reducing the risks, there is a pressing need to formalise, regulate, and institutionalise these community-based security structures. This includes setting national standards for recruitment, training, codes of conduct, operational accountability, and civilian oversight to ensure compliance with constitutional and human rights norms.
With proper legal backing, technical support, and institutionalised frameworks, these groups can serve as effective force multipliers for conventional security agencies. A well-coordinated, community-driven security model anchored in transparency and oversight offers a more sustainable path to national stability.
Isah Mohammed Shambo is Founding Partner, Legacy Initiative Ltd
