EXPLOITING THE NON-KINETIC OPTIONS IN COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS: PROSPECTS AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF NIGERIA, A PRESENTATION BY BRIGADIER GENERAL SANI KUKASHEKA USMAN (RTD) mni fnipr fapra fnarc FIOARM fspsp, TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY SEMINAR AT THE ARMED FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE JAJI ON TUESDAY 28 FEBRUARY 2023
PROTOCOL
INTRODUCTION
1. It is a great honour to stand before you to discuss a very important issue, “Exploiting the Non-Kinetic Options in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency (CTCOIN) Operations: Prospect and the way Forward for the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN).” However, before proceeding further, I would like to thank the Commandant of this prestigious and great institution, the faculty members, and the seminar organisers for the kind invitation. This year’s seminar could not have come at a better time because Nigeria has been involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts against Boko Haram terrorist group (BHT) and other terrorist groups for over thirteen years now. Therefore, the theme for this seminar, “Optimising the Whole of Society Approach to CTCOIN Operations,” is quite apt and timely, given the fact that the government and the military have over the years been using mostly kinetic approaches in dealing with these security challenges.
2. Interestingly, the concept of CTCOIN has become a topic of great concern since the attacks by Al-Qaeda terrorist groups on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 2001. Since then, terrorists and insurgent groups such as the Al-Qaeda, Taliban, BHT, and Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have continued to employ unconventional means to engage in conflicts against the state. According to Ogbaje (2023), “The complexity of the insurgency and the heterogeneous nature of non-state armed groups in the region demand that the state apply a mix of both military and civil approach to the crisis.” In some advanced nations, authorities have developed synergy and capabilities using both the military and other means to curb terrorism and insurgency in their respective countries. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) created winning the heart and minds in Northern Ireland to curtail the Irish Republican Army’s insurgency. Sri Lanka is another example when it developed what is termed a “politico-military strategy” to isolate The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from international influence and militarily defeated them in May 2009. These countries employed both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches in winning the war against terrorism and insurgency. Therefore, the implementation of these approaches in CTCOIN efforts by these countries leading to victory over insurgents in their respective countries holds an excellent lesson for Nigeria. In Nigeria, a strong emphasis has been placed on using the military to address the serious security and political issues the nation is currently facing.
3. Therefore, efforts to address the challenges of CTCOIN have become imperative because of the threat posed by the menace of BHT in the Northeast (NE) and other parts of Nigeria. The military strategy of Decimate, Dominate and Occupy (DDO) is still evolving in the CTCOIN efforts. However, the call to consider other steps towards defeating terrorism and insurgency has led the country to explore and integrate a non-kinetic approach. Interestingly, since the beginning of the non-kinetic effort, the fight against terrorism and insurgency has taken a new and positive dimension. Therefore, it is essential to explore this approach in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, its prospect and the way forward.
4. The whole essence of the non-kinetic approach to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is to unify the military and civilian efforts in the attainment of the overall objective of defeating terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. However, the topic given to me is a bit confusing because, unlike “Kinetic”, the concept “Non-kinetic” has different meanings, understanding and applications, especially in this modern conflict-saturated era, which mostly involves non-state actors. However, it is essential to note that there is no way anyone could talk about non-kinetics without comprehending what is kinetic. In its ordinary meaning, the word “kinetic” is an adjective related to or resulting from motion. Etymologically, however, it was derived from the ancient Greek word “kinetikos” which means “to move.” However, in these contemporary times, it refers to those military physical actions or measures taken against an enemy or adversary. Many people refer to information operations as a non-kinetic aspect of warfare. In contrast, others refer to those humanitarian assistance activities such as Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and other efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. It also relates to media and information management, to influence and gain support, cooperation, and understanding of the people.
5. To underscore the importance of the media in contemporary warfare, Gorka (2010) stated, “Today we face a foe who knows that wars start with ideas and depends on them far more than weapons.” He further stated that because of this capability violent extremists and terrorist organisations have capitalised on the media to replenish their ranks and sway neutral populations who provide safe havens, and moral and material support. Insurgents and violent extremists in various parts of the world have enjoyed, and still enjoy, a period in which they could spread their ideas. This is done mainly through the media; mainstream and online. The power of media and information in today’s world cannot be overemphasised. Image making, perception development, shaping and managing public information have become the prime means for influencing the target audiences’ attitudes, behaviours, and decisions. Therefore, non-kinetic efforts have an overriding effect and influence over most conflict resolution mechanisms. According to Letho and Henselmann (2020), “The sole aim of information operations is to massively flood volumes of information into the mind of the target audience. This flooding leaves the audience unable to filter right from wrong. Whether information is believed, ignored or distrusted will depend upon the intellectual standing of the receiver and reputation and credibility of the sender.” Regardless of the perception and understanding of what constitutes non-kinetic efforts, we must appraise it concerning Nigeria’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign, and its prospects to enhance it.
AIM
6. This presentation aims to explore the non-kinetic approach to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts in Nigeria, and its prospects and make recommendations.
SCOPE
7. The presentation will cover the following:
a. Conceptual clarification.
b. Understanding the differences between Kinetic and Non-Kinetic efforts.
c. Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria using Kinetic efforts.
d. Exploring Non-kinetic efforts in Nigeria.
e. The media and non-kinetic efforts in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria.
f. Way forward.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
8. In a presentation of this nature, there is the need to clarify some key terms in the context of use. These are Kinetic and Non-kinetic efforts, Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism Operations and Media.
Kinetic Efforts
9. As noted earlier, the word “kinetic” is an adjective used to describe motion. However, it has assumed a new and more comprehensive meaning. Therefore, the kinetic effort is used to contrast conventional military force and “soft” force, including diplomacy, sanctions, and cyber warfare (Rochford, 2013). Similarly, kinetic efforts refer to the use of military or security forces against enemies or opposing forces using lethal effects in their physical domain. The United States Air Force also defined it as actions taken using physical, material means like bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions against an enemy, adversary, or target. This effort is targeted at degrading the enemy of a nation without sympathy for them. The various operations of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) in the Northeast, beginning with Operation BOYONA which has transformed into the present Operation HADIN KAI, are clear examples of kinetic efforts.
Non-kinetic Efforts
10. Non-kinetic efforts describe the application of non-military and other capabilities against an adversary or enemy. It can be seen as the application of nonviolent strategies and tactics to influence the attitude and mind of the targeted population. The United States of America Air Force describes non-kinetic efforts and actions as “logical, electromagnetic, or behavioural, such as a computer network attack on an enemy system or a psychological operation aimed at enemy troops.” The 21st-century military is exploring less violent and more high-tech means of warfare, such as messing electronically with the enemy’s communications equipment or wiping out its bank accounts (Noah, 2002). These efforts are non-kinetic and have a physical component with mainly indirect effects which are functional, systematic, psychological, or behavioural. In Nigeria, the military operation codenamed Operation SAFE CORRIDOR, established in 2016 to receive voluntary defectors from the BHT, is non-kinetic in nature.
Counterinsurgency Operations
11. According to Eteng (2016), Counterinsurgency (COIN) operation is the full range of measures, military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and sociological, which are undertaken by a government independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to prevent or defeat the insurgency and restore the authority of the central government. COIN operation involves a combination of measures undertaken by the legitimate government to curb or suppress an insurgency taken up against it. The clarification of COIN is not explicit without the role of civil society and other stakeholders in such an operation, which is very important in non-kinetic operations.
12. The 2009 American Joint Publication 3-24 COIN Operations Manual defines COIN operations as comprehensive civilian and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency and address any core governance issues. Counterinsurgency operations therefore must balance the elimination of grievances to include the prevention of human rights abuses and security force action that eliminates the insurgents. In addition, the security forces provide the populace with the protection necessary to restore government presence, essential services, and control.
Counterterrorism Operations
13. Counterterrorism (CT) operations are special measures aimed at stopping terrorist action, ensuring the security of individuals, neutralising terrorists, and minimising the consequences of terrorist action (Legislationline.org, 2021). CT incorporates the practice, military tactics, techniques, and strategies used by government, military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies to combat or prevent terrorism (Miller and Donnatucci, 2019). Accordingly, CT focuses on the study of terrorism as a global and national threat and the methods for analysing and countering it.
Media
14. According to Akin and Burgess (2005), “Mass media include all forms of information communicated to large groups of people, from a handmade sign to an international news network. There is no standard for how large the audience needs to be before communication becomes mass communication.” Similarly, the Nigerian Army Media Operations Handbook (2009), defined media as “how news and information are communicated to the public through the airwaves and newspapers.” It went further to add that “the general usage now, collectively, considers the media to be television, radio, and the press.” However, media in this context refers to all those tools or means of disseminating messages, information, or entertainment to the people. These include newspapers, magazines, radio, television, social media platforms, blogs, mobile phones, and other matters hosted on the Internet (World Wide Web) for news, entertainment, and information dissemination to a wide variety of audiences.
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KINETIC AND
NON-KINETIC EFFORTS
15. Generally, kinetic efforts are the application of military force based on the release or concentration of dynamic forces against adversaries or opposing objects with primarily lethal effects in the physical domain. In contrast, non-kinetic targeting describes the targeted application of other military and non-military capabilities against adversaries to generate additional non-kinetic effects in the non-physical and physical domains (Ducheine, 2014). Kinetic operations are actions on the battlefield that involve direct fire, specifically intended to exterminate the enemy violently. The non-kinetic effort, on the other hand, is an operational activity in the battlespace that consists of shaping the battlefield environment without directly engaging the target audience with violent weaponry or action. In non-kinetic operations, the target audience is either the enemy or the local populace. Kinetic and non-kinetic operations are not mutually exclusive. Commanders require discipline and a deliberate focus to balance and coordinate the two in shaping the battlefield to support successful CTCOIN operations (Stern, 2011).
16. In CTCOIN operations, it may be more accessible, or even necessary, for irregular guerrilla forces to use information as their non-kinetic primary weapon, if they lack the kinetic or physical resources, or if they are less troubled by ethical, political, and legal constraints in exploiting kinetic efforts to the maximum extent possible. Although non-kinetic action is not a standalone concept, it is vitally important in contemporary military operations. It provides opportunities to engage and affect other target audiences, including supporters, with less devastating effects. It also includes stressing the crucial role of non-kinetic elements like information, perception, cohesion, understanding and will. Non-kinetic efforts create unique uncertainties before and outside of traditional military warfare, precisely because they have qualitatively and quantitatively “fuzzy boundaries” as blatant acts of aggression. The intentionally induced ambiguity of non-kinetic efforts in military operations can also generate additional advantages for the executor and zero-sum dilemmas for the targets (HDIAC, 2019).
Figure 1: Kinetic and Non-kinetic Spectrum
17. Although non-kinetic efforts are preferred over kinetic ones, mainly because fewer casualties are involved, non-kinetic steps will only work to a certain extent. Thus, the government must aim to solve every conflict with non-kinetic efforts because they are deemed “non-lethal.” However, there is a point in every conflict where applying forces becomes imperative, forcing a shift from non-kinetic operations to kinetic. At this point, non-kinetic efforts should not cease but carefully be coupled with kinetic efforts to ensure the future stability of the population. In COIN, kinetic operations alone are less successful than when joined with non-kinetic operations, therefore, there is a need to combine both.
COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA, USING KINETIC EFFORTS
18. The AFN and other security agencies have been involved in kinetic operations against the BHTs in the ongoing CTCOIN operations. The kinetic approaches employed are discussed below:
Joint Operations
19. In 2009, the BHTs operated for days leading to the death of more than 1,000 people and the destruction of government and public facilities such as police stations and schools. In response to this attack, a Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation Restore Order (ORO) was established to curtail the activities of the insurgents in Borno State and its environs. JTF ORO, which was composed of AFN, Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and other security agencies, laid the foundation for the subsequent joint COIN operations in the Northeast. Effective collaboration in JTF ORO made the insurgents withdraw to Nigerian border areas with Cameroon, Chad and the Niger Republic. However, they often regrouped and launch attacks from these border areas. In response, Nigeria sought alliances with her neighbouring countries in line with Sun Tzu’s assertion that “no one has ever achieved anything of note without having alliances.”
20. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a joint military operation involving Nigeria and her neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region, was launched to deal with the BHTs’ threats. However, the asymmetric tactics of the BHTs enabled them to carry out attacks in the Nigerian border communities in the Northeast despite the overwhelming military presence. To give the requisite legal backing and effective Inter-Agency Collaboration (IAC), the amended National Anti-Terrorism Act of 2013 stipulates that the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is the coordinating body for all security and enforcement agencies. The Attorney General of the Federation is to ensure conformity of Nigeria’s CTCOIN laws and policies with international standards and UN conventions. The Act also provides that Nigeria maintains the international cooperation required for preventing and combating international acts of terrorism. Despite these efforts, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2013 did not specify the lead agency in the theatre of operations. This gap has often led to poor synergy and inter-service rivalry in CTCOIN operations in the Northeast.
Combat Operations
21. The 7 Division Nigerian Army was established in 2013 to take over the CTCOIN operations in Northeast Nigeria. Headquarters Theatre Command (TC) was established in 2015 for unified command and control of the joint operation involving the land, naval and air, components and other security agencies. The COIN operation was later renamed in July 2015 from Operation ZAMAN LAFIYA (OPZL) to Operation LAFIYA DOLE (OPLD), signalling the determination to attain peace at all costs. The change of name also brought in new concepts of operations. For example, motorcycle battalions and mobile brigades were established to enhance the firepower and mobility of the troops. Mobile Strike Teams (MST) were formed and deployed to cover specific areas within the theatre. The task of the MSTs was to conduct subsidiary and combined operations.
22. These operations include Operations GAMA AIKI, CRACKDOWN, RESCUE FINALE, DEEP PUNCH I, RAWAN KADA and DEEP PUNCH II, which yielded tremendous results. They led to the capture and occupation of Sambisa Forest, which was hitherto the BHTs stronghold. The achievements were partly made possible by the new equipment holding of the Nigerian Army (NA) after the procurement of new platforms and the introduction of the NA Decimate, Dominate and Occupy (DDO) strategy to CTCOIN. The DDO provided an essential guide to commanders and troops in the theatre of operations. Nonetheless, there are pockets of terrorists mostly on the fringes of Lake Chad with limited capacity to launch attacks on troops and soft targets, although mostly unsuccessfully nowadays.
APPRAISAL OF NON-KINETIC EFFORTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA
23. Although the conventional military yardsticks are still determining the overall power potential of states; non-kinetic means are becoming more relevant in the power projection of states. Non-kinetic warfare employs non-lethal strategies and tactics with sub-lethal weapons not intended to be lethal. It also includes a soft approach that emphasises the importance of persuasive methods. It aims to persuade, coerce, shape and impair the will of a target through exploitation, deepening or precipitating already existing fault lines and instabilities. This succinctly aligns with Sun Tzu’s Theory on the importance of taking the enemy state whole. The enemy should thus be regarded not as an entity that should be destroyed but convinced or subdued to stop their violent attacks. The Nigerian government has been involved in various non-kinetic efforts in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities against terrorists. The efforts have been well articulated and integrated as complete lines of operation to produce the desired effect and end terrorism and insurgency. Some of the non-kinetic approaches as discussed below include Deradicalization, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Information Operations.
Deradicalization
24. Radicalisation is the action or process of causing an individual or group to adopt a radical stance on political or social issues. Deradicalisation is, therefore, one of the non-kinetic measures undertaken to prevent such and find a lasting solution to terrorism and insurgency in a country. Operation SAFE CORRIDOR is one of the multidimensional non-kinetic efforts of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN)to restore lasting peace and security, especially in the Northeast. The operation was established to facilitate De-Radicalisation, Rehabilitation and Re-Integration (DRR) of surrendered members of the BHT group. It is a fully integrated humanitarian operation driven by the combined core competencies of relevant civil and military agencies. Facilitating easy access and passage for the surrender of insurgents to security forces for the subsequent DRR process was the operation’s primary objective. While the civil agencies under the operation handle the core aspect of the DRR programme using their expertise, however, the military provides leadership, coordination, and security through the established channel of command, control, and communication.
25. Operation SAFE CORRIDOR Camp at Malam Sidi in Gombe, Gombe State, became operational on 22 April 2016 with a core mandate to carry out deradicalisation and rehabilitation of surrendered BHT fighters and prepare them for re-integration into larger society through their respective State authorities. In carrying out this robust mandate, Operation SAFE CORRIDOR has recorded some achievements. While the ex-combatants are in the camp, they indicate where they wish to be resettled, and contact is made with their relations who sign consent notes indicating a willingness to accept the ex-combatants.
26. The traditional, community and religious leaders and representatives of the State Government in the areas are also notified of the intention, and they are involved in the resettlement process. The Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (FMWASD) and other relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) handle the resettlement process and assign parole officers to monitor the ex-combatants for not less than a period of 6 months after discharge from the camp. Depending on the vocation of their choice, the ex-combatants are engaged in further training with the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) skill acquisition centres. Before leaving the camp, ex-combatants often sign Attestation Forms and take an oath of allegiance to be law-abiding citizens in the presence of a judge of the Sharia Upper High Court/Magistrate Court. However, the reintegration process of the deradicalised ex-combatant is facing severe challenges. Many North-eastern State governments and communities have refused to cooperate in the reintegration process. Thus, some of these ex-combatants remained in the camp after the deradicalisation training as they await re-integration into society.
Quick Impact Projects
27. The BHTs have taken advantage of the high rate of poverty in the Northeast over the years to recruit and radicalise the unwary populace. Unemployment and poverty are socio-economic challenges that are intricately interconnected and glaringly evident in Northern Nigeria. Figures from Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicate that the country’s unemployment rate in 2006 averaged 14.60 per cent and increased to 33.30 per cent in 2021. In 2013, it was reported that the BHTs paid young members in Yobe and Borno States the sum of Five Thousand Naira (N5,000), each to set schools ablaze and spy on soldiers. In the hinterland of the Northeast, especially Borno and the Yobe States, government presence in terms of social amenities such as schools, roads, pipe-borne water and electricity was grossly lacking. The BHTs took advantage of this gap by providing essential services to the people, thus winning their support.
28. According to Clausewitz in his paradoxical trinity, “the properly balanced relationship between the government, military and people are vital during planning and execution of the war.” This emphasises the need to win the support of the population. Consequently, the military embarked on several community development projects to counter the radicalisation strategy of the BHTs to win the populace’s support. Specifically, the AFN provided and reconstructed roads, bridges, and schools. Others include the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to liberated towns, donating tractors to rural communities and building a major highway to open up Sambisa Forest. During the third quarter of 2020, the AFN sunk 81 boreholes, renovated 14 schools and constructed 14 clinics and dispensaries in various host communities. The military also renovated worship centres, donated buses, built roads, and installed transformer and solar-powered equipment in some host communities within the period (Alhassan, 2020). There were also various interventions in the educational sectors, especially in Pulka, Gwoza and Bama, just to mention a few, in Borno State. These QIPs are non-kinetic efforts executed to support COIN operations in the Northeast.
Information Operations
29. Information operations are a significant non-kinetic effort in ending terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. It entails the offensive and defensive use of information systems to negate, exploit or destroy an adversary’s information, information-based processes and computer-based networks while protecting the government’s own. The critical role of the media is thus magnified as the BHTs engage the media as a tool to propagate their ideology, recruit, pass messages, the source for funds and counter government efforts. Hence, the need to vary their propaganda through a medium closer to the populace, especially grassroots ones. In 2014, the Nigerian military commenced using radio as a medium for disseminating CTCOIN information to the people of Maiduguri and its environs. From 2015, the military, particularly the Nigerian Army, intensified the use of non-kinetic efforts such as the production and distribution of flyers, the use of media, and particularly social media to disseminate information and countered the terrorists’ propaganda and misinformation, it further countered the BHTs narratives, which were fast spreading across the Northeast. The establishment of Armed Forces Radio in Abuja and Operation LAFIYA DOLE (OPLD) Radio Frequency Modulation (FM) 108 MHz, (it now broadcasts 107.7), have assisted in the CTCOIN operations by sending messages to the general public on the efforts of the military.
30. The OPLD 108 FM Radio has a series of versatile programmes tailored to broad teeming listeners, such as sports news, health programmes, and Christian and Islamic programmes, amongst others. The FM radio has assisted Operation SAFE CORRIDOR by sending messages to the insurgents to come out and lay down their arms. This has helped counter the BHT propaganda that the military would kill any insurgent that surrenders to the security agencies. In September 2018, over ten repentant BHT confirmed that the FM radio programme they listened to gave them the confidence to come out and surrender to the Nigerian military. Furthermore, a member of the National Assembly representing Jere Federal Constituency remarks in 2021 that more insurgents were laying down their arms in Borno State because of the non-kinetic efforts in warfare adopted by the Nigerian military. This statement revealed the positive impact of non-kinetic efforts in the CTCOIN operations in the Northeast. The military, particularly the Nigerian Army, made extensive use of the media through consistent, timely and accurate dissemination of information to the public. These include the use of radio programmes, press releases, media briefings, production and distribution of flyers, toll-free call centre, the establishment of human rights desks, and embedding some journalists on the entourage of the Chief of Army Staff, as well as the use of social media and documentaries broadcast on television stations. The success gained with non-kinetic efforts in CTCOIN operations in Nigeria made people advocate for more of such an approach to the government in tackling insecurity in the country.
The Media and Non-kinetic Efforts in Nigeria
31. The role and importance of the media in any given society cannot be overemphasised as it seems to be indispensable because of its traditional role in society. People rely on the media for information on happenings in the community. It also performs a vital function in maintaining and guaranteeing free and democratic societies such as ours. In recognition of its ubiquitous roles and influence, it is often referred to as “The Watchdog” and the “Fourth Estate of the Realm.” This is due to the belief that the media makes the government accountable to the people through its works and shapes public opinion through information dissemination, enlightenment, and entertainment. The media mobilises and aggregates public opinion, influencing governments, persons, and business organisations’ decisions and policy formulation. It also enhances social interaction and integration. The advent of modern information and communication technology has vastly widened the scope of the role and coverage of the media, especially in CTCOIN operations.For example, in Nigeria, the media has brought information about the war against terror to the people through consistent reportage and updates of happenings at the various theatres of operations, often with graphic and sensational details. Through this, they support the information and psychological operations, which are significant non-kinetic efforts of the military in CTCOIN operations. Beyond this, the various services have continued to use the media to project their efforts and counter BHTs’ propaganda.
RECOMMENDATIONS
32. To further enhance the non-kinetic effort of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Nigeria, the following recommendations are proffered:
a. The Federal Government of Nigeria should encourage the AFN of Nigeria to continuously pursue the anon-kinetic line of operations as part of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Nigeria.
b. There should be legal backing and budgetary allocation to non-kinetic operations in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Nigeria.
CONCLUSION
33. Indeed, terrorism and insurgency as manifested by the activities of Boko Haram, ISWAP and other terrorist groups have continued to threaten peace and security in Nigeria. The nation continues to face multiple challenges posed by various terrorist groups with the devastating human cost, in terms of lives lost or permanently altered, internally displaced persons and immensely negative consequences for security and socio-economic development to thrive. Consequently, the government has been making concerted efforts to get rid of these twin security challenges using mainly kinetic efforts with visible but limited success. In the light of above, this presentation critically appraised the non-kinetic efforts in the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts in Nigeria. Therefore, a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts could have added more impetus to the fight against terrorism and insurgency in this country. This is because, both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts, used by competing powers are evolving and will continue to evolve over the coming years. Nigeria is mostly engaged in kinetic approaches to the fight against terrorism and insurgency. However, to enhance the CTCOIN efforts, the military needs to conduct kinetic and non-kinetic operations simultaneously. As non-kinetic efforts in CTCOIN efforts are aimed at gaining the population’s support, it is important that the AFN needs to involve the local populace and other stakeholders. This is a crucial step because it is a decision that is beneficial to the nation. Undoubtedly, the combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts in the CTCOIN operation will deepen the understanding and the relationship between the military and society. It will also go a long way in enhancing the performance of the AFN and security agencies.
34. Thank you for listening.
REFERENCES
1. Akin, Jennifer (2005). “Mass Media.” Beyond Intractability, Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder Originally published at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/mass-communication in March 2005. Retrieved on January 21, 2023.
2. Alhassan, R. (2020) Nigerian Military drilled 81 boreholes, others as a non-kinetic approach to insurgency – DHQ, https://dailynigerian.com/nigerian-military-drilled-81-boreholes-others-as-non-kinetic-approach-to-insurgency-dhq/, Accessed on January 29, 2022.
3. Bashir, M. (2021) Nigeria: More Insurgents Surrender Through Non-Kinetic Operations, https://allafrica.com/stories/202110250097.html, Accessed on January 29, 2023.
4. Ducheine, P. (2014) Non-Kinetic Capabilities: Complementing the Kinetic Prevalence to Targeting, Amsterdam Centre for International Law No 2014-26.
5. Eteng, G.B. (2016) “Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism Operations in Northern Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Role of the DSS,” (A Paper Presented to course No. 24 Participants of the National Defence College, Abuja).
6. Gorka, Sebastian, Harmon, Christopher and Pratt, Andrew (2010). Towards a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism. McGraw-Hill, New York.
7. HDIAC (2019) Emerging Technologies for Disruptive Effects in Non-Kinetic Engagements, https://hdiac.org/articles/emerging-technologies-for-disruptive-effects-in-non-kinetic-engagements/, Accessed on January 30, 2023.
8. Joint Publication 3-24 (2009) Counterinsurgency Operations Manual, Washington DC: Department of the Army.
9. Legislationline.org (2022) Law on Combating terrorism (1999), https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/6924, Accessed on January 31, 2023.
10. Lehto, M., & Henselmann, G. (2020). Non-Kinetic Warfare: The New Game Changer in the Battle Space. In B. K. Payne, & H. Wu (Eds.), ICCWS 2020: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (pp. 316-325).
11. Miller, S. and Donnatucci, (2019) “The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism: A Synoptic Overview”. American University National Security Law Brief.
12. NCES (2022) Terrorism and Counterterrorism Operations, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/cipcode/cipdetail.aspx?y=55&cipid=89419, Accessed on January 31, 2023.
13. Nigerian Army (2009). Nigerian Army Media Operations Handbook, Army Headquarters, Abuja.
14. Noah, T. (2002) When warfare gets “kinetic”, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2002/11/kinetic-warfare.html, Accessed on February 1, 2023.
15. Ogbaje, Sumaila (2023). Addressing Terrorism and Violent Extremism Through Community-Based Reintegration. A feature article published by the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN). https://www.nannews.ng/2023/02/09/addressing-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-through-community-based-reintegration/ Accessed on 9 February 2023.
16. Onwudiwe, Ebere and Osaghae, Eghosa E. (2010). Winning Hearts and Minds, A Community Relations Approach for the Nigerian Military. John Archers (Publishers) Limited. Dugbe, Ibadan.
17. Rochford, O. (2013) Cyberwar: Breaching the Kinetic Barrier, https://www.securityweek.com/cyberwar-breaching-kinetic-barrier, Accessed on February 3, 2023.
18. Shittu, J. (2022) Nigerian Army, Media Firm Produce Movie on Non-Kinetic Operations, https://prnigeria.com/2022/01/11/nigerian-army-media-firm/, Accessed on February 5, 2023.
19. Stern, J. (2011). Civil-military operations and military information support operations coordination: A non-kinetic ballast for disciplined counterinsurgency operations. Small Wars Foundation Bethesda Md.
20. Usman, Sani Kukasheka. (2021). Psychological Operations and the social media: Countering Wrong and Divisive Narrative in the New Media a presentation to the participants of the Leadership Course in Psychological Operations and Strategic Communications Management on Thursday 10th June 2021, at Hall “C” TY Buratai Building, Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja.
21. Usman, Sani Kukasheka. (2022). Non-Kinetic Approach to Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria: An Appraisal, a Presentation to Students of Senior Course 44/22 and Participants of Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Seminar 2022 at Ihejirika Hall, Jaji Military Cantonment on Wednesday 22 February 2022.