By Group Captain Sadeeq Shehu Garba (rtd)
- A recalled caution on the “Egbetokun Amendment” and the perils of personalised law-making
For those who follow my posts, on the IGP Egbetokun matter, I cautioned—publicly and repeatedly—on 24 July 2024 and again on 9 February 2025 against subverting an entire institution for the convenience of one individual. Laws exist to protect institutions, not to flatter incumbents. When that boundary is crossed, legitimacy suffers, morale erodes, and dangerous precedents are set.
Whether President Bola Ahmed Tinubu retains or sacks the current Inspector-General of Police, Kayode Egbetokun will likely be remembered—fairly or unfairly—as an IGP with a tainted mandate. If not labelled outright “illegal,” then certainly as an IGP whose continuation in office required tailor-made legislation, inviting quiet scorn from contemporaries and subordinates alike.
From my years in uniform, I have consistently opposed extensions of service. My stand was, and still is, I am yet to see an officer whose departure a Service could not survive. Do your 35 years or attain 60 years (as it should apply to every personnel from Private to General to Service Chief/IGP and equivalent ), and leave. Institutions must outlive individuals. By the same token, I see nothing so extraordinary in Egbetokun as to justify amending the Police Act to suit his pleasure. In my vocabulary, this was less a Police Act (Amendment) than what I called it “Egbetokun Amendment.”
THE UNFORTUNATE BILL—AND THE PRECEDENT IT SETS
Despite widespread objections, the Nigerian Senate Nigerian Senate hurriedly, and shamelessly in less than 1 hour passed the Police Act (Amendment) Bill, 2024. This occurred even after key stakeholders—the Police Service Commission, the Ministry of Police Affairs, and the National Salaries and Wages Commission—withheld support at public hearings. Their warnings were clear: the proposal would produce unintended, far-reaching consequences—encouraging stagnation, weakening morale, distorting career progression, and setting a dangerous precedent for the military, intelligence, and paramilitary services.
Beyond policy wisdom lies an ethical problem. Global best practice is simple: when a law confers added advantages on an office, the current occupant should not be the first beneficiary. This avoids the obvious conflict—entering office and rewriting the rules for personal gain.
There is also a normative conflict with long-standing public service principles that fix retirement at 60 years of age or 35 years of service, whichever comes first. To carve out exceptions for one officeholder undermines uniformity and fairness across the service.
WHAT THE 2024 AMENDMENT ACTUALLY DID
To be precise, the 2024 amendment inserted a new subsection into Section 18—commonly referenced as Section 18(8A). It provides that:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (
… any person appointed to the office of Inspector-General of Police shall remain in office until the end of the term stipulated in the letter of appointment in line with the provisions of Section 7(6) of this Act.”
In effect, this creates a bespoke exception for the IGP: regardless of age or years of service, an appointed IGP may serve the full four-year term stated in the appointment letter. Applied to IGP Egbetokun the intended beneficiary, this meant he was to remain IGP until 31 October 2027, bypassing the standard retirement threshold. That is the heart of the controversy—and why many rightly view it as personalised legislation.
WHY FIXED TENURE MATTERS IN A DEMOCRACY
In mature democracies, the tenure and retirement thresholds of security chiefs (military, Police, Intelligence, paramilitary ) are fixed by law and altered only in extraordinary circumstances (such as war). The benefits are well known:
• Stability & continuity in leadership and operations
• Professionalism & meritocracy, insulated from political whims
• Strategic planning with policy consistency
• Accountability, with clear expectations and reviews
• Institutional memory, mentoring, and orderly succession
• Morale & discipline, driven by predictability and fairness
• Public trust, strengthened by democratic oversight
Conversely, ad hoc extensions breed uncertainty, politicisation, and low morale. Worse still, senior officers who know they will never reach the top may lapse into “injury-time” behaviour—prioritising personal extraction over institutional stewardship. Loyalty begins to trump merit; respect erodes; and corruption risks rise.
We have seen this movie before. Unusually long tenures under previous administrations distorted progression and forced premature retirements of capable officers. Once you allow five-and-a-half years, someone else will ask for eight.
THE IRONY OF THE EGBETOKUN AMENDMENT —AND THE LESSON
The bitter irony is this: after a law crafted for one man, the beneficiary reportedly fell out of favour before reaching the very end date the amendment was designed to secure. So, to what end the contortions? What was gained—besides institutional damage?
Democracy is checks and balances. Presidential power is not limitless; it is regulated by the legislature. In this instance, the Senate failed that duty.
FINAL WORD
Laws especially those regarding appointments and promotions within the security services must be general, prospective, and impersonal. When legislation is personalised, institutions bleed—and the individual it sought to protect is often the first casualty of the backlash. By same token recall the attempt to promote the President’s ADC from Col to Brigadier-General within 1 year!
The lesson is timeless:
Never bend the law for one man. Build institutions that endure beyond all men.
Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd) is a Security & Defence Analyst/Conflict Security & Development Consult Ltd
