By Scott Morgan, Militant Wire
The last year has presented both challenges and opportunities regarding the conflict that still rages in Sudan. There was a renewed sense of optimism when talks brokered by the United States and Saudi Arabia resumed in Jeddah. Both warring factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel-Fattah Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka “Hemeti”), are taking part in the talks. However, the reality on the ground has probably been both the catalyst for the resumption of negotiations as well as the chief cause of their failure.
The Biden Administration has taken the decision to appoint a Special Envoy, Tom Perriello, to mediate the crisis, and he is well-qualified for the position. Previously Mr. Perriello served in a similar capacity in the Great Lakes region of Africa under the Obama Administration. In May 2023, the Envoy undertook a visit to key stakeholders in the ongoing Sudan conflict.
Most recent data indicates that the RSF are now in virtual control of Darfur after a series of victories led to the capture of Nyala, the second largest city in the country, and the city of Zalingei. However, the capture of another town in Darfur, Ardamata, appeared to have been the scene of yet another regional massacre in November 2023. The number of casualties varies, but the UN has estimated that the death toll was at least 800 people, while other local sources reported that approximately 1,300 people were murdered. A video was made available to some western news outlets that showed locals being rounded up by the RSF. Credible allegations have been made against the RSF accusing them of ethnic cleansing, a tactic that has been all-too common in the region for decades.
In terms of recent RSF gains’ impact upon their rivals, one estimate has it that the SAF has lost three out of the four headquarters in the state capitals of Darfur. The only capital that has resisted falling was El Fashir. Currently El Fahsir is the front where most of the focus of concern by humanitarian groups is focused. These defeats will place enormous pressure on the SAF just to maintain their presence in Darfur, and this is not the only region where the RSF has seen advances.
Reports also indicate that there was an increase in hostilities in Omdurman, which is across the Nile River from the capital of Khartoum. Additional reporting also indicated that the SAF was forced to abandon another military installation in Kordofan State in January 2024.
The current struggle began over the timeframe in which the RSF would become integrated with the SAF. The SAF wanted this to be accomplished within a two-year window while the RSF wanted the integration to take place more gradually over the next decade. Judging from recent events the SAF stand to gain the most from successful negotiations.
One of the reasons for this is that General Burhan attended the recent Saudi-Africa Summit while Generak Hemeti did not. On the surface we should assume that General Burhan was actively seeking support to shore up his increasingly fragile position, and take note that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is supportive of efforts to resolve the conflict. In a statement that was released when the ceasefire talks resumed in late October, the Foreign Ministry stated that it hoped for “a political agreement under which security, stability and prosperity will be achieved for Sudan and its brotherly people.”
The United Arab Emirates has been a sponsor of the peace talks, and has provided key logistical support for the refugees that have fled into eastern Chad during the conflict, despite accusations that they have been providing material support to the RSF. The inability by Washington to rein in the alleged UAE activities in Sudan is seen as evidence of its waning influence not just in Africa but in the Gulf as well.
It is not just the Emirates that have a proxy in this conflict. In recent weeks both Iran and Russia have shown signs that they are supporting General Burhan in the conflict. Reports also indicate that Russia will be allowed to construct a naval facility on the Red Sea, strengthening arguments that the conflict has officially become a proxy war.
There is a train of thought that suggests that a deal will not happen. What was at one point a situation that appeared to be a strategic stalemate has given rise to a new concern. What if Sudan divides again? Could the RSF take over Darfur and then secede? Or will Sudan then resemble neighboring Libya with two governments contesting who is in charge of national affairs? If talks fail—an increasingly likely possibility—then questions remain as to whether Sudan will divide once again, as Juba and South Sudan seceded from the rest of the country in 2011 following years of bloody conflict, or if the country will come to resemble neighboring Libya with two rival governments competing to run the country. A total RSF victory in western region of Sudan would certainly increase the likelihood of yet another breakup of the country and would undoubtedly have destabilizing effects for the rest of the region as a whole, particularly impacting neighboring South Sudan and Chad, which are themselves struggling with simmering internal conflicts.
Scott Morgan is an independent Analyst based in Washington DC. He often writes and tweet about Africa but also interested in Southeast Asia as well.