By Pearl Matibe – 8th August 2025
On 1 August, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch introduced key amendments to the 2026 National Defence Authorisation Act, signalling a major shift in US policy toward Africa. Risch aims to ensure that US military and financial ties with African nations clearly align with American interests.
At the centre of this shift is S.Amdmt.3628, a call for review of Kenya’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). Under the amendment, the US President must submit a report to Congress evaluating whether Kenya’s policies remain aligned with US national security goals. This assessment is expected to scrutinise not only Kenya’s bilateral military cooperation with the United States but also its growing entanglements with China and Russia. Washington’s patience appears to be waning as Nairobi engages in multipolar balancing. MNNA status is more than ceremonial; it comes with real defence benefits. Risch’s amendments signal that these benefits may now be conditional.
Next is S.Amdt.3627, addressing Ghana, where the issue is not military conduct but financial governance. Risch’s amendment prohibits America from supporting Ghana’s access to International Monetary Fund (IMF) resources unless and until Ghana resolves long-standing commercial debts owed to American companies. This places US commercial interests squarely into the diplomatic equation. Ghana, currently in the midst of a complex IMF-backed economic recovery programme, must now reckon with a new requirement; honouring international obligations to American firms before enjoying multilateral financial support backed by Washington.
A third amendment (S.Amdt.3626) calling for an assessment of whether M23 and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) introduces a decisive turn in US counterterrorism posture. The RSF has been responsible for egregious human rights violations in Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Meanwhile, the Allied Democratic Forces (ISIS-DRC) is already designated an FTO, raising the question: if ISIS-DRC meets the threshold, why not M23?
M23—specifically, the armed coalition known as AFC-M23—is no longer a small-scale rebel outfit confined to skirmishes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since late 2024 and throughout 2025, AFC-M23 has exhibited a dangerous evolution in both tactics and organisational structure. M23 has deployed increasingly sophisticated heavy weapon systems, coordinated cross-regional offensives, and made verified public claims of territorial control over major cities such as Goma and Bukavu, and more than six territories in the last few years. These actions are not incidental or improvised; they reflect strategic planning, military logistics, and political ambition.
Under the United States Code, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” By this standard, AFC-M23’s activities meet—and in fact exemplify—that definition. Their calculated use of force against civilian populations and local governance structures is neither random nor reactive. In statements to international media, AFC-M23 (aka M23) spokespeople have claimed credit for these assaults and justified them as necessary steps toward their broader political goals. This is not a rogue faction; it is a structured rebel formation with distinct political and military wings, akin to other hybrid armed organisations seen across the globe.
In proposing this FTO assessment, Risch is making an argument that US policy has lagged behind the on-ground reality in Central Africa. Designating AFC-M23 and RSF as FTOs would not only limit their international financial and logistical mobility but would also send a message to regional governments that harbouring or negotiating with such groups carries international legal and diplomatic consequences.
A fourth amendment (S.Amdt.3626) addresses the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), where Risch seeks to limit US financial involvement in African Union-led peace operations in Somalia via UN-assessed contributions, unless stringent conditions are met.
Risch, alongside Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Rick Scott (R-FL), introduced the AUSSOM Funding Restriction Act of 2025 to restrict the use of United States Assessed Contributions to the United Nations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) “to safeguard US taxpayer funds and hold the UN and African Union (AU) accountable in African peace operations.” In other words, the senators’ concern is not about all US funding to Africa. It is specifically about how American taxpayer money sent through the UN might be used to support an AU-linked institution without clear safeguards.
The senators argue that the AU has not met the eligibility and funding conditions expected by the US government, stating bluntly, “The AU’s inability to meet the eligibility criteria and funding conditions asked of the US shows a disregard for the American taxpayer’s money.” This amendment calls for temporarily blocking such funds unless the State Department certifies that AUSSOM is not promoting anti-democratic or anti-American values. The amendment pushes for greater accountability, burden-sharing, and alternative funding models for such missions.
For African policymakers, the message is clear. US support is not disappearing, but it is changing. Access to defence privileges, financial backing, and counterterrorism partnership will increasingly depend on tangible alignment with US strategic objectives—and demonstrable distance from behaviours that violate human rights, undermine, or obstruct American commercial and national interests.
Pearl Matibe is a Washington, DC-based geopolitical analyst and correspondent with expertise in foreign policy and international security, regularly covering the Pentagon and White House. Follow her on X (Twitter): @PearlMatibe