By Nwankwo T. Nwaezeigwe, PhD
I met Chuks Iloegbunam at Rear Admiral Ndubuisi Kanu’s office in Victoria Island Lagos just immediately after the publication of his book “Ironside”, a copy Admiral Kanu handed to me as gift. There is therefore no doubt that Chuks Iloegbunam in his tantrums against General Yakubu Gowon wrote from the fulcrum of Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi’s biographer. There is no gainsaying the fact that that profile clearly rendered his rebuttal to General Gowon’s interview more sentimentally-driven than objective.
Of course, as a fellow Igbo man, I might be tempted to ally hook, line, and sinker with his sentimentally–driven tirades against General Gowon. But as a professional historian who sees every episode of history from the contraption of both sides of the coin, I am compelled to disagree with him on some of his fundamental extrapolations.
I have had the opportunity of reading several literatures on both American and Nigerian civil wars, including of course successive interviews of General Yakubu Gowon as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria both during and after the civil war. One of such interviews that remained indelible in my mind was that of the American Time Magazine issue of July 4, 1967, when he stated in response to the manner of the prosecution of the war:
“This is a war with a difference. We do not take the Ibos as our enemies; they are our brothers. As far as I am concerned, I’m fighting a war to keep the country one and united. I therefore cannot afford to be callous in the way I prosecute this war. I have got to think of the problems of reconstruction, reconciliation and winning the heart, if we are to have a happy country in the end.”
Of course this was not the vision of such people as Generals Murtala Mohammed, Muhammadu Buhari, I. B. M. Haruna, Mamman Vatsa, and Mohammed Shuwa, among other mainly Fulani Northern Muslim hawkish officers. One is therefore surprised that Igbo intellectuals like Chuks Iloegbunam have always exhibited uncanny cowardice in taking up these hawkish sworn anti-Igbo Fulani perpetrators of the atrocious pogroms and civil war against the Igbo.
It is indeed ridiculous to observe that whenever issues of the civil war are raised, it is either the Yoruba or the minority ethnic groups these hawkish Igbo writers and commentators bare their ethnic pangs against, cowardly leaving out the actual instigators and perpetrators of the worst acts of hatred against the Igbo in the annals of Nigerian history.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the Nigerian civil war was a collective mistake by the Igbo, Yoruba and non-Muslim minority groups in Nigeria founded on uncalculated ignorance of the eternalized jihad project of Sokoto Caliphate. This explains why the only institutionalized beneficiary of the Nigerian civil war today are the Fulani, who indeed have continued to use the suspicion and disarray arising from the civil war among these ethnic groups to perpetrate themselves in power. This is an area writers like Chuks Iloegbunam deliberately gloss over because of their institutionalized fear of the Fulani.
Indeed, it will sound ridiculous within the contextual discussion of the events leading to both the pogroms against the Igbo and the Nigerian civil war if the greater part of the blame is not apportioned to General Aguiyi-Ironsi. This is because much of the events that created the enabling environment for the May 29, 1966 anti-Igbo riot and the subsequent July 29, 1966 that ousted him arose from his political ineptitude and ideological bankruptcy. It is obvious that had Aguiyi-Ironsi effectively managed the policies that eventually provided the excuses for the above sad episodes, there wouldn’t have been any room for both the anti-Igbo pogroms and the following civil war.
This explains why Iloegbunam’s tirade against General Yakubu Gowon has to be taken with a pinch of salt. Beyond being colored in sentimentally-driven half-truths and bogus hyper-ethnic political propaganda, it presents no soluble path to the Igbo problem in Nigeria. On the other hand, Chuks Iloegbunam simply displayed his stark ignorance of the trajectory of the current state of ethno-religious politics in Nigeria and its ominous relationship with the events of 1966 and 1967-1970 to date.
A critical writer should most often place himself on the saddle of a Priest preaching from the pulpit or, a lawyer presenting his client’s case before a Judge. Both situations have their expected respective ends to achieve. Mr. Chuks Iloegbunam in his uncalculated umbrage against General (Dr.) Jack Yakubu Gowon did not adopt any solution to the current state of the Igbo problem in Nigeria against the background of General Gowon’s roles in both the 1966 crisis and the civil war. It is only unfortunate that while some people are tirelessly busy building bridges across ethno-Christian lines in Nigeria, some people are making every effort to destroy such bridges because of their desire to have their often weird opinions heard.
The first umbrage Chuks Iloegbunam held against General Gowon was his failure to acknowledge the original intent of the Northern Region to secede from Nigeria. Of course, by the circumstances of the moment in 1966, the basis of Nigerian unity was under serious test and if Gowon had stated so he was right. Historians are aware that General Gown was not the proponent of Northern secession but Murtala Mohammed.
The same way Gowon was grafted into the secession scheme the same way he detached himself based on expert advice and the overall interest of his people—the Middle Belt. What is wrong with his later realization that it would have amounted to outright political suicide if he had acceded to the Fulani-driven Northern secession?
Does Chuks Iloegbunam expect him to give a full load-down of all the events leading to Nigerian civil war during a mere newspaper interview? Did people like Chuks Iloegbunam for once query Dim Chukwuemeka Ojukwu for joining the same people who perpetrated the heinous pogrom against the Igbo—the Fulani National Party of Nigeria (NPN) on his return from exile? Part of the Igbo problem today was created by Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi which Chuks Iloegbunam did not present in his Ironsi biography even in one sentence. The point is that Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi is not worth any discord between the Igbo and their Middle Belt Christian brothers at this trying point of Nigerian history.
Ruth First her book, The Barrel of the Gun, described Aguiyi-Ironsi as “a man of the old order, with the reflexes of the old regime and the pace of a staid senior administrator, [who] filled his office with vagueness and procrastination. This was the failing of a military governor, but also of a government which had no clear purpose, made no statement of aims beyond immediate ones and, when it decided on a policy, acted by administrative fiat, without consultation or any attempt at mobilization in the country.”
Even Frederick Forsyth in his The Biafra Story, with all his pro-Biafra dispositions made no qualms about Aguiyi-Ironsi regime’s obstinate inclination to acting against popular opinion when he wrote concerning the ill-fated dissolution of the highly guarded regional system thus: “Particular exception was taken at once to Mr. Nwokedi, whose inquiry into the possibility]y of unifying the civil service took him on a tour of the North. Though he listened to the Northerners’ views, his final report to General Ironsi contained conclusions that did not coincide with those views.”
Ruth First in a note to his above book further elaborated on the above obstinate conspiracy of a few Igbo ethnic bigots whose actions eventually resulted to the death of many innocent Igbo lives on May 29, 1966 and further on July 29 and September-October, 1966:
“One of the most influential of the Federal Permanent Secretaries complained that he had first heard of the decree on the radio as he came off the tennis court. There had been two months of argument for and against a unified public service; suddenly it was law. The Supreme Military Council had been divided, with most of its members opposed. At the meeting immediately before the decree was promulgated, Ironsi heard the Governors out after they had lodged their objections in writing, and then said, ‘I’m committed. ‘Colonel Katsina flew from the meeting of the Council to announce at Kaduna airport, ‘Tell the nation that the egg will be broken on Tuesday. Two important announcements will be made by the Supreme Commander.’ These, he added with characteristic accommodation, would be for the betterment of the nation as a whole and ‘a very good thing’.”
His Military Governor of Western Region and later Group of Provinces Lt. Col. Fajuyi who later sacrificed his life for an act he vehemently opposed wrote a five-page memorandum detailing the problems that would be encountered with the proposed Unitary system of Government and concluding that unless such problems were addressed, he would not be in support of the decree 34. The Governor of Northern Region Lt Col Hassan Usman Katsina was reported to have asked Col Fajuyi, “why the last paragraph”, and Lt. Col Fajuyi was said to have responded, “Out of courtesy.”
Aguiyi-Ironsi ordered the detention of all Southern politicians while leaving their Northern counterparts free to roam about and plan the anti-Igbo pogroms, just to please the Sokoto Caliphate. Worst still was his appointment of Sir Ahmadu Bello’s relative, Mallam Hamsad Ahmadu as his Principal Secretary. In order not to antagonize the Fulani Sokoto Caliphate, he refused to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Chief Anthony Enahoro and their other imprisoned associates, including the thirty-five Tiv alleged rioters imprisoned by Sardauna of Sokoto Sir Ahmadu Bello; an action that could have mobilized enormous support base for his regime.
All entreaties by his friend Lt. Col Fajuyi to Aguiyi-Ironsi to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo in order for the regime to build a popular support base among Chief Awolowo’s teaming grassroots supporters in the West fell on deaf ears. Aguiyi-Ironsi could only hearken to the Judasian voice of the Fulani-born Military Governor of the Northern Region, Lt. Col Hassan Usman Katsina who threatened that the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo would threaten the peace and security of the country.
It took General Yakubu Gowon two days after his coming to power to order the immediate release of the above men. General Yakubu Gowon assumed power as Head of State on August 4, 1966, and August 6, 1966 ordered the immediate release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and all political prisoners including Chief Anthony Enahoro and the thirty-five anti-Sardauna Tiv activists. Yet some Igbo ethnic bigots like Chuks Iloegbunam will be blaming Chief Obafemi Awolowo for pitching his camp with General Yakubu Gowon during the Nigerian civil war.
Unless the Igbo have a class of leaders who are willing to objectively judge the episodes of the 1966 crisis from the fulcrum of two sides of the coin, neither full reconciliation nor final solution to the Igbo political question in Nigeria will be achieved. Yes, the heinous crime of pogrom against the Igbo was carried out both during the regime of General Aguiyi-Ironsi and after. But the fundamental question is did Aguiyi-Ironsi consider the reason for the May 29, 1966 anti-Igbo pogrom and make haste to rescind it? No! He did not.
The death of hundreds of innocent and defenseless Igbo residents in the North during the May 29, 1966 anti-Igbo pogrom did not matter to him, otherwise he should have listened to the voice of reason and rescind the obnoxious Decree 34. But he chose to have his hands committed, as he aptly stated during the May 25, 1966 Federal Executive Council Meeting by a small click of bigoted Igbo bureaucrats led by Francis Nwokedi, which eventually resulted to the death of countless Igbo residents in the North.
General Gowon had stated in the said interview ipso facto:
“When I met him (Captain Martin Adamu) and asked what the commotion was about, he said General Aguiyi Ironsi, who was the General Officer Commanding (GOC), came and told them that there was some crisis in town affecting the prime minister, Tafawa Balewa and Okotie Eboh, the finance minister and he had come to seek some assistance to see if he could deal with the problem. My first reaction was: Why Ironsi? Why not the brigadier because the chain of command should have come through him? Ironsi should have told the brigadier, who would have related to the battalion commander. However, I asked where he was and he said he was at the master parade area. So I had to change into civil clothes to see what was happening. When we got there, he briefed me, saying that he wanted some units to be prepared so that they could go and deal with the situation. When he finished, he asked if there were questions. I did not know that by that time, all the senior officers from my school – Maimalari, Kur Mohammed, Lt Col Abogo Largema, Yakubu Pam – had been killed. One of my good friends,g Arthur Unegbe, from Ozobulu was also killed and I didn’t know. I went and I got the Quarter Master to get me some military uniforms, boots, hat etc and I went into town. Luckily enough, we were able to deal with the coup in Lagos.”
To Chuks Iloegbunam the above account was a bundle of lies. His first umbrage against General Gowon is his alleged claim that he crushed the coup. But did General say he crushed the coup alone? His last sentence in the above account clearly states, “Luckily enough, we were able to deal with the coup in Lagos.” Must General Gowon mention all the actors of that night’s episode by names? Was General Yakubu Gowon not right to question the presence of General Aguiyi-Ironsi that moment given the chain of military command?
Was General Gowon also not entitled to lament over the high-profile military victims of the coup that night? Most importantly, Lt. Col James Pam from the same Plateau Province was killed and Chuks Iloegbunam expects General Gowon to be happy at that moment? Objectivity begins when a critic puts his legs in the shoes of the one he is criticizing. Why then should Chuks Iloegbunam hold umbrage against General Gowon for betraying General Aguiyi-Ironi?
For historians like me and those very familiar with the events that actually transpired at Ikeja Military Barracks that unfortunate night of January 15, 1966, there is no doubt that General Gowon was only being economical with facts and not lies. In the first instance, General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s presence at Ikeja Barracks at that moment was one of the fraudulent episodes of the January 15, 1966 coup that tilted the burden of proof against the Igbo that it was not an ethnically-inspired coup.
Aguiyi-Ironsi was supposed to have been killed according to the original plans of the coup initiators. And if he had been killed as planned, there shouldn’t have been any hullabaloo about the coup being an Igbo plot and possibly no July 29, 1966 counter-coup, no September-October anti-Igbo pogrom and no possibility of Biafran secession and subsequently the civil war. Events beget events and historical episodes succeed the other in stream-like movements.
That General Aguiyi-ironsi was not killed as planned turned out to be a political curse to the Igbo rather than blessing. Indeed it was from the moment of his appearance at Ikeja Army Barracks that the suspicion emerged, not only that it was an Igbo-inspired coup but that he was privy to the plot. This suspicion revolves round three conspiratorial theories.
The first theory was that he was as well-informed as much as he was supportive of the 15 January, 1966 coup. The second theory was centered on the decision to discard the original objective of the Coup plotters; which was the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo from Prison and install him the Interim Prime Minister; while the third is interpreted as a designed attempt to bring about Igbo dominance in Nigeria’s political affairs.
Yemi Adedeji in his article, “The Nigeria-Biafra war: July 29, 1966, The Day of Revenge” Historical Flashback September 6-October 3, 2017, Vol.6: No. 6, 4, narrated in part the episode of that morning of January 15, 1966 at Ikeja Army barracks, which strongly heaped the suspicion of an accomplice in the coup on General Aguiyi-Ironsi:
“It was Ironsi himself who revealed to others that he knew. After he had escaped and rushed to the Second Battalion at Ikeja Lagos, he drove straight to the quarters of the Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM), Garuba Muhammed, who he ordered to alert the battalion, and direct the men to report to their companies. It was here Lieutenant-Colonels Hilary Njoku and Yakubu Gowon met him. Ironsi was so agitated that he continued to murmur to the hearing of his officers: ‘But they said they would not kill anyone! But they said they would not kill anyone!’ Gowon heard this clearly so were other officers and no one was in doubt that their GOC knew about this beforehand.”
Does Chuks Iloegbunam expect General Gowon to throw his characteristic modesty into the gutters of ethnic bigotry to recount the above episode? That that Aguiyi-Ironsi’s unconscious utterance became the basis of further suspicion that the coup was indeed an Igbo plot is a truism beyond vile ethnic contraptions.
Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna’s statement in his unpublished manuscript clearly revealed that if Aguiyi-Ironsi was not aware of the January 15, 1966 coup, he was deliberately spared by the Lagos axis plotters to eventually assume the position of Head of State against their original plan with Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo from Calabar Prisons and install him the Interim Prime Minister. In Major Ifeajuna’s words:
“We were to present our General with a fait accompli. We were to apologize to him for our actions and request him to join us and take over the plans. If he was not prepared to join us, we would request that he should leave us alone to complete it…If our General agreed to come with us then he could rest in charge of the army or he could be head of state (while Awolowo would be Prime Minister or Executive President, depending on the reaction of our General).”
Even Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi stated that it was Major Ifeajuna who revealed the planned coup to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe his Onitsha kinsman, who subsequently abandoned his office as Ceremonial President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and embarked on indefinite sick-leave abroad till after the outbreak of the civil war. Thus if Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was informed of impending coup, definitely there was no reason the likes of Aguiyi-ironsi, and Michael Okpara shouldn’t have been equally informed.
In his own account, Lt. Col. Macaulay Nzefili who was then as Major the second-in-command to Lt. Col. Abogo Largema at the 4th Battalion, Ibadan pointed out this element of sabotage by some officers of Igbo origin, specifically singling out Major John Obienu as the officer who leaked the plan to Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi. In his words:
“Nevertheless, it is true that some younger officers were identified as “coup material” and recruited during the congregation of officers and units for the Abeokuta course. Among the students in that course, however, only Captain Ben Gbulie returned to Kaduna to join Nzeogwu in the plot. Among units being brought together to create the new “All-Arms” Abeokuta Garrison, Major John Obienu, tapped to take over the new Recce squadron at Abeokuta from Major Christian Anuforo (also a January conspirator), was recruited but reportedly switched loyalty and was among those that allegedly leaked the plot to General Ironsi.”
Indeed it might appear that it was the later introduction of these extraneous Igbo ethnic elements into the main body of the plan that eventually changed the original objective of making Chief Awolowo the Interim Prime Minister, otherwise the idea of presenting “our General with a fait accompli” by Major Ifeajuna was not part of the original plan.
This seems to underscore the suspicion that Aguiyi-Ironsi’s refusal to grant Chief Awolowo amnesty was partly because he already saw him as a possible rival, and partly to please the Northern Fulani elements. In fact there was no doubt that the release of Awolowo would have created a larger field of cross-ethnic alliance between the Igbo and Yoruba for the survival of Aguiyi-Ironsi’s regime.
Yakubu Gowon who appeared to be sympathetic to Major Nzeogwu’s execution of the plan in the North but tacitly against the selective killings in the South, clearly seized the same opportunity jettisoned by Aguiyi-Ironsi, released Chief Awolowo and appointed him the Vice Chairman of his Federal Executive Council and de facto Vice Head of State. This again underscores why he ordered full military honor for Major Nzeogwu’s burial at Kaduna Military Cemetery.
If Aguiyi-Ironsi quelled the coup which had already failed practically by then in Lagos, he did so with the belief that he would be the ultimate beneficiary of the final outcome and not based on his patriotic zeal; otherwise if he was not aware that he was not among the senior officers targeted by the plotters, he would have gone into hiding in the first instance.
In another round of tantrums Chuks Iloegbunam went further to state:
“As someone in Biafra during the hostilities, I am not persuaded that your forces knew a thing about the Conventions you covet. What you prosecuted was a genocidal war. One may refrain from talking about the millions, mostly children, that perished from starvation and kwashiorkor because of your blockade of Biafra. After all, your junta made it clear from the onset that “starvation is a legitimate instrument of warfare.” One may also not talk about Asaba of October 7, 1967, where your soldiers massacred a thousand indigenes of the town. After all, Major General I. B. M. Haruna insists to this day that the Asaba genocide never happened.”
There is no doubt that the Nigeria civil war was a brutal episode which could have been avoided if both sides of the conflicting divides actually foresaw the cumulative consequences of the war. It is however unfair and historically unjustified to apportion all the blames of the Nigerian civil war on one man, not even on Yakubu Gowon. Yes, Yakubu Gowon was the Head of State under whose direction the civil war was prosecuted. But he was not responsible for the start of the war. The civil war was entrusted on him as Head of State and it could have been worse for the Igbo had somebody like Murtala Mohammed occupied that position.
Lt. Col Ojukwu declared the State of Biafra on May 30, 1967 and for one month and two weeks General Gowon was hesitant on going to war with the Igbo whom he considered his kinsmen, against insurmountable pressures from the Fulani hawks around him. Within the interim of those six weeks he sent a high-powered delegation led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo to plead with Col Ojukwu to reconsider the secession, which resulted to nothing. So General Yakubu Gowon had no intention of going to war against the Igbo. Circumstances beyond his control entrusted the responsibility of conducting the civil war on him. It took General Gowon under intense pressure to formally dismiss Lt. Col Ojukwu from the Army on July 1, 1967.
Furthermore, in the prosecution of wars, there is no moral question of lack of brutality. Every war by nature is brutal. Recounting the sad events of the Nigerian civil war in a manner that solely heaps the blame on General Gowon is not only unjustifiable but a subtle intention to create political cleavages and hatred between the Igbo and their Middle Belt brothers. So it is not unlikely that Chuks Iloegbunam by such unqualified selective guilt apportionment might be acting in tandem with Fulani schemes of creating divisions among the Igbo and their Middle Belt Christian kinsmen.
General Gowon was the Head of State no doubt. But there were field commanders that prosecuted the war and carried out the heinous crimes of the war. Adolph Hitler prosecuted World War II, but there were other people brought to trial for their respective actions. Did Chuks Iloegbunam in singling out General Gowon for blames see it necessary to mention such actors, or was he afraid to mention their names? The Asaba massacre he mentioned had a known kingpin and perpetrator. Did he mention his name? Is it not ridiculous that the same Major General I. B. M. Haruna he mentioned was the same person the now deceased Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu shamelessly led his decrepit class of Igbo leaders to apologize to for the killing of Sir Ahmadu Bello by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu?
There are certain issues some Igbo historians would not want to say about the civil war either for fear of being branded Igbo saboteurs or for sentimental ethnic considerations; although I don’t consider myself among those who fear to state the truth for the fear of being branded anything; except that caution often arises as prevailing circumstances demand. But oftentimes it becomes necessary to chip in some of these historical absurdities on the part of the Igbo if only to remind some Igbo ethnic bigots like Chuks Iloegbunam that there are always two sides of the coin in every historical episode.
It is evident that had Biafra not invaded Midwest against its neutral status in the war, may be there shouldn’t have been mass killing of the Igbo in Benin City and no Asaba massacre. It was collectively agreed during the Commander-in-Chief’s Conference of June 7, 1967 in Lagos that “Midwestern State will be kept free from active operations unless where necessary, but the border between the Eastern States and the Midwest will be completely sealed off.”
This was reiterated by Lt. Col David Ejoor in a speech at Asaba on June 18, 1967, when he stated that Midwestern Region would not be turned into a battlefield between Eastern and Northern Regions, since the popular notion then was that it was a conflict between the Northern Region and Eastern Region. Indeed, on August 5, 1967, an attempt by the Federal Government to transport a consignment of military boats through the Midwestern Region to Bonny for the Federal troops was rebuffed by both the Military Governor Lt. Col David Ejoor and the Commander of the Benin Garrison Lt. Col Conrad Nwawo.
This ideal situation was shattered by the Biafran invasion of the Region; an action which not only turned the objective of war from self-defence to that of territorial conquest, but created an atmosphere of hatred against the Western Igbo by their non-Igbo ethnic kinsmen. The replacement of Lt. Col David Ejoor—the Urhobo as Military Governor of Midwest State and his subsequent replacement with Major Albert Okonkwo—an Igbo by Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was taken as Igbo intent to conquer and dominate others. Most detestable was the retreat of the Biafran forces to their Eastern enclave without waiting to confront the advancing Federal forces, subsequently blowing up the connecting Niger Bridge, thereby leaving the Western Igbo at the mercy of the advancing Federal forces. It was like stirring the hornets’ nest among a people and abandoning them to face the stings.
Iloegbunam’s attempt to wholly condemn General Gown for the shortfall in the implementation of Reconciliation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (Three Rs) policy is again bereft of objectivity and colored with sentimental half-truth. The claim that the Federal Government paid £20 to ex-Biafrans irrespective of what they had in their bank accounts is not only false and unfounded but a pungent propaganda that has obstructed the needed post-war understanding between the Igbo and the Yoruba. From accusing Chief Obafemi Awolowo, it is now the turn of General Yakubu Gowon to be accused.
First, in such a war as the Nigerian civil war, the Federal Government was not under any obligation to initiate the kind of magnanimity it initiated. Those Igbo with complete documents relating to their bank accounts received their money in full without obstructions. It was only the old expired Nigerian pound notes that were changed during the war, and the Biafran pounds that were changed at the rate of 20 pounds.
Moreover, it was not the issue of forcing one to bring all the money in his possession to be change to 20 pounds. It was strictly for the amount registered in one name. So many people registered different amounts in different names. Was it obligatory for the Federal Government to even tamper with the Biafran currency if not for General Gowon’s humane desire to create a relatively easy starting point for the Igbo, when there was no defined exchange value of the Biafran pound to Nigerian pound?
It Chuks Iloegbunam had attended University of Nigeria Nsukka after the Nigerian civil war up to the late 1980s like the present writer, he should have witnessed how the Igbo themselves misused the enormous funds sent for the reconstruction of the university by constructing prefabricated wooden buildings against solid permanent buildings. The Vice Chancellor Prof Kodilinye was even reported of returning excess money to the Federal Government.
Mocking General Gowon for his overthrow and eventual habitation with an Igbo friend in London is not only morally detestable of a writer of Chuks Iloegbunam’s stature but a testimony that there are still many Igbo outside the likes of Chuks Iloegbunam that hold General Gowon in high esteem. For a former Head of State of oil-rich Nigeria who ruled for nine years not to have a personal house in London or any foreign country adds to the testimony of Gowon’s humble dispositions, selfless service to the nation, political honesty and financial incorruptibility.
Furthermore, Chuks Iloegbunam’s accusation of General Gowon as an accomplice in the abandoned property saga in Rivers State is smack of intellectual indecency. Was the abandoned property matter a Federal Government policy or universal in the whole Federal Republic of Nigeria? Why not take an incisive self-moral assessment of Igbo relationship with their Ijaw and Ikwerre kinsmen in defunct Eastern Nigeria instead of pointing accusing leprous-fingers on an innocent by-stander?
The allusion of “Abraham Lincoln of Nigeria” to General Yakubu Gowon was perfectly in order and an acceptable dictum. It does not matter if the likes of Chuks Iloegbunam developed running-stomach for its acclamation. For those of us who are professional historians, we know there were some basic similarities between President Abraham Lincoln’s post-civil war reconstruction policies and General Yakubu Gowon’s post-civil war Reconciliation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (Three Rs) policy, with General Yakubu Gowon even surpassing President Lincoln] in some aspects.
There was no war tribunal. General Gowon did not appoint an outsider but an Igbo as Administrator of East Central State. Those major actors who were put in detention were later released without trial or payroll. All the surviving Igbo commissioned officers of lower ranks were reabsorbed, including all the surviving non-commissioned officers. Igbo Federal civil and public servants returned to their jobs without difficulties, including the various private sectors. This was a war if the Igbo had known its outcome should not have been fought to the extent it went.
On the Aburi question, it was not a case of General Gowon lying but being economical with the truth. Even if the Aburi agreement was implemented as presented on paper, it would still not have worked well for the Igbo because of the concerted opposition of Eastern minorities who were agitating for complete independence from Igbo domination through their C.O.R. State Movement.
The question then was, were they carried along in the adoption of the Aburi Accord? The answer was no, and they were indeed the ones who protested to General Gowon against the Aburi Accord, stating their opposition to any Confederation with the Igbo. This was also coming against the background of the quelling of the secession uprising in the Niger Delta led by Isaac Boro in which he declared the Niger Delta Republic. Ironically Isaac Boro was still in prison at the time and only released at the outbreak of the war.
It is ridiculous therefore that Chuks Iloegbunam throughout the length and breadth of his tirades did not mention anything positive about General Gowon on the Igbo. Could that be historically correct? There is no doubt that General (Dr.) Yakubu Gowon remains one of the finest, if not the finest gentleman-military politician Nigeria ever produced. A devout Christian from birth who decided to anchor the later part of his live on Christianity, even though politically shy and exclusively in self-resignation, he represents the cemen fondu of the most needed political bridge between the Christian South and Christian Middle Belt of Nigeria. At ninety, it is celebrative for all Nigerian Christians to celebrate General (Dr.) Sir Jack Yakubu Gowon.
Nwankwo T. Nwaezeigwe, PhD is Odogwu of Ibusa & President, International Coalition against Christian Genocide in Nigeria
Email: Nwaezeigwe.genocideafrica@gmail.com