“The unity of Nigeria relies on equal and merit-based collaboration” – Nnamdi Azikiwe.
The political landscape for the 2027 election was solidified on May 8, 2026, when Peter Obi formed a significant strategic alliance with influential Kano politician Rabiu Kwankwaso. This partnership united two prominent grassroots movements in Nigeria’s political sphere: the Obidient and Kwankwasiyya movements. The formal announcement by their party, the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), to zone the presidential position to Southern Nigeria was a major development that began to materialise last Saturday. This decision has triggered panic among their opponents, leading to a flurry of negative speculations. It would be unrealistic to expect anything less than frustration, akin to a parent hitting a child and then expecting them not to cry or dictate how they should react.
Obi and Kwankwaso initiated this political shake-up by departing from the fractured African Democratic Congress (ADC), which hesitated on zoning due to its own selfish interests which are now very well exposed by the recent unwise and provocative statement against zoning by the ADC’s chieftain former Vice President Atiku Abubakar. Atiku had anticipated that Obi and Kwankwaso would remain caught in a web of confusion over zoning and party legitimacy, but they demonstrated considerable acumen. Their shrewdness has stirred frustration, prompting extreme reactions from adversaries.
With impending defeat becoming increasingly evident, Seyi Tinubu, son of President Tinubu, reportedly claimed that not even God could prevent his father from completing a second term, reflecting a misunderstanding of divine omniscience and omnipotence. Another provocateur on social media, an Afenifere chieftain Akin Fapunda threatened that if the Obi/Kwankwaso alliance led to Tinubu’s defeat in 2027, it could incite a conflict between the Yorubas and Igbos reminiscent of the Rwandan tragedy between the Hutus and Tutsis. These reactions indicate an awakening realisation among them that the farce surrounding governance since 2023 is nearing its end, regardless of their wishes.
Such frustration was inevitable after their manoeuvres began to falter. Their initial strategy involved undermining credible political platforms to prevent strong opposition from arising, alongside pressuring governors to align with the ruling party in support of the President’s reelection. Similarly, members of the national assembly, judiciary, and security forces have acted in accordance with the President’s agenda, hoping to replicate the electoral manipulation of 2023. They seem to have forgotten that when Obi triumphed over the President in Lagos, FCT, Enugu, Kaduna, Plateau, Imo, Abia, Ebonyi, and other states in 2023, he did so without any Governors, national assembly members, or security support. The excitement surrounding the political alliance between Obi and Kwankwaso has raised numerous intriguing issues that highlight the self-interest in our political landscape and the shortsightedness of our leaders.
Undoubtedly, since the political era began in 1999, the Igbos have been the most marginalised among Nigeria’s major ethnic groups, despite their loyalty. Analysing power distribution among the three dominant ethnic groups—Yorubas, Hausa-Fulani, and Igbos—enlightens the current situation. Since 1999, these groups have held power as follows: the Yorubas for 11 years (Olusegun Obasanjo for 8 and Bola Tinubu for 4); Hausa-Fulani for 11 years (Umaru Yar’Adua for 3 and Muhammadu Buhari for 8); Vice Presidents: Yorubas for 8 years (Yemi Osinbajo), Hausa-Fulani for 13 years (Atiku Abubakar for 8 and Namadi Sambo for 5). The Igbos have not occupied either the presidency or vice-presidency during the past 27 years.
Notably, smaller ethnic groups like the Ijaw have held five years of the presidency and three years of the vice-presidency, while the Kanuri have held three years in the vice-presidential role. Throughout these dynamics, the Igbos significantly contributed to the ascension of Obasanjo (Yoruba), Yar’Adua (Hausa-Fulani), and Goodluck Jonathan (Ijaw). Against this backdrop, someone is threatening the Igbos for seeking the presidency through legitimate electoral means. Previously, the narrative suggested a lack of unity among the Igbos; however, they are now presenting a single candidate regarded as the most qualified for the country, both in character and vision. The stark truth is that the current predicament has surpassed ethnic nationalism, demanding pragmatic leadership to address the numerous governance challenges facing the nation.
Coincidentally, among the presidential aspirants, a well-regarded candidate with a strong track record hails from the Igbo community. This situation simplifies matters for numerous Igbo political allies keen on settling debts. In Nigerian politics, “debts” are rarely honoured altruistically; they are repaid when the cost of non-compliance becomes prohibitive. For the Southeast, 2027 marks a pivotal moment for political “debt collection.” This upcoming cycle gives the Igbos a substantial opportunity to expect returns from their political benefactors. From 1999 to 2015, the Southeast constituted the backbone of the former ruling PDP, consistently supporting the party.
Many political analysts contend that the PDP has become a political debtor by failing to honour its commitment to the Southeast with a presidential ticket in 2023, disregarding zoning principles, an action still engineered by Atiku. Senator Kwankwaso’s comments at the recent national convention of the NDC in Abuja reinforce the argument for the Igbos to anticipate political reparations in 2027.
In Kwankwaso’s words: “In 1954, a significant alliance was formed between the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), led by Aminu Kano, and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, aimed at achieving national unity. Again, in 1960, despite formidable challenges, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe’s NCNC formed a coalition with the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) to secure our independence. The alliance between Shehu Shagari and Alex Ekwueme under the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) restored civilian governance and national cohesion post-military rule in the Second Republic. It is with a sense of unity and solidarity that, as a dedicated party member, I endorse the decision to zone the NDC presidential ticket to the south, granting the region an opportunity to fulfil its leadership role. This signifies a genuine chance for healing and national reconciliation. We will adhere to the party’s commitment to ensure fairness and a federal character in all matters.”
The connection between the Igbo populace and the Nigerian political environment is commonly characterized by a complicated ledger of “political debt,” grounded in historical alliances, unfulfilled promises, and the pursuit of inclusion. To grasp the dynamics of “political debtors” within this framework, one must examine the various stakeholders indebted to the Southeast and the approaches taken to collect these debts. For many, the foremost “debtor” is the Nigerian federation itself. Since the end of the Civil War, the “Three Rs” (Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration) have often been perceived by the Southeast as a partially fulfilled promise. Among the most significant debts mentioned is the “zoning” or “power shift” agreement.
Since 1999, there has been significant support for various regional blocs in presidential elections, leading to a widespread belief that the Southeast deserves a chance at the presidency as a final move toward complete reintegration. This sentiment is strongly emphasised by Senator Kwankwaso in his remarks aimed at healing the nation. As we approach the pivotal electoral year of 2027, the notion of Nigeria’s “political debt” to the Ndigbo highlights a longstanding argument that the Southeast requires both moral and structural restoration within the Nigerian federation. This “debt” is often interpreted through the lenses of historical exclusion, economic marginalisation, and the pursuit of political equity—issues that Senator Kwankwaso accurately describes as wounds in need of urgent attention.
The unfair treatment of the Ndigbo in Nigeria’s political landscape is no longer a quiet concern; it is a widely recognised issue, even among international observers, with deep-rooted historical context. Dr Henry Kissinger, a highly regarded former U.S. Secretary of State, succinctly articulated this plight, describing the Igbos as “the wandering Jews of West Africa—gifted, aggressive, and westernised; at best envied and resented, but mostly despised by their neighbours.” The uncomfortable truth that many continue to overlook is that the marginalisation of the Ndigbo in Nigeria is a genuine issue, compounded by consistent failings in internal leadership – a gap that Obi and Kwankwaso are poised to address and rectify. We hope for divine assistance in this endeavour. God help us.
