By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd)
Given our current security challenges, neighbouring threats, and given our size of territory and population as well as our geopolitical aspiration as regional hegemony and provider of peacekeepers to ECOWAS, African Union and the United Nations, that Nigeria needs more military personnel and policemen is no longer an issue of debate. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s announcement that four additional Nigerian Army Divisions are to be established – bringing the number from eight to twelve – has understandably been received as good news. Nigeria faces terrorism, insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence, oil theft and other security threats across a vast territory.
It therefore seems logical to conclude that more Army Divisions must mean greater security. But would creating four more Divisions automatically produce a stronger Army?
Not necessarily so, in my humble opinion.
Permit me to explain three related but very different military concepts in language everyone can understand: Force Structure, Force Strength and Force Readiness.
1. FORCE STRUCTURE: WHAT EXISTS ON PAPER
Force structure is the way a military is organised. For the Army, it includes:
Army Headquarters (AHQ); Divisions; Brigades; Battalions; Companies; and Combat-support and Logistics Formations.
A Division (whether Infantry or Armoured) is not merely a collection of soldiers. It is a major formation normally comprising a headquarters, subordinate Brigades and Battalions, together with artillery, engineers, signals, intelligence, medical, transport, maintenance and logistics support.
Creating a new Division therefore increases the Army’s organisational structure. It may provide better Command and Control over a particular geographical area and reduce the burden on an existing Divisional Headquarters.
However, drawing four additional boxes on an organisational chart does not, by itself, produce four additional fighting formations.
Think of a Division as a new hospital. Government may announce the creation of four hospitals, construct signboards, appoint four Chief Medical Directors and establish administrative departments. But unless the hospitals have doctors, nurses, beds, medicines, laboratories, ambulances and reliable funding, the country has increased the number of hospitals without necessarily increasing healthcare delivery. The same principle applies to military formations.
2. FORCE STRENGTH: WHAT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT THE STRUCTURE ACTUALLY HAS
Force strength refers to the personnel, weapons, vehicles, communications systems and other equipment assigned to military formations. From Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) in the subject Organization and Administration (O&A), officers are told every formation has an authourised establishment – often reflected in its Table of Organisation and Equipment (TOE). This states how many personnel and what types of equipment the formation should possess, so detailed as number per rank for personnel, number of doctors, chaplain and for equipment even how many radio sets ambulances and field kitchen.
But in talking about TOE three figures must not be confused:
Authourised strength as per TOE – What the unit should have; For example, a Battalion – 700-800 officers and men; Brigade – some 2,500+ and Division – 10,000-20,000 depending on type and role of the Division.
Actual strength – What it presently has; and
Effective strength – What is genuinely available for operations less those on leave, sick, on training, on AWOL or in guardroom killing mosquitoes. For example, a Battalion may be authourised 700 personnel but have only 480 assigned. Of those, some may be on courses, medically unavailable, attached elsewhere, on leave or performing administrative duties. Its effective operational strength may therefore be considerably lower than 700.
The same applies to equipment. A unit may be authourised 50 vehicles as per TOE, have 35 recorded on its inventory, physically possess 30 and have only 18 that are immediately serviceable. Its true operational vehicle strength is not 50, 35 or even 30. It is 18.
This is why the important question is not only how many Divisions Nigeria has, but:
How adequately manned are the existing 8 Divisions? How many of their Brigades and Battalions are at or near authourised strength? What are their actual equipment holdings? How much of that equipment is serviceable, ready to be used ? Are critical shortages being addressed? Where will the personnel and equipment for four new Divisions come from? (Some are asking is it the 28, 000 to be recruited that will man the 4 new Divisions?) If personnel and equipment are simply transferred from the existing eight Divisions to populate the new four, Nigeria may end up redistributing existing shortages instead of generating additional combat power. We must therefore distinguish between creating new formations and creating new military capability.
3. FORCE READINESS: WHAT THE MILITARY CAN ACTUALLY DEPLOY, FIGHT AND SUSTAIN
This is the most important concept. Force readiness is the ability of a formation to undertake its assigned mission within the required time and sustain that mission for as long as necessary. A formation may exist on paper and possess personnel and equipment, yet still not be operationally ready. Readiness depends on several factors working together: personnel; equipment availability and serviceability; training; ammunition; fuel; communications; intelligence; mobility assets muti-mode ; medical support; maintenance; logistics; and effective command and control. Without some or any of these, the unit will struggle. Suppose a brigade has enough soldiers say minimum 70% of TOE, but lacks sufficient vehicles to transport them. Or it possesses vehicles but cannot obtain spare parts. Or it has weapons but inadequate ammunition stocks. Or its units have been continuously deployed without sufficient time to rest, retrain and replace equipment. Yes, that brigade exists. It has some force strength. But its readiness may still be low.
A military formation must be able to mobilise, deploy, communicate, fight, evacuate casualties, repair its equipment, replenish ammunition and remain supplied. Otherwise, it is not a fully operational formation.
As a general professional rule of thumb, military experts consider a unit at 90–100 per cent of its authorised personnel and equipment establishment (TOE) to be fully or highly ready (even though 100% is an aspiration and hardly attainable even for the most advanced and resourced militaries). At 80–89 per cent TOE, it remains substantially ready and can normally perform most missions despite manageable deficiencies. Between 70 and 79 per cent, it becomes marginally ready and is likely to struggle with sustained or full-spectrum operations. Below 70 per cent, its capability is seriously degraded, and it may be unable to perform its complete designed mission without reinforcement. Below 60 per cent, it is generally considered ineffective as a complete formation, although it may still undertake limited or specialized tasks. These are broad benchmarks rather than absolute rules, because shortages of critical commanders, specialists or essential equipment can render a unit ineffective even when its overall TOE percentage appears relatively high.
WHY ROTATION ALSO MATTERS
Soldiers and equipment cannot remain continuously deployed without deterioration. For every Battalion conducting sustained operations, for example in the North East (NE), there should be another battalion preparing to deploy, while a third Battalion recovers, retrains and repairs its equipment after deployment. Therefore, maintaining one Battalion continuously in the field may require several Battalions within the rotation system. People sometimes reduce this to the statement that for every soldier at the front, four or five others are behind him.
Nigerian Army is deployed across many States and theatres. Persistent Internal Security Operations (ISOs) can stretch personnel, wear out vehicles and weapons, reduce training time and weaken the rotation system.
This is why just increasing 4 Divisional headquarters without proportionately increasing trained personnel, equipment, logistics and maintenance in existing 8 Divisions could aggravate existing pressure.
Having said all this, SO, ARE FOUR ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS A BAD IDEA?
Not necessarily. Additional Divisions may be justified if Nigeria’s security assessment shows that: Existing Divisions cover excessively large areas; additional headquarters are required for better Command and Control; sufficient Brigades and Battalions will be created to populate them; recruitment and training will expand without lowering standards; equipment procurement will match personnel expansion; artillery, engineers, signals, intelligence, aviation, medical and logistics support will increase correspondingly; barracks, depots, workshops and training facilities will be provided; and government can sustain the recurrent costs over many years.
The announcement could therefore represent the beginning of a necessary expansion.
But before celebrating the number 12, Nigerians deserve to understand the force-generation plan behind it. Will these be four genuinely additional Divisions, with new personnel, equipment and supporting capabilities? Or will existing less than optimal TOE formations be just divided and redistributed under four new headquarters?
EXPANSION TO 12 DIVISIONS OR CONSOLIDATION OF EXISTING 8 DIVISIONS?
It is not a binary issue. Looking at it, the proper choice is not necessarily between creating new Divisions and strengthening existing ones. Nigeria may need to do both – but expansion must be properly sequenced, funded and sustained.
A comprehensive defence-force audit should first establish:
1. The authourised, actual and deployable strength of existing formations;
2. Equipment holdings and serviceability;
3. Operational commitments and rotation requirements;
4. Personnel and specialist shortages;
5. Current logistics and infrastructure gaps;
6. Training and readiness levels; and
7. The full cost of establishing and sustaining additional divisions.
Only then can government determine whether four new Divisions are the most urgent solution – or whether some resources should first bring existing 8 Divisions, Brigades and battalions closer to their authourised strength and readiness levels.
THE BOTTOM LINE
FORCE STRUCTURE is what appears on the organisational chart. For example, we have 12 Divisions.
STRENGTH is the personnel and equipment actually assigned to that structure as per TOE. For example, each Division has…
FORCE READINESS (the most important) is the portion of that strength that can deploy, fight and be sustained.
Increasing the number of Divisions immediately increases Force Structure. Yes, it does not automatically increase Force Strength, readiness or combat power. Twelve under-strength and inadequately equipped Divisions may look more impressive on paper. But eight properly manned, equipped, trained and sustainable Divisions could possess greater operational capability.
If honest and frank discussions are held between the NA/military top brass – Defence Headquarters Nigeria, HQ Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force and Mr President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Bola Ahmed Tinubu – we may well find that for NOW, upgrading and filling the yawning personnel and equipment gaps in the existing 8 Army Divisions is a better idea than creating 4 new Divisions. This is six (6) pence worth of my personal opinion.
Finally, permit me to say, citizens need to know, the state of readiness of our Army currently is not so that good. It is same in the Navy and the Nigerian Air Force. None of the three Services in my humble opinion really need additional units now. What they need is consolidation of existing ones by filling yawning gaps in both personnel and equipment (for the Army) and mostly equipment (for the Navy and NAF).
Once again, I apologise for putting a professional dampener on what appears to be very happy news to Nigerians. Note: I am not opposed to expanding the Nigerian Army. Nigeria’s security challenges may indeed require it.
My caution is simply this: Let us ensure that we are creating four additional operational capabilities – not merely four additional Divisional Headquarters.
In military affairs, what ultimately matters is not the number of formations announced, but the number that can actually deploy, accomplish their missions and be sustained in the field. Sometimes eight may be better than 12.
FINAL POSER: A Daily Trust 26 April 2026 investigation of the Nigerian Army’s 2025 budget found that only ₦1.46 billion – or 7.11% – of the ₦20.56 billion allocated for security equipment was released. Similarly, only ₦16.71 billion – or 4.96% – of the ₦336.76 billion budgeted for defence equipment was released. Overall, the Army reportedly received just ₦1.17 trillion – or 25.94% – of its ₦4.52 trillion proposed expenditure.
Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume reinforced the seriousness of the funding gap: “They don’t have MRAPs, they don’t have gun trucks, they don’t have other arms and ammunition required.” He maintained that although troop morale remained high, inadequate equipment and ammunition were undermining operational effectiveness
These figures reinforce the central question: if the existing Army is receiving only a fraction of its approved equipment funding, how will four additional Divisions be properly manned, equipped and sustained?
Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd) is a Security & Defence Analyst/Conflict Security & Development Consult Ltd
