By Moshood Oshunfurewa, June 28, 2026

- Rather, the concern is whether Africa’s largest economy should present subsistence trading as a strategic response to mass unemployment among millions of educated youths.
Senator Oluremi Tinubu’s recent advocacy urging Nigerian youths to embrace the sale of akara, roasted corn and kuli-kuli as empowerment opportunities has triggered intense national debate. While the initiative promotes entrepreneurship and self-reliance, many Nigerians view it as a troubling metaphor for the country’s economic direction. Across social media, citizens have appropriately termed this philosophy “Akaraeconometrics” – an economic condition where frying pans become instruments of national survival. The controversy is not about the dignity of labour; selling akara is honourable. Rather, the concern is whether Africa’s largest economy should present subsistence trading as a strategic response to mass unemployment among millions of educated youths.
The fundamental question is simple: should Nigerian graduates compete in the global digital economy as software developers, engineers and innovators, or compete for lucrative roadside spaces to sell bean cakes? Akaraeconometrics represents a framework in which declining productivity, weak industrialisation and shrinking formal employment force citizens into low-income informal activities. It inadvertently normalises survivalist entrepreneurship as public policy. If this trajectory continues, future labour statistics may include new occupations such as “Senior Akara Analyst” or “Principal Roasted Corn Consultant.” Humorous as this sounds, it reflects a painful economic reality confronting millions of Nigerians.
Since President Bola Ahmed Tinubu assumed office in May 2023, his administration has implemented significant reforms, notably fuel subsidy removal, exchange-rate unification and fiscal restructuring. Government officials argue that these measures are painful but necessary reforms designed to stabilise the economy and stimulate long-term growth. However, for ordinary Nigerians, these policies have resembled economic surgery performed without anaesthesia. The immediate consequence has been a sharp increase in the cost of living, with citizens bearing the heaviest burden of adjustment while the anticipated benefits remain largely prospective rather than tangible.
Inflation remains the most visible indicator of this hardship. Nigeria’s headline inflation exceeded 34 per cent in 2024 before moderating slightly, while food inflation rose beyond 39 per cent at certain periods. Consequently, the purchasing power of workers has collapsed dramatically. A civil servant earning ₦70,000 monthly under the new minimum wage often spends more than 60 per cent of income on food alone. For many households, salaries no longer survive beyond the first week of the month. Economists call this declining real income; Nigerians simply describe it as “salary disappearing before month-end.”
Exchange-rate reforms have also imposed severe pressures on households and businesses. The naira depreciated from approximately ₦460 per dollar in early 2023 to above ₦1,500 per dollar in various periods thereafter. Since Nigeria relies heavily on imported raw materials, machinery and refined petroleum products, depreciation immediately translated into higher prices. Transportation fares increased by over 100 per cent in many cities following subsidy removal. Electricity tariffs also rose significantly, further compounding the burden on workers and small enterprises already struggling with declining consumer demand.
At the microeconomic level, small and medium-scale enterprises have become unintended casualties of reform. According to business associations, thousands of micro-enterprises have either downsized operations or shut down entirely due to escalating production costs. Manufacturers face rising expenses for diesel, logistics, imported inputs and electricity. Many firms have consequently reduced staff strength. Unemployment and underemployment remain significant challenges, particularly among young Nigerians. In this environment, informal economic activities naturally expand because citizens must survive, irrespective of macroeconomic theories.
This expansion of the informal economy is what gives birth to Akaraeconometrics. Not necessarily as deliberate state policy, but as evidence of structural deficiencies within the economy. Nigerians have demonstrated extraordinary resilience by adapting creatively to adversity. Yet resilience should never substitute for development policy. A nation cannot sustainably develop by merely encouraging citizens to improvise their way through hardship. Public policy should focus on creating productive jobs rather than celebrating coping mechanisms that emerge from economic distress.
History offers important lessons. China transformed its economy through industrialisation and export-led manufacturing. India leveraged technology and service industries to absorb millions of skilled youths. South Korea invested aggressively in education, infrastructure and innovation. None of these economies institutionalised subsistence trading as a principal youth employment strategy. Nigeria therefore risks romanticising informality while neglecting industrial development, technological advancement and large-scale job creation capable of harnessing its demographic potential.
The tragedy is not that youths sell akara, roasted corn or kuli-kuli. The tragedy lies in the fact that many possess university degrees, technical competencies and entrepreneurial ambitions far beyond subsistence trading. Yet weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure, policy inconsistencies and governance challenges constrain their productive capacities. Every graduate compelled into survivalist commerce represents both an individual adaptation and a collective economic failure. Human capital, arguably Nigeria’s greatest resource, remains grossly underutilised.
Consequently, Akaraeconometrics should serve less as an empowerment slogan and more as a national wake-up call. With a population exceeding 230 million people and a median age below 19 years, Nigeria possesses enormous demographic advantages. However, demographic dividends emerge only when young people access quality education, productive employment and innovation opportunities. Expanding roadside commerce may reduce visible unemployment statistics, but it cannot substitute for coherent industrial policy or sustainable economic transformation.
Governments are judged not by the number of empowerment programmes launched, but by the quality of opportunities available to citizens. A truly renewed hope economy should empower young Nigerians to manufacture, innovate, conduct research, develop software and compete globally. Until then, Akaraeconometrics may remain the unintended symbol of an economy where citizens are repeatedly urged to tighten their belts while simultaneously being encouraged to sell what they can fry. The critical question, therefore, is whether the economic fire beneath Nigeria’s frying pan is becoming unbearably hot for ordinary citizens.
@SaharaReporters


