By Zagazola Makama
In Nigeria’s dynamic security environment, the contest is no longer limited to guns, troops and airstrikes, as the information space has become an active front where competing narratives shape public perception. While some reports are factual, others are misleading or exaggerated, prompting scrutiny among security stakeholders about the impact of disinformation on trust, decision-making and ongoing operations.
In recent days, the pattern has been consistent: major security incidents are swiftly followed by a flood of conflicting reports, exaggerated casualty figures and unverified claims, many of which gain traction before official information becomes available.
The latest example is the military airstrike on a Boko Haram enclave or Market in Jilli, Gubio Local Government Area of Borno.
Within hours of the operation, the media space was awash with reports alleging mass civilian casualties. Figures varied widely, some reports claimed 50 killed, others 159, while some went as high as 200. Yet, available information from official and emergency sources tells a different story.
The area targeted, Jilli, is widely regarded by military authorities as a “no man’s land” an enclave long abandoned by civilians and occupied by insurgents. Access to the location is highly restricted, with movement largely controlled by terrorist elements.
Even state emergency officials in neighbouring Yobe confirmed that while some injured persons from Geidam were treated, they could not independently verify casualty figures from the strike zone.
This prompts a critical question: who is counting the dead in a territory largely inaccessible to civilians and government authorities? The answer lies in the speed and structure of modern information flows.
In today’s digital ecosystem, news travels faster than verification. Initial reports often based on speculation or unverified sources are quickly amplified across social media and picked up by multiple outlets. One credible medium can mislead the whole of the Nigeria’s media with a narrative that is entirely not true and by the time accurate information emerges, the narrative may already be firmly established in public consciousness.
A similar pattern was observed in the reporting of the recent attack in Benisheik. Early reports claimed that 17 people, including a Brigade Commander, were killed. However, subsequent official confirmation put the figure at four. Burial for the four slain soldiers and officers will be carried out on Tuesday 14 April 2026.
Despite the correction, the earlier narrative had already circulated widely, shaping public perception of the incident. Beyond casualty figures, misinformation has also extended to operational details.
In the aftermath of the Benisheik attack, claims surfaced alleging that the Brigade Commander died due to obsolete weapons and faulty Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, as well as suggestions that requests for better equipment had been denied. Some even went as far as publishing an entirely fictitious report claiming the general confessed to someone and wrote to Abuja many times.
Military high command and sources in the Brigade however, dismissed these claims as unfounded, noting that no verifiable evidence was provided to support them. Even the MRAP that was burnt in the attack was not because it was faulty, it was because the driver got panicked and ran away.
Perhaps more concerning is the emergence of content that goes beyond misinformation into the realm of psychological influence. One such example is a viral audio message circulating online, in which a speaker makes sweeping allegations linking government officials and security institutions to sponsorship of bandits to Saudi Arabia.
The audio, attributed in some platforms to a figure identified as “English Alhaji,” alleges that the Nigerian authorities are collaborating with armed groups and even facilitating foreign travel for them.
While the claims are serious, and supporting the conspiracy theories on peoples head, they are presented without names, locations, or supporting evidence. It starts with specific accusations on a certain Local Government Chiarman, then gradually expands into a broader claim of institutional betrayal.
The message repeatedly suggests that those responsible for protecting the country are themselves complicit in insecurity. But who are those saddled with the responsibility of protecting the country? (Military and Government). It is clear that the narrative was designed to erode trust in the country’s security institutions and such messaging often relies on emotional intensity rather than verifiable facts.
References to personal danger such as claims that the speaker may be assassinated for revealing the information are also used to enhance perceived credibility and discourage scrutiny. In conflict-affected regions, the impact of such narratives can be immediate and far-reaching.
When trust in security agencies is weakened, civilians may become less willing to share intelligence, report suspicious activities or cooperate with patrols all of which are critical to counter-insurgency efforts.
The spread of disinformation also risks undermining non-kinetic approaches to security.
In several parts of the country, authorities have adopted strategies such as dialogue, amnesty programmes and community reconciliation to reduce violence. However, when these initiatives are stripped of context, they can be misrepresented as evidence of collusion.
The trend is not limited to local incidents. In December, a US-based humanitarian organization issued a grave warning that armed groups are planning coordinated attacks against Christian communities in northern Nigeria during the Christmas period.
The report titled “Concerns about possible Christmas Day attacks” by Mr Judd Saul, the founder of Equipping the Persecuted, says he has privileged information that there are plots by terrorists and bandits to attack rural communities in the councils and kill as many people as possible on Christmas Day.
“They are gathering forces around the Plateau and Nasarawa border, along the Nasarawa-Benue border, and along the Nasarawa-Kaduna border. They are planning to hit on Christmas Day in Riyom, Bokkos, and Barkin Ladi,” Saul said during an Emergency Summit on Crimes against Christians that was held at the US Capitol on Tuesday, December 16. Christmas had came and passed and no mass attacks took place on Christmas day on Christians. The claims were understood to be plot by the foreign NGO, to promote campaign of genocide against Christians in order to destabilized the country along religious lines.
In the past week, claims circulated that more than 1,000 Boko Haram fighters had been transported into Abuja, allegedly prompting US Embassy to shut down operations and evacuated its staff because Abuja is no longer safe is another FAKE news which authorities have since dismissed the claim as FALSE.
Within the same day, another viral video resurfaced claiming that terrorists were advancing on Abuja amid heavy gunfire. The viral report had since been described by the FCT Commissioner of Police, Ahmed Sanusi, false and misleading.
Another viral post emerged again and being circulated widely on Watssap groups titled “Viewers discretion advised” The 25 female students abducted from a school in Maga, Kebbi state on Sunday been slaughtered like fowls.Honestly this is getting out of hand.
Unfortunately, that video from Burkina Faso had circulated since early 2025 after a terrorists organization carried out mass slaughter of some men in a certain community. But in the circulated message, it was presented as the 25 female students abducted in Maga, kebbi state.
Similarly, viral posts attempted to link Nigeria to a purported social media statement by U.S. President Donald Trump on purported message which allegedly emanate from Iran. President Tump lashed out on CNN for relying on the report. But it turned out that Mr Trump claims
that was also found to be baseless. The statement never emanate from Nigeria but Iran themselves.
These incidents illustrate how misinformation can transcend borders, drawing in global figures and institutions to lend credibility to false narratives. The cumulative effect of these developments is the gradual erosion of “trust architecture” between the public and state institutions.
In counter-insurgency operations, trust is not just a social value, it is an operational asset.
Without it, intelligence gathering becomes more difficult, community policing weakens, and early warning systems begin to fail.
For media organisations, the challenge is balancing speed with accuracy. In a competitive information environment, the pressure to publish quickly can sometimes override the need for verification. However, it is emphasise that credibility remains the most valuable asset of journalism. For the public, the responsibility lies in critical consumption. Not every viral message is factual, and not every widely shared claim is true.
Majority of media organizations also blamed delayed official responses from state institutions for the spread of conflicting narratives during security crises, noting that information gaps often compel media organisations to rely on unverified sources. They said the absence of timely and authoritative updates creates room for speculation, misinformation and exaggerated reporting, which can mislead the public and undermine ongoing operations.
According to them, government agencies responsible for information management must act swiftly to bridge this gap by providing accurate and prompt briefings. State institutions charged with the responsibility of information are not doing enough. The people need to be properly informed,”they said.
The stakeholders emphasised that improving communication and ensuring consequences for misinformation are critical to restoring public trust and maintaining stability during crises.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analysts in the Lake Chad Region