By Group Captain Saheed Shehu (rtd)
Before I delve into the personal styles of all previous National Security Advisers (NSAs) and finish with the year of current NSA, Major General Babagana Monguno (rtd), permit me to say that it is impossible to talk about the role of the NSA without talking about Gen Brent Scowcroft who is considered by many experts on the subject as “the father of the modern-day National Security Adviser” and “Master of the Modern-Day National Security Apparatus.”
Brent Scowcroft, who died in 2020, was a United States Air Force officer who was a two-time United States NSA, first under U.S. President Gerald Ford and then under George H. W. Bush. He also served as Military Assistant to President Richard Nixon and as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in the Nixon and Ford administrations. He served as Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2005 and advised President Barack Obama on choosing his national security team.
The manner and method by which Scowcroft performed the NSA role became the model for all those who came after him. David Rothkopf, who had conducted authoritative studies of the role of the NSA and the various individuals who have filled that position, concludes that the “Scowcroft Model” is the one that best serves the President and the national security decision-making process.
The result was that Scowcroft “proved to be an extraordinarily effective national security adviser” in comparison with others who have held the office. While NSA and NSC staffs come and go, the Scowcroft model continues to be seen as the gold standard for administering the NSA system. A generation later, the roles of the National Security Adviser and NSC staff remain more or less as Scowcroft designed them — subject to the President’s management style and political priorities, of course.
As National Security Adviser, Scowcroft set the standard for how to balance the dual roles of honest broker among different policy perspectives and Presidential Adviser on major policy matters. Every one of the 11 women and men who followed in his footsteps including all four of Donald Trump’s advisers, have sought to make the “Scowcroft model” their own — with mixed success at best.
What became known in foreign policy circles as “the Scowcroft model” has six basic elements:
- Running a fair and transparent process for bringing issues to the President for decision: Making the national security principals full participants in the policy process. Not inserting the NSA between the President and Ministers/Heads of agencies while maintaining the confidence of the other National Security Council principals.
- Putting the President at the center of the decision-making process: Making sure the national security organisational structure and the interagency process are meeting the President’s needs and evolve over time.
- Providing policy advice to the President in confidence.
- Keeping a low public profile and operating generally off stage. Operating Behind the Scene and shunning publicity. As Henry Kissinger’s deputy under Nixon, Scowcroft learned that elevating the NSA to a large public and operational role came with significant costs, not least in undermining the secretaries of states and that of defence and others who are normally in charge of executing foreign and defence policy. The NSA , he found, would be more effective if he operated behind the scenes. He “should be seen occasionally, heard even less,” Scowcroft often remarked. But operating in the shadows didn’t mean that the adviser should do so in secret, without involving other key players in the government. The adviser, Scowcroft concluded, could succeed only if he operated inclusively and openly, as part of a clearly defined process, rather than secretly and on his own.
- Accepting responsibility. Mistakes are inevitable. Mistakes should be disclosed, admitted, and the consequences accepted.
- Honest Brokerage . The importance of honest brokerage is highlighted and Scowcroft is considered by many the epitome of the ‘honest broker’ NSA. Scowcroft’s success as an honest broker was based on the bonds of trust he established among all the key national security players. All trusted that Scowcroft, who spent more time with the president than anyone else, would faithfully reflect their views in the Oval Office even in he does not agree with those views. And Scowcroft made sure that trust extended down throughout the interagency — including among deputies and lower ranks in the process. Having gained that trust and created an inclusive process, Scowcroft used his closeness to the president to make sure his policy views were heard
NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
While an examination has now been made of the ideal model, roles and resulting responsibilities of a national security advisor, it is now important to examine the necessary ingredients for the NSA.
a. Bureaucratic Muscle: It is always necessary to strengthen the position of the NSA in relation to the cabinet-level NSC members in order to effectively manage the system for the President . While national security concerns are growing in complexity, a weakening of the advisor’s position could be as detrimental as an over strengthening of it. The NSA in the Nigerian system must be given the bureaucratic power that will be necessary to protect the President’s interests, manage potentially difficult MDA heads, present unpopular information, and ensure that decisions are implemented through the full realm of government. The NSA can most easily guarantee this bureaucratic power by being directly tied to the President’s Office with the executive power it affords, and independent of any department or agency save the FEC/NSC.
b. Close Proximity to the President: Because the NSA ultimately serves the President and the FEC/NSC as a manager of the national security community, it is imperative that the NSA has close proximity to the chief executive in order to anticipate the needs and preferences of the President and cabinet. In the case of Nigeria (and even in the United States), the system has worked best when the president and his NSA has had a close relationship. President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and Colonel Dambo Dasuki (rtd) were extremely close, as were General Ibrahim Babangida and Aliyu Gusau. The effectiveness of the systems these NSAs instituted were due partly to their understanding of their role, and partly to their relationship with the presidents, born out of a close proximity which allowed them to best serve the chief executive and the NSC principles. The same proximity must be given to the incoming NSA , by ensuring that the NSA has open and regular access to the President and cabinet-level ministers.
c. Strategic Thinker: In order to be an effective process manager, independent policy advisor, and honest broker, the NSA must operate at a strategic, not tactical, or operational level. That is to say the NSA must operate at a level above that of the managers of specific sectors of the larger national security community, such as the intelligence community or the armed forces. The very essence of the NSA is that he will operate independently of major departments or agencies, and in a way that attempts to guarantee cohesiveness of national security policy throughout the government.
d. Policy-Neutral Intelligence: There is the current debate within intelligence studies over whether intelligence should be policy-relevant or policy-neutral. Policy-relevant intelligence is considered intelligence which is tailored around pre-conceived policy requirements, while policy-neutral intelligence is intelligence which would inform policy-making decisions by telling the policymakers what they need to hear, as opposed to what they might want to hear. Reliance on policy-relevant intelligence is dangerous in that it leaves open the possibility that policymakers will not be made aware of indicators which suggest a policy is flawed.
e. Intelligence Community Management: Experts agree (including Monguno himself and the in-coming President ) that one of the major issues facing modern-day intelligence communities is maintaining and strengthening the coordination between the producers and consumers of the intelligence community’s product. One could take this directly to a more Nigerian perspective to state, as it is often stated by many, that one of the fundamental challenges to the Nigerian intelligence community is the “weak capacity for co-ordination of Nigeria’s decentralized and diverse security and intelligence community”
These statements, made by several observers of the Nigerian intelligence community, indicate the need for Nigeria to have another person as the intelligence community manager similar to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. Currently however, this role is filled most by the NSA. For the NSA to remain an honest broker, independent of any specific department or agency (or in this case group of agencies) within the national security community and as manager of Nigeria’s intelligence community, the NSA runs the risk of losing credibility with other departments or bodies if he is seen as too close to the interests of a particular security or intelligence agency.
NEXT PART 4 : THE MONGUNO YEARS
Group Captain Saheed Shehu (rtd) is an international Defence and Security Consultant and member of Security Committee, APC-PCC