By Hurso Adam
Our region, West Africa has never been defined merely by borders drawn on maps. Long before colonial powers partitioned the continent, communities across the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea were connected through trade, migration, intermarriage, culture, and shared survival. The people of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have always belonged to the wider story of West Africa. Their histories are deeply tied to those of Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and neighbouring states. That is why the growing distance between the Alliance of Sahel States and Economic Community of West African States should not be dismissed as a routine diplomatic disagreement. It is a development with consequences that could shape the future of our region’s stability, economic growth, and collective security.
The formal withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS in January 2025 was welcomed by many within those countries as an act of political independence. In Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou, the decision was framed as a rejection of external pressure and a declaration of sovereign dignity. For citizens frustrated by sanctions and criticism from regional leaders, the move carried emotional appeal. It projected strength, resistance, and the promise of charting a new path.
Yet political symbolism does not always align with long-term reality. Beyond the celebration lies an important question: what does separation mean for ordinary people whose lives depend on cooperation across borders? Regional integration in West Africa is not simply a diplomatic idea. It affects food supply chains, transport corridors, electricity access, trade, employment, and family connections.
West Africa cannot afford deeper fragmentation at a time when the region is already under immense pressure. The Sahel faces overlapping crises—violent extremism, climate stress, food insecurity, displacement, unemployment, and weak governance. These challenges do not stop at customs posts. For example, insecurity in northern Mali affects Niger and Nigeria. Economic hardship in one country creates migration pressures elsewhere. Regional instability rarely remains local.
The argument for withdrawal has largely centred on sovereignty and security. The governments of the Sahel states insist they require independent decision-making to confront insurgency and defend their national interests. Their frustrations are understandable. Many citizens believed ECOWAS sanctions during political crises punished ordinary populations more than political leaders. Border closures disrupted trade, while electricity restrictions hurt businesses and households. These measures created resentment that remains visible today.
However, sovereignty should not be mistaken for isolation. A nation can preserve its independence while participating in regional cooperation. Geography itself makes this clear. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are landlocked nations whose access to global markets depends heavily on neighbouring coastal states. Their imports and exports move through ports in Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. Their economies are tied to regional transit agreements.
No political declaration can change geography. The colonial divisions created during the Berlin Conference fractured communities that had long existed within shared cultural and economic spaces. Borders were drawn with little regard for ethnic identities or trade routes. Communities that once moved freely suddenly found themselves separated by administrative lines. ECOWAS emerged partly to reduce the damage of those divisions by encouraging mobility, integration, and cooperation.
When regional institutions weaken, colonial boundaries become stronger. Administrative borders become more rigid. Trade becomes more expensive. Bureaucracy increases. The divisions imposed during colonial rule begin to harden once again.
For many communities, such separation feels unnatural. A Fulani pastoralist moving cattle across the Sahel does not experience the region through political boundaries. Hausa and Kanuri traders operating between Niger and Nigeria are part of centuries-old commercial networks. Families spread across borders maintain social ties that predate modern states.
These realities cannot be erased by political disagreements. Security remains one of the strongest justifications for the Alliance of Sahel States. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger face severe threats from insurgent groups that continue to destabilise rural communities and weaken state authority. Governments naturally seek stronger coordination to confront these dangers.
Yet insecurity itself ignores borders. Armed groups move across territories with ease, exploiting weak cooperation among states. Weapons flow through informal routes, while extremist networks recruit across multiple countries. Criminal organisations benefit when intelligence-sharing becomes fragmented.
No country can defeat transnational threats alone. A coordinated regional security framework remains essential. Intelligence sharing, joint patrols, legal cooperation, and cross-border surveillance become more effective when supported by regional institutions. The weakening of political ties risks creating gaps that armed groups can exploit.
The growing involvement of external powers adds another layer of concern. As French military influence has declined in parts of the Sahel, other actors have stepped forward. Russia has expanded its security presence in Mali. The United States maintains strategic interests in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. China, Gulf countries, and European states continue to pursue economic and geopolitical influence. In my opinion as far as West Africa is concerned, Nigeria must lead. The region remains Nigeria’s primary sphere of economic, security, and strategic influence.
Africa has seen this pattern before. When regions become fragmented, foreign competition intensifies. Countries negotiating individually often have limited leverage. A united regional bloc can negotiate from a stronger position, setting rules around military cooperation, investment, and resource extraction. Division weakens bargaining power.
This does not mean the Alliance of Sahel States lacks legitimacy. The alliance reflects shared security realities and a desire for closer coordination among neighbouring countries facing similar challenges. The Sahel’s geography and insurgency threats justify stronger military cooperation. The alliance may continue to play an important role in regional defence. But it does not need to exist in opposition to ECOWAS.
The Sahel alliance and ECOWAS can coexist. One can function as a focused security arrangement, while the other provides broader economic and diplomatic integration. Such an approach would allow the three countries to preserve strategic independence while remaining connected to the larger regional framework.
I think, economic logic strongly supports this path. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger depend on regional trade corridors. Their agricultural products, livestock, and minerals require access to external markets. Political distance raises transport costs, discourages investment, and creates uncertainty for businesses.
ECOWAS provides access to a regional market of more than 400 million people. That scale matters in a competitive global economy. Investors are more likely to commit resources to integrated markets than fragmented ones.
Also, infrastructure development also depends on cooperation. Roads, railways, energy projects, and telecommunications networks require long-term planning. The West African Power Pool, designed to connect electricity grids across countries, could improve energy access throughout the region. Political estrangement threatens such shared ambitions.
The human consequences of division may be the most painful. West Africa’s social fabric depends on movement. Students study across borders. Health professionals work in neighbouring countries. Traders move goods between markets. Families gather across states for weddings, funerals, and religious celebrations. When borders become harder to cross, people suffer quietly.
For instance, women transporting food products and textiles face more checkpoints and unofficial payments. Young people encounter reduced mobility for work and education. Families become burdened by bureaucracy in moments of celebration or grief. These costs rarely appear in political speeches, yet they shape everyday life.
At the same time, ECOWAS has to acknowledge its own shortcomings. Some sanctions imposed during recent crises created resentment among populations who felt unfairly punished. Rebuilding trust requires humility. Dialogue cannot succeed if grievances are ignored.
West Africa now faces a choice between prolonged separation and pragmatic reintegration. The future should not be guided by pride alone but by practical necessity. The Sahel alliance can remain intact as a security platform while reopening engagement with ECOWAS. Regional institutions can evolve without abandoning integration.
The region’s challenges; poverty, insecurity, migration, climate stress, and unemployment cannot be solved in isolation. These are shared problems demanding shared responses.
West Africa remains bound together by geography, history, and necessity. Instability in one country inevitably affects others. No nation can permanently isolate itself from the fortunes of its neighbours.
The youth of the Sahel do not simply need symbols of independence. They need opportunity, safety, mobility, and hope. They need roads that connect rather than divide, institutions that cooperate rather than compete, and leaders willing to place long-term stability above short-term political satisfaction.
The Alliance of Sahel States may become an important pillar of regional security, but a reformed ECOWAS remains essential as the wider political and economic home for West Africa. Division may offer temporary emotional satisfaction, but lasting prosperity will depend on renewed cooperation. West Africa has survived colonial partition, economic hardship, and political turbulence because its people understand one enduring truth: our destinies remain linked, whether governments recognise it or not.
Dr Hurso Adam wrote from Abuja
