- Supporters of Imran Khan, Pakistan’s jailed ex-premier, took to the streets again in late November pressing the claim that February’s elections were stolen from his party. As the impasse goes on, the risk of violence is ever present. All sides should take a step back
By International Crisis Group (ICG)
What’s new? Following Pakistan’s general elections in February, a new coalition headed by Shehbaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz came to power. But Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which claims it won the balloting, rejects the government’s legitimacy and demands a vote recount.
Why does it matter? The disputed polls have fuelled political turmoil and mass protests at a time when the country faces grave economic and security challenges. The credibility of all elected institutions is at stake, with few signs that rival claimants to power are willing to compromise.
What should be done? Both sides should acknowledge that deadlock undermines democracy at a critical moment. The government should end its crackdown on the PTI-led opposition and seek consensus in parliament on issues of mutual concern. Pulling back from its hardline rhetoric, the PTI should use parliamentary forums to advance its political agenda.
Executive Summary
A hard-fought election in Pakistan in February brought to power a coalition government led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and set the stage for months of political strife. Imprisoned since August 2023, former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party (PTI) refuse to recognise the new government’s legitimacy, claiming the election was stolen though vote rigging and tampering. Backed by other smaller parties, Khan’s party is resorting to protests both within and outside parliament. Mass demonstrations led by the party in November, following similar ones in September and October, brought major cities to a grinding halt and inflamed tensions. With the country’s ailing economy reliant on International Monetary Fund credit and security conditions worsening in border provinces, the PTI should desist from violent street action aimed at ousting the government, dial back its hardline rhetoric and look instead to work with rivals in parliament on issues of mutual interest. The government, for its part, should acknowledge that the PTI will not agree to talks so long as its crackdown on the party continues.
The 8 February polls for Pakistan’s national and four provincial assemblies took place in the shadow of a military-led campaign to prosecute PTI members following a 9 May 2023 rampage in which the party’s supporters attacked military properties and installations in response to Khan’s arrest on corruption charges. The challenges that his party faced in contesting the elections appeared insurmountable. Top leaders including Khan were imprisoned on charges ranging from graft to subverting national security, and caretaker governments in the centre and the provinces denied the PTI the space to campaign afforded to its opponents. The election commission also denied the party a common symbol on paper ballots, forcing it to field candidates as independents.
Even so, in response to Khan’s call to action PTI supporters turned out to vote in droves, angered by the persecution of the party and its leader. With 93 seats, party-backed candidates emerged as the largest bloc in the National Assembly, followed by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). But Khan and senior party leaders have refused to accept the results, alleging vote manipulation by the election commission, particularly on the part of returning officers recruited from the civil bureaucracy. The party insists that it won 180 seats, enough to form the national government, and disputes the PML-N’s victory in Punjab, the country’s main political battleground.
Tensions between the country’s main political forces have simmered for months, disrupting parliamentary proceedings and spurring street protests demanding that the PTI’s allegedly “stolen mandate” be returned and that Khan and other party leaders be released. Demonstrations in late November, following others in September and October, descended into violence, bringing life in the capital Islamabad to a standstill and leaving scores of people wounded, security personnel and protesters alike. At least one police officer and three paramilitary Rangers officers were killed, along with at least two demonstrators, during the latest unrest. PTI leaders claim the death toll of party loyalists in the protests is much higher.
Meanwhile, wrangling over parliamentary seats reserved for women and minorities continues after the Supreme Court’s 12 July ruling granted 77 of these to the PTI, thus depriving the ruling coalition of the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional amendments. The government in turn has pressed on with its crackdown on PTI supporters and filed new cases against its leaders, including Khan, including for inciting the violence that led to the deaths of police officers in the October and November protests.
It is in the [Pakistani] government’s interest to dial down this animosity at a time of serious national difficulties.
Political discord could prove disruptive and damaging. It is in the government’s interest to dial down this animosity at a time of serious national difficulties. Reviving the economy after the country was hit by a balance of payments crisis in 2022 requires agreement among Pakistan’s political class. Containing militancy in the provinces that border Afghanistan equally requires cooperation with the PTI-governed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The ruling coalition should realise that respecting the political and civil rights of PTI and other aggrieved opposition parties – including those representing Baloch and Pashtun nationalists – is an essential first step toward restoring democratic stability.
Mindful of the risks, the national government and its allies have attempted to reach out to the PTI. But the opposition party’s continued attacks on the government and preconditions it seeks to impose, particularly the handover of power and Khan’s immediate release, undermine the prospects of such dialogue. Instead, the PTI has hoped to regain the backing of the country’s most powerful force, the military establishment. But the high command has rejected its overtures, angered by the party’s refusal to take blame for the 9 May 2023 violence and by Khan’s attacks on the army chief. Following the arrest of Khan’s close confidant and former intelligence chief Faiz Hameed, alarm has risen in PTI ranks that the party leader may soon be transferred to military custody – a move that would unquestionably pour fuel on an already incendiary political stage.
Although prospects of direct talks between political forces appear to have receded in recent months, there are still ways to ease the tensions. Parliamentarians representing the government and opposition could begin to break the logjam through collaborative work on parliamentary committees, outside the media’s gaze, which could help build trust between the sides as they work on issues of mutual interest. These could include new electoral legislation that removes flaws that have bedevilled previous polls. Reforms should also ensure that women stand a better chance of winning elections.
The superior judiciary, which has already overturned Khan’s convictions in several cases, also has a role to play in defusing political hostilities. The courts should be more intrepid in upholding constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, association and assembly. Judges should also expedite the hearing of election petitions, while the Supreme Court should issue a final ruling on the constitutionality of the military trials of those suspected of involvement in the 9 May 2023 unrest at the earliest opportunity. At the same time, Pakistan’s key diplomatic partners should keep pushing for a more robust democratic process, electoral integrity and greater respect for human rights, though both quiet and public diplomacy.
There are few signs that the government and its PTI opposition are ready to break the deadlock. But the longer the impasse continues, the more difficult it will be for the government to address mounting economic and security threats, for parliament to legislate through consensus, and for the judiciary to deliver impartial justice. All parties should realise that they stand to lose if the edifice of Pakistani parliamentary democracy crumbles under their unwillingness to compromise.
Islamabad/Brussels, 28 November 2024
I. Introduction
The seeds of Pakistan’s 8 February contested elections and the mass protests they have generated were sown well before election day.1 Pakistan has been beset by political turmoil since Imran Khan, who became prime minister in 2018, was ousted as the country’s premier following a “no trust” vote in parliament in April 2022.2 Though he was unseated through a constitutionally approved procedure, Khan claimed that the U.S. had conspired with Pakistan’s top military leaders and his rivals in the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party to overthrow his government. Fed a steady diet of conspiracy theories, his enraged supporters attacked military properties and installations in several cities following Khan’s arrest on corruption charges on 9 May 2023, including the residence of the army corps commander in Lahore.
Led by Pakistan’s military, the crackdown that followed has resulted in scores of leading figures in Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party quitting the movement or suffering arrest, along with hundreds of supporters, mainly on charges related to the 9 May 2023 unrest. As the country’s principal powerbroker, the military establishment has played a crucial role in tilting the electoral playing field, first in Khan’s favour and lately against him. His victory in the 2018 polls came after then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s relations with military high command soured, leading to his conviction on corruption charges and a ban on standing in those elections.3 Khan’s attempts to influence top military appointments, including that of the incoming army chief, nevertheless placed him at the receiving end of the military’s ire. Sharif, for his part, came home from years in exile in 2023 to lead his party’s election campaign after being exonerated by the courts.
With Khan behind bars since August 2023 and scores of PTI leaders imprisoned, conditions were already heavily skewed against the party as the 2024 polls drew near.4 Even so, his party retained a huge following throughout Pakistan, largely due to Khan’s personal charisma and ability to capitalise on public discontent stemming from economic hardship. Defying adverse electoral conditions, the PTI went on achieve a major upset at the polls that were held for the federal and provincial legislatures in February, but not enough to obtain a majority in the national legislature.
Claiming that manipulation had deprived the PTI of a decisive victory, demanding wholesale revision of the election results and fighting in the courts to retain what it regards as its fair share of parliamentary seats, Khan, who is still in jail, has engaged in scathing criticism of the new government and its supposed military backers. Late in November, his followers descended upon the capital Islamabad, demanding their leader’s release and rejecting the outcome of the 8 February polls. A government crackdown swiftly silenced the protest, but the potential for further violence remains.
Focusing on the disputed 2024 elections, this report examines the extent to which high political tensions are affecting the incoming government and parliament’s ability to operate. It assesses the effects of polarisation on the country’s economy and security. Lastly, it identifies opportunities to ease the current deadlock. It is based on more than 60 interviews conducted between February and October 2024 with Pakistani political leaders, parliamentarians, including women lawmakers, former officials, political and security analysts and businesspeople.
II. A Disputed Election
The 2024 elections did not take place on a level playing field. Following Khan’s ouster two years earlier, Pakistan’s other leading political parties, the PML-N and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), had formed a coalition government that was eventually replaced by a caretaker administration charged with overseeing the polls.5 In the run-up to the balloting, caretaker governments at both the national and provincial level cracked down on the PTI and sought to quiet critics in civil society and the media.
A. A Tense Polling Day
Restrictions on freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly marred the credibility of the election even before voting for national and provincial parliaments took place on 8 February.
A spike in violence in the run-up to election day raised alarm in many parts of Pakistan. An array of militant groups – ranging from Baloch nationalist hardliners to the jihadist Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – claimed attacks on political rallies, election offices and the homes of leaders of all major parties, particularly in the conflict-hit provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that border Afghanistan.6 A day before the vote, at least 28 people were killed and over 50 wounded in two bomb blasts outside candidates’ offices in Balochistan’s Pishin and Qilla Saifullah districts.7 Almost two dozen militant attacks took place mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan on polling day, killing scores of security personnel – many of whom had been deployed to guard voting stations – and civilians. In the rest of the country, however, polling went ahead relatively smoothly.
Pointing to these security threats, the federal caretaker government imposed a countrywide communications blackout on election day, including a shutdown of mobile phone and internet services. The authorities insisted they had taken this step out of “no other motive than [the] security of people”.8 But many election observers and analysts believed the blackout was aimed at misleading and deterring PTI voters.9 Since candidates for the party were forced to stand as independents in the polls, potential PTI voters would have found it difficult to identify the myriad symbols allotted to them on paper ballots without access to phones or the internet given that many people in Pakistan share this information via social media.
In any event, the PTI was prepared. It had used social media to educate voters about both the electoral symbols of party-backed independent candidates and the locations of polling stations.10 PTI members also set up party camps outside polling stations to guide potential voters.11 Turnout in the polls was 46.9 per cent, far less than the 53 per cent participation in the 2013 elections and the 51 per cent rate in 2018, largely because of security fears and the clampdown on opposition campaigning. In absolute numbers, half of all eligible voters did not exercise their right of franchise. Turnout was particularly low among women; the nationwide gender gap of 17.4 per cent meant that 10.2 million fewer women voted than men.12
B. Victories and Defeats
The election results, above all those for the federal parliament, confirmed the PTI’s comeback in the face of adversity. No party won enough seats to enable it to form a government.13 But with 93 directly elected seats (of the 266 available), PTI-backed candidates emerged as the largest bloc in the National Assembly, followed by the PML-N with 75 and the PPP with 54. The PML-N’s representation subsequently increased as nine independent candidates – including some PTI-backed ones – joined its ranks.
Results for Pakistan’s four provincial legislatures proved more of a mixed bag. As expected, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari’s PPP won an absolute majority in Sindh province by sweeping Sindhi-dominated areas, but it also made inroads in constituencies where the PTI has support, such as Karachi. The Muttahida Quami Movement-Pakistan, or MQM-P, also performed well in urban centres such as Karachi and Hyderabad with the backing of its traditional muhajir constituency.14 The PTI won an absolute majority in its longstanding stronghold of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, defeating both Islamist and Pashtun nationalist parties. In Balochistan, meanwhile, the PML-N and PPP fared far better than anticipated at the cost of Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties, which attributed their losses to ballot rigging.15 In Punjab, the PML-N won enough seats to form a government, but the PTI refused to accept its rival’s victory.
Several factors help explain the PTI’s strong performance against the odds, foremost among them Khan’s personal standing. “The 9 May 2023 violence turned Pakistan’s electoral history on its head”, noted an analyst, in reference to how winning parties had traditionally relied on military backing. “The military was furious. But PTI voters stayed loyal to Khan”.16 In effect, Khan’s supporters responded in large numbers to his calls from jail that they come out to vote.17 At one Islamabad polling station Crisis Group visited on election day, several PTI supporters said they were concerned about their personal security as a result of staying loyal to the party, but they remained committed to backing their imprisoned leader.18 Some political analysts also attributed the PTI’s electoral success to disillusionment with its main rivals, the PPP and PML-N, which had alternated in leading governments from 2008, when Pervez Musharraf’s military regime ended, until the PTI’s 2018 victory, and then returned to power in a coalition in 2022. Others believed that the PTI’s effective use of social media helped the party galvanise its base.19
Despite its strong showing at the ballot box, the PTI remains convinced it performed better than official results suggest.
Despite its strong showing at the ballot box, the PTI remains convinced it performed better than official results suggest, claiming that it won enough seats to form a majority in both the national parliament and Punjab’s assembly. The party alleges that returning officers fraudulently changed the vote tallies of party-backed independent candidates in Punjab and claims to have won 180 seats in the National Assembly. Party leaders maintain that they found glaring discrepancies between the ballot counts made by presiding officers at polling stations, noted in a document known as Form-45, and the returning officers’ provisional consolidated results, issued later on another called Form-47.20 In short, many candidates have alleged that the results recorded in Form-47 do not reflect what appeared in Form-45 in their constituency. “We have only one demand: that results be declared in accordance with Form-45”, said a senior PTI leader.21
Many of the fraud allegations appear well founded.Scores of PTI-backed candidates did appear to pile up substantial leads, particularly over PML-N rivals in the national and Punjab polls, as the vote count proceeded. But the PTI’s share of the vote shrank as returning officers consolidated results from polling stations.22 Holding the country’s electoral commission and caretaker federal and provincial governments responsible for widespread fraud, the party has demanded a vote recount in several constituencies. Backed by other smaller parties that also did poorly in the polls, the PTI has refused to accept the legitimacy of the incoming government and elected institutions, including the current composition of the federal parliament. Responding to Khan’s calls, the PTI has also once again taken to the streets in protest.
The potential for violence has been ever-present as the PTI and its allies have spearheaded a nationwide movement with one main objective: to oust the sitting government. On 13 April, the PTI’s secretary-general announced protests to be led by a coalition of six parties under the banner Tehreek Tahafuz Ayeen-i-Pakistan (Movement for the Protection of Pakistan’s Constitution) decrying the alleged rigging of the polls. “We reject the legitimacy of the ‘Form-47’ government”, Baloch leader Akhtar Mengal said. The PTI’s secretary-general, for his part, warned that “our protest will continue until the people’s mandate is restored in PTI’s favour”.23 The government has responded by cracking down on its adversaries, lodging cases against opposition leaders, banning demonstrations and arresting protesters. This reliance on coercion and repression has exacerbated tensions throughout the nation.
III. The Struggle for Power
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif now heads a national coalition government, while his PML-N party and political allies also govern three of Pakistan’s four federal units: Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. But the government still faces formidable opposition in the shape of the PTI, which continues to protest within and outside parliament for the return of its “stolen mandate” and the unconditional release of Khan and other party leaders.
A. A New Coalition
Since no single party obtained a simple majority in the federal parliament, according to the official results, a coalition government seemed the most likely outcome. As the largest parliamentary bloc, the PTI-backed candidates could have formed a government had they forged an alliance with another major party. But the party’s leadership was disinclined to join forces with a rival.24 Instead, the party insisted it had the right to form a government by itself, adding that it could still do so if its “stolen votes” were returned. In response, and after prolonged negotiations, the PML-N and PPP eventually reached agreement on a coalition government in late February.25 On 3 March, amid noisy protests from the opposition in the National Assembly, the PML-N’s Shehbaz Sharif was elected prime minister; on 9 March, the PPP’s Asif Ali Zardari became president.26 The PTI immediately took to the streets in protest, with many supporters clashing with police, particularly in Punjab. Scores were arrested.
Although it has a parliamentary majority, the PML-N-led coalition government “is fragile”, a ruling-party parliamentarian admitted.27 Rather than join the federal cabinet, the PPP, the PML-N’s key ally, decided to limit its role to supporting the government in parliament – and even then on a case-by-case basis. The PPP was likely concerned about paying the political price for the harsh but essential reforms the government would have to make to revive a moribund economy (see Section IV). The government also faces an intimidating opposition, further emboldened by the Supreme Court’s 12 July ruling, which decided that the PTI should have the 77 seats reserved for women and minorities earlier granted to its opponents (see Section III.B). Neither side appears in a mood for compromise.
Provincial governments, for their part, were formed soon after the polls. On 26 February, the Sindh provincial assembly elected the PPP’s Murad Ali Shah as chief minister, while Punjab’s assembly elected the PML-N’s Maryam Nawaz, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s daughter, amid opposition boycotts and protests.28 On 1 March, the PTI’s Ali Amin Gandapur was elected Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s chief minister.29 In Balochistan, where the PPP and PML-N formed a coalition government, Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties agitated against what they argued were fraudulent electoral defeats, bringing public life to a standstill for several weeks.30
B. Rising Tensions
PTI leaders and other opposition parties reiterated their allegations of tampering after the election commission uploaded the final results on its website on 5 March.31 The PTI’s secretary-general called Shehbaz Sharif’s cabinet “fake and unconstitutional” because it was the result of a “stolen mandate”.32 Alongside public protests, the PTI lodged a series of appeals in election tribunals and superior courts, hoping that these bodies would overturn its candidates’ supposed defeats at the polls.
Relief for the party appeared to come in the shape of a Supreme Court ruling on 12 July, which boosted the party’s parliamentary numbers after determining it was entitled to seats reserved for women and minorities in the provincial and federal legislatures. Since PTI-backed candidates had to stand as independents in the February polls, the party had been concerned it would not be legally entitled to these seats, which are granted in proportion to a party’s parliamentary presence. As a result, party officials had embarked on a legal campaign to ensure they would not lose out. First, the party sought a proxy to represent it. On 19 February, PTI-backed parliamentarians joined the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), composed of an array of Sunni Barelvi political parties and groups.33 The instantaneously enlarged ranks of the SIC then laid claim to 77 of the 255 seats reserved for women and religious minorities in the federal legislature and four provincial assemblies.34 The election commission nevertheless rejected the request on 4 March, ruling that these seats would be allocated to other parties proportional to their existing weight in parliament.35
Absorbing many of these new seats, the PML-N in early March became the largest party in the national legislature, with 123 seats, while the PPP’s share rose from 68 to 73.36 This change in parliament’s composition incensed the new government’s opponents, who appealed the decision in the courts.37 Opponents also said Zardari’s election as president was illegal because it was conducted by an “incomplete house”, in the absence of the SIC’s reserved seats.38
On 12 July, the Supreme Court declared the commission’s decision to distribute the 77 seats to the PTI’s rivals as unconstitutional.
A reprieve for the PTI was nevertheless in the offing. In its verdict on 12 July, the Supreme Court declared the commission’s decision to distribute the 77 seats to the PTI’s rivals as unconstitutional, “without lawful authority and of no legal effect”.39 The bench also unanimously ruled that the denial of an election symbol did not affect a political party’s right to participate in elections. The verdict declared that the PTI, whose candidates had won as independents in the 2024 poll, was entitled to the reserved seats, rather than its SIC proxy.40
The court’s ruling meant that the PTI could return as a lawful parliamentary party in the federal and provincial legislatures. Not only that, but with 114 seats it would become the largest parliamentary party in the National Assembly, followed by the PML-N with 108 sets and the PPP with 68. As a result, the ruling coalition would retain its 209 seats but no longer have the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution.41
Even so, legal wrangling over the seats is far from ending. Despite the Supreme Court ruling, the election commission has so far failed to transfer the seats to the PTI, citing the ruling coalition’s amendment in August of certain electoral laws.42 The court responded in turn on 18 October, ruling that changes to the law could not have retroactive effect.43 The commission might have no choice but to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision, but the prolonged controversy has stoked vitriolic exchanges between the government and opposition. Tensions escalated once again in mid-September, when the ruling coalition considered tabling a constitutional amendment that would establish a federal constitutional court.44 According to a leaked draft, the new court would have the sole authority over constitutional cases, thus absorbing the Supreme Court’s powers to make rulings on these matters. Eventually, on 21 October, parliament approved the creation of a new constitutional bench and other judicial reforms (see Section V.A for details).45
Well aware that it lacked a two-thirds majority, the government reached out to the opposition within a special parliamentary committee tasked with drafting the proposed amendment.46 Though Khan’s party had representatives on the committee, the controversy gave it another rallying cry for its aggrieved support base.
C. Protests and Prosecutions
Defying the government’s ban on protests and rallies, PTI supporters took to the streets in Rawalpindi and Islamabad in ever greater numbers from late September to demonstrate against the “mandate theft”, as well as Khan’s imprisonment, and in support of an independent judiciary. During the first series of marches, which lasted under early October, hundreds were arrested in Rawalpindi and other cities in Punjab as activists clashed with police. The protests in Islamabad on 4 and 5 October turned even more violent as supporters responded to Khan’s call, shared in a media post on X: “It’s time to do or die”.47
These initial protests soon ended, largely because the army deployed troops in the capital and the government blockaded streets, including with shipping containers. But before they did, violent clashes led to the death of a police officer while scores of protesters and police were wounded.48 In the aftermath, the police lodged charges of attempted murder, terrorism and sedition against Khan and 200 party workers, including senior leaders.49 PML-N leaders and ministers accused protesters of aiming to sabotage the high-level summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Council that was held on 15 October.50
With no prospect in sight of concessions from the government, party leaders and supporters once again flocked to the streets on 24 November in response to Khan’s “final call” for a march on Islamabad.51 PTI officials and lawmakers who declined to take part would be obliged to “dissociate from the party”, Khan stated.52
Efforts to reach a deal to avert a resurgence of protests were soon thwarted. Three days before the planned march, the Islamabad High Court declared it unlawful, saying the PTI had failed to obtain prior permission from local authorities, and called on the federal government to engage with PTI leaders in search of a negotiated resolution. Should a deal prove unattainable, the court said all necessary measures could be taken to maintain law and order.53 Though initial talks did consider postponement of the protest until after the 24-25 November visit of a high-level delegation from Belarus, Khan insisted that he would only “gauge the seriousness of the negotiations” upon his release.54 With talks between the sides stuck and the PTI adamant that it would go ahead with the protest, the government proceeded to enforce bans on public gatherings in Punjab and Islamabad, detain PTI leaders and supporters, deploy paramilitary Rangers along with thousands of additional police, close all major highways and roads to the capital, seal off city streets with barriers, including freight containers, and shut down internet and mobile phone services.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, led by the PTI, spearheaded the protest.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, led by the PTI, spearheaded the protest. Provincial chief minister Ali Amin Gandapur and Khan’s wife Bushra Bibi led convoys of supporters that crossed from Punjab into Islamabad on 25 November despite security forces’ attempts to deter them by firing tear gas and rubber bullets, as well as carrying out baton charges.55 Meanwhile, last-ditch efforts by the federal government to convince the PTI to hold the protest in the outskirts of Islamabad failed after Bibi insisted on heading to D-Chowk, a square in the heart of the city and close to the parliament and other important state buildings.56 As violence erupted in the capital the next day, 26 November, the federal government called in the army, authorising it to shoot “PTI miscreants” on sight and to impose curfews where necessary.57 A midnight operation conducted by the police and paramilitary forces ousted PTI supporters from D-Chowk, with Gandapur and Bibi fleeing to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa while the party faithful also headed back to the province.58
Disturbances during the protests reportedly claimed the lives of three Rangers officers, one police officer and at least two protesters. Alleging that security forces were responsible for the death of around 20 activists, a claim the government denies, the PTI said it had called off its Islamabad sit-in “for the time being” while Khan decides its future course.59 But the federal government’s stance bodes ill for any future thaw between the sides, with the information minister saying the PTI “will not dare to do this again”, adding that there will be “no deal, no concession”.60
In the meantime, the government has also filed new corruption cases against Khan, as well as several others linked to the 9 May 2023 violence, reportedly with the aim of keeping him in jail. On 13 July, Khan and his wife were acquitted of charges that their marriage was unlawful, raising the PTI’s hopes that he would be released.61 But Khan had been “re-arrested” while still in prison on new charges related to the sale of toshakahana (gifts received by state officials). On 14 July, Punjab police also “arrested” Khan in connection with a dozen cases linked to the 9 May 2023 demonstrations. An anti-terrorism court approved his remand to custody.62 Khan, his spouse Bibi, and a number of top PTI leaders have now also been charged with criminal conspiracy for alleged incitement to protest; and Khan has also been charged in relation to the deaths of two police constables in the October and November protests.63
Top officials nevertheless seem hesitant to go further by imposing an outright ban on the PTI. Several coalition partners have cautioned against the political, legal and constitutional implications of prohibiting the party.64 In all likelihood, the PPP’s opposition to this move has proven critical. In any event, the final decision would need to come from the Supreme Court, which lawyers and political analysts believe would not support a ban on the PTI or, for that matter, high treason charges against Khan.65
D. A Negotiated Way Out?
Besides the rolling protests, the costs of Pakistan’s political standoff are increasingly tangible. The PML-N-led ruling coalition has the numbers to push through legislation in the National Assembly, but it has little chance of doing so smoothly. Since the February election, PTI-backed lawmakers have sought to disrupt every parliamentary session. Similar protests have been held in the Punjab and Sindh legislatures. With opposition members aggressively confronting ruling-party legislators in parliamentary debates, some lawmakers fear they could resort to violence. “There is such hatred, such ugly language used against us, that we feel physically threatened even within the premises of the House”, said a woman parliamentarian from the ruling coalition. “This can’t go on for five years [the parliament’s term]. Something is bound to give”, she added, voicing a concern shared by many inside parliament and out.66
Despite the hostility between the government and the opposition, the ruling coalition has attempted to reach out to the PTI in the hope of defusing tensions through direct talks. In his first speech to parliament, Prime Minister Sharif called for “national reconciliation”; President Zardari expressed similar sentiments in his inaugural address.67 The PTI responded by laying down conditions that would appear to make talks prohibitively costly for the government: demands included return of its “stolen mandate” and Khan’s release, as well as the withdrawal of all cases against him and other party members.68 The prospect of direct talks between the parties, which had receded as the two sides traded barbs in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 12 July verdict, has become even more remote as the PTI continues to protest, at times violently, for Khan’s freedom.69
The PTI, for its part, has made several abortive attempts to engage with the military, which it insists holds all the strings of power. On 29 April, Khan had authorised three PTI leaders to hold talks with the top brass.70 These efforts have made little headway, and Khan’s offer of talks has not stopped his verbal attacks on military leaders. In an article published in May, the former prime minister accused the military, and army chief General Asim Munir in particular, of seeking to “decimate my party’s presence”. The PTI’s electoral victory, he said, was the “democratic revenge of the people against the agenda of the military establishment”.71
Some analysts believe that the PTI is under the misapprehension that public pressure will force the high command to accept talks.72 Instead, the generals have reportedly closed ranks behind Munir, whom Khan seems to hold personally responsible for his and his party’s predicament. The military is particularly vexed by the PTI’s refusal to acknowledge its role in the 9 May 2023 violence. Speaking ahead of the first anniversary of that unrest, the military spokesperson called for a public apology from Khan and ruled out negotiations with the PTI, branding the party’s members “anarchists”. He added, however, that talks could take place between the PTI and political parties.73 Khan has gone on to insist that he would only engage in dialogue with the “real authority”, since negotiations with the government were a “futile exercise”.74 He also offered to apologise for the 9 May 2023 riots if the involvement of his party’s supporters was proven.75 But the military rejected his overtures, saying its stance remained unaltered: those responsible for the riots must be brought to book.76
Should the [PTI] apologise for the 9 May 2023 violence … it could in their view open the door to dialogue.
PTI leaders and supporters, including top lawyers, cling to the belief that indignation in military circles will not stop the armed forces from eventually reaching a settlement with Khan. They appear to assume that the military cannot disregard the party’s political clout, as well as that PTI protests within and outside parliament will weaken an already fragile coalition government. Further, party leaders and supporters seem to believe that the Sharif government will fail to revive the economy and win over voters, leaving the military with no choice but to mend fences with the PTI. Finally, they are of the opinion that the PTI enjoys backing within senior military ranks, which could persuade the high command to rethink the targeting of Khan and his party.77 Should the party apologise for the 9 May 2023 violence, as the military demands, it could in their view open the door to dialogue. But they remain concerned that doing so would represent an abandonment of anti-military rhetoric, endangering the public support the PTI has earned from denouncing an alleged campaign of unfair persecution of the party and its leaders.78
That said, there is no sign so far that the military intends to withdraw its support for the Sharif government. The ruling coalition can push through legislation in parliament, overriding opposition benches. Furthermore, PTI supporters within the military are unlikely to press the Munir-led high command to change its political calculations. Several senior officers suspected of being loyal to the PTI have already been sidelined or dismissed. One prominent confidant of Khan, former Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) chief General Faiz Hameed, was taken into military custody on 12 August and now faces court-martial, accused of corruption and violating army rules after his retirement.79 A military spokesperson said court-martial proceedings against the former ISI chief, along with three other retired officers, a brigadier general and two colonels, were based on “concrete evidence” that they “crossed legal and constitutional bounds on the instruction of particular political elements”, a veiled reference to Khan’s PTI.80
Prominent party supporters had hoped that reconciliation with the military establishment would become more feasible after army chief Munir’s retirement. But this prospect also fell by the wayside after parliament extended his tenure from three to five years.81 For now, the fear in PTI ranks is that Hameed could testify against Khan, potentially paving the way for a trial in a military court on cases related to the 9 May 2023 unrest.82 With that in mind, Khan’s lawyers have approached the Islamabad High Court seeking to prevent their client’s transfer to military custody.83 The federal government has downplayed the prospect of a military trial for Khan, but it has been careful not to rule out the option entirely.84 Any effort to try Khan in a military court would doubtless exacerbate Pakistan’s political disputes.
IV. Coping with Economic and Security Challenges
Shehbaz Sharif’s government has assumed power in the face of stiff opposition, and at a time when the country confronts a deep fiscal crisis and rising militant violence. Political tensions could jeopardise the fragile ruling coalition’s ability to cope with the country’s economic challenges and security threats.
A. Living on Credit
Approval on 25 September of a $7 billion three-year credit by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) marked the achievement of a top government priority, with the first tranche of $1.1 billion released soon after.85 “There is no Plan B”, Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb had warned earlier in the year, pointing out that the country’s foreign exchange reserves were sufficient to cover only a few weeks of essential imports.86 Without the IMF’s green light, Islamabad would have struggled to fork over billions of dollars in foreign debt repayments to avoid a sovereign default.87
Reaching an agreement with the IMF, however, could prove easier for the government than making the tough and unpopular economic reforms that such a deal entails. Shehbaz’s first coalition government paid a heavy electoral price after it had to undertake harsh austerity measures in line with the $3 billion IMF Standby Agreement, signed in April 2023. The PTI’s success at the polls was due in part to public discontent with rising fuel and energy prices in the run-up to the elections.88 Concerns about deepening popular disaffection amid high inflation and slow economic growth – not to mention rising poverty and unemployment – might well have been behind the PPP’s refusal to join the federal cabinet.89
Pakistan’s commitments to the IMF under the Standby Agreement had included raising domestic taxes, privatising state-owned enterprises and ending subsidies, particularly those covering the energy sector, thus hiking electricity and fuel prices.90 The public disliked these measures, but they helped ensure the successful conclusion of the long-term bailout while also improving macro-economic indicators, including shoring up foreign exchange reserves and reducing inflation, which is now in the single digits.91
While the risks of sovereign default have decreased, the road ahead will be hard. Among other commitments, the government has agreed to respect fiscal and monetary discipline, increase taxes, and remove more subsidies for the energy sector. Though the government might have little choice but adhere to those commitments, its political standing could take a hit as austerity measures, particularly the energy subsidy cuts, further increase the cost of living.92
B. Centre-State Relations and Militant Resurgence
The months following the February election have seen a spike in militant attacks, particularly in the two provinces – Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – that border Afghanistan. According to data provided by the interior ministry to parliament in August, 2,075 terrorist attacks took place over the preceding sixteen months, many carried out by the jihadist TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, resulting in 1,215 deaths. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa bore the brunt of the violence with 736 fatalities, followed by Balochistan with 432.93 A Pakistani think-tank estimated that the number of militant attacks had surged from 38 in July to 59 in August, killing 84 people and wounding 166 others.94
Counter-insurgency operations have gained momentum in recent months, but they are unlikely to ward off a militant resurgence unless they are backed by a cohesive, comprehensive approach, including the buy-in of all provincial governments.95 Pakistani politics means it will not be easy to put such an approach together. The February elections fragmented the state apparatus, with clear effects on security matters. When it was in power, Khan’s government had entered peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban.96 The Shehbaz Sharif government and the military establishment, on the other hand, strongly oppose overtures to jihadist groups. Now that the PTI is in control of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, its decision to continue or abandon the policy of engaging with the TTP is sure to come under the spotlight. What it does could undermine coordination between the province’s police force and counter-terrorism department and national authorities.
Security forces have … cracked down on NDM protests of alleged electoral manipulation.
Complicating matters further is that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-based Pashtun nationalist parties believe they were the targets of ballot rigging in the February polls. Leaders of one such party, the National Democratic Movement (NDM), which opposes militant violence, allege that the will of the people has been “trampled upon” and warn that “mandate theft” risks exacerbating tensions in the province.97 Security forces have already cracked down on NDM protests of alleged electoral manipulation, while the federal government in October banned the civil society-led Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, citing threats to national security. This group opposes militancy but is also critical of rights abuses during military operations in the province.98 These actions could prove counterproductive, with the TTP poised to become the main beneficiary of attempts to suppress moderate Pashtun parties and groups.99 “As local alienation rises, militants are already filling the political vacuum”, said a security analyst, referring to TTP efforts to attract new recruits.100
Conditions are no simpler in Balochistan, where Baloch nationalist parties that fared poorly in the elections have joined the ranks of the PTI-led opposition. Many Baloch believe that Islamabad has long denied them political, social and economic rights, while efforts to crush their shows of dissent have stoked mistrust.101 With militancy already surging across the province, Baloch nationalist leaders warn that sidelining their parties will only serve to worsen conflict.102 According to one senior leader and former parliamentarian, “political parties such as mine that participate in national politics are strongly opposed by the Baloch militants”. He warned that militant groups will now find ready recruits by convincing Baloch youth that they can gain their rights only “through the gun, not the ballot box”.103
V. Breaking Pakistan’s Deadlock
There is little chance that Pakistan’s ruling coalition will acknowledge, let alone accept, the PTI-led opposition’s demands for wholesale revision of the February election results or Khan’s immediate, unconditional release. There are still opportunities to find a middle path, however, provided all parties realise that they stand to lose if parliamentary democracy erodes as a result of their intransigence.
A. The Role of Parliament
Even in Pakistan’s highly polarised environment, there are still opportunities for parliament to focus on its main tasks of policy debate, lawmaking and overseeing the work of government. In June, the ruling coalition offered and the united opposition accepted the chairs of eleven National Assembly standing parliamentary committees, all but one headed by the PTI’s proxy, the Sunni Ittehad Council.104 It is in these committees, a parliamentarian noted, “where the real work on legislation is done”.105 The realisation seems to be dawning within PTI ranks that such debate over legislation could be a powerful means of gaining political strength.106 At the same time, these committees represent a space shared among rival parties and a potential vehicle for creating greater understanding among political foes. “Since parliamentary committees work out of the public eye, members tend to work together far more smoothly and far more seriously”, said another lawmaker.107
These parliamentary committees could prove a useful avenue for the PTI and its political opponents to initiate a broader dialogue on tempering the hostility between them. One such attempt, on the particularly sensitive issue of judicial reform, made little headway, but the PTI’s active participation in the parliamentary committee dealing with the matter was still a promising sign. As part of the special parliamentary committee deliberating on the creation of a federal constitutional court (see Section III.B), PTI representatives with the backing of party leaders at first supported efforts to water down the plans for a separate court by instead creating a constitutional bench within the Supreme Court. 108 The PPP and PML-N finally agreed to this plan, which had been proposed by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, (Fazlur Rehman), a PTI ally, and parliament approved the constitutional amendment to this effect on 21 October.109
Despite this show of compromise, the PTI has vacillated over whether to support the constitutional amendment or not. In public, it has portrayed the measure as an attack on judicial independence. But in parliament, it has proven less resistant, while two party lawmakers have joined the judicial commission set up under the amendment after receiving Khan’s approval.110 The strategy adopted by the PTI appears to involve both galvanising the party faithful through street protests while fighting for political advantage within the bounds of parliament.
Other issues of mutual interest between government and opposition forces could spur joint legislative work at the committee stage. One of these is election reform, which has been a top concern of the PTI since the 2024 polls; the PML-N, for its part, is still bitter about alleged military manipulation of the 2018 election. Proposals for reform could include providing the election commission with sufficient funds to hire permanent staff to conduct and oversee the electoral process, putting an end to the controversial recruitment of returning officers from the judiciary or state bureaucracy. A better legal framework could also remove technical and other flaws in the reporting of results, helping ensure that the next election is transparent, fair and credible. While that will not address the PTI’s most pressing demands, it will work to the benefit of all major political parties, including Khan’s, as they contest the next national elections.
Consensus among the parties could also be reached on new laws to safeguard the rights of women to participate in elections.
Consensus among the parties could also be reached on new laws to safeguard the rights of women to participate in elections, both as voters and candidates. Parliament should in particular expand the quota for women standing as candidates in general (directly elected) seats in the national and provincial parliaments beyond the current 5 per cent minimum representation. It should also amend the election law to include a mandatory quota for women elected to general seats in parliament.111 That would ensure that political parties do not merely pay lip service to the 5 per cent requirement by nominating women candidates in constituencies where the parties are likely to lose.112 In parallel, parliament should urge the executive to end the glaring gender gaps in the voter rolls, which mean that millions of women cannot exercise their right of franchise.113
Political parties should also end the widespread practice of relegating women lawmakers to the sidelines. “Women parliamentarians are largely neglected by their parliamentary parties and when recognised it is only because male family members – fathers, brothers or husbands – are politically prominent”, a former woman lawmaker commented, adding that very few women parliamentarians are appointed as chairs of important committees. “Not for lack of knowledge or professional expertise”, she said, “but solely because of their gender”.114 In that regard, the creation of a new cross-party women’s caucus in the National Assembly is a welcome development, as such caucuses have in the past helped women lawmakers gain more influence in parliamentary debates while also building a degree of trust among parties. Women parliamentarians themselves are clear as to the importance of overcoming political differences to advance gender-sensitive legislation.
Building trust among the parties in parliament in these ways could prepare the ground for a more open-ended dialogue between the ruling coalition and the PTI. But that is unlikely to happen until such time that both sides are willing to compromise. The outlines of a sensible agreement would see the government end its clampdown on the PTI and its leaders, while the PTI walks back from its hardline posture of rejecting the government’s legitimacy. Yet since no number of concessions by the government appears enough to persuade the PTI to recognise the government, for now the best hope for political reconciliation lies behind the scenes, within and through parliamentary forums.
B. Economic Policies
Despite the political pressure it faces, the ruling coalition should resist the temptation of quick fixes and populist measures that could have adverse consequences for a moribund economy and generate worsening unrest. That said, as it follows IMF guidance to remove subsidies, including for the energy sector, and sell off or restructure state-run entities, it should also enhance social protections for those most vulnerable to economic shocks, particularly women. It should, for instance, expand the number of beneficiaries of targeted schemes such as the Benazir Income Support Program, which provides cash transfers to women heads of households falling under the poverty line; it should also index such cash grants to inflation.
The PTI-led opposition should in turn recognise that scoring political points on economic issues, including targeting the reforms planned under the IMF bailout, could prove counterproductive. Many businesspeople believe that instability will continue to undermine economic recovery unless the country’s political establishment reaches consensus around a set of fundamental reforms. The solution, they insist, lies in dialogue between ruling and opposition parties that would ensure the continuity of economic policies and reduce the risks of political turmoil.115 Once again, parliamentary committees could provide a suitable space for discussion of economic issues by rival political forces.
C. The Judiciary’s Burden
The judiciary has found itself under huge strain as it handles cases that stand at the heart of Pakistan’s polarised political landscape, with the courts attracting the wrath of both government and opposition for its rulings. On several occasions, the judiciary has handed down landmark rulings against the government, such as the Supreme Court’s 12 July decision on reserved seats – which the PML-N appealed. Despite criticism from Khan’s party that civilian courts have failed to deliver justice to its imprisoned leaders and supporters, Pakistan’s courts have upheld many of the PTI’s requests, including accepting Khan’s appeals in several cases, such as the high-profile “cipher case” on 3 June.116 The superior judiciary has also released scores of PTI supporters on bail. But many others charged in relation to the 9 May violence, including senior women leaders, remain in prison, and the judicial system could do more to protect civil liberties and constitutional rights, particularly in cases involving jailed political activists.
Several other highly sensitive cases await court decisions. The superior courts will be tested again as the government lodges more cases against Khan for the unrest on 9 May 2023 (see Section III.B). The Supreme Court has also yet to rule on the legality of trials of PTI supporters through courts-martial. Its final verdict on this highly controversial issue will decide once and for all whether the trial of civilians by military tribunals is within the limits of the constitution.
The judiciary could also play a role in restoring public trust in the electoral process by addressing the flaws that marred the February polls, particularly by expediting the cases of dozens of losing candidates, including scores backed by the PTI, presently pending in the country’s election tribunals.117 Hearings for these cases tend to drag on endlessly, to the extent that, in the past, some were not brought to a conclusion before the next election cycle.118 Amid today’s deep polarisation, the tribunals should ensure they are dealt with in an expedited manner.
D. The Role of Foreign Actors
Pakistan’s key diplomatic partners, particularly the U.S., the European Union and the UK, have expressed reservations about the manner in which the general election was held. A day after the polls, the U.S. State Department said it joined “credible international and local election observers in their assessment that these elections included undue restrictions on freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly”.119 Britain and the EU also raised concerns about the credibility of the polls and the lack of fairness in the exercise. The British foreign secretary, for instance, regretted that “not all parties were formally permitted to contest the polls”, while the EU spokesperson for foreign and security policy noted the lack of a “level playing field” for all political parties.120
All three capitals – Washington, Brussels and London – have called for an inquiry into claims of electoral interference and fraud. A statement issued by the EU Council, for example, said “the relevant authorities” should “ensure a timely and full investigation of all reported electoral irregularities”.121 Testifying before Congress, the U.S. State Department’s top South Asia official warned that the failure of Pakistan’s election commission to look into irregularities would “retard our ability to have the type of relationship we want, in security matters, on [the] business front and people to people. All that suffers if Pakistan is not a full democracy”.122
Despite these statements, the U.S., the UK and EU member states and institutions are generally averse to putting pressure on an important diplomatic and strategic partner. They should nevertheless continue, through public messaging and quiet diplomacy, to remind Islamabad of its obligation to respect – under both international law and its own constitution – human rights and democratic norms and practices. Their dialogue with the government should focus on protecting the freedoms of association and speech enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution. Engagement with the incoming parliament, including exchanges between legislative bodies, would also help forge ties with a constituency that should have the most at stake in preventing relations among political parties from deteriorating beyond repair.
VI. Conclusion
Pakistan’s February elections have left the country’s polity more polarised than ever. With no party winning an absolute majority, the PML-N joined hands with the PPP and other allies to form a coalition government, leading to Shehbaz Sharif becoming prime minister once again. But the PTI, which won the greatest number of seats, rejects the government’s legitimacy, demands that its “stolen mandate” be returned and leans toward mass protest as a means of pressing its case.
With inter-party tensions at a peak in the wake of the disputed polls, the road ahead will be bumpy. The Sharif government is attempting to use carrots and sticks, offering dialogue but continuing to crack down on the PTI-led opposition. Rejecting such overtures, the PTI is endeavouring to combined popular mobilisation with efforts to reach out to an incensed military top brass in the hope of resurrecting its political fortunes, albeit so far in vain. Every democratic institution is suffering the consequences of this logjam: a fragile executive must prove it can address mounting economic and security challenges; parliament risks becoming more of a venue for protest than lawmaking; and an overburdened judiciary has found itself under pressure to deliver results that all political contenders find acceptable. Unless the ruling coalition and its PTI-led opposition find a middle path, the government and parliament will struggle to curb unrest and deliver effective democratic governance at a time of acute public need.
International Crisis Group (ICG), Islamabad/Brussels, 28 November 2024