Kano State Must Not Fall Into Banditry

Daily Trust Editorial, Wednesday November 12, 2025

The recent incursion of bandits into Kano State has come as a shock. Over the years, since 2013, when banditry beset the North-West region, Kano State had been largely shielded from the menace. The first time bandits crossed the border into Kano was in 2022 when they infested border communities such as Faruruwa, Kuraku, and Goran Dutse. They engaged in kidnappings, cattle rustling, and destruction of property.

Community leaders reported that these raids became more frequent and devastating over time. However, there had been respite in the last three years until recent weeks.

The recent attacks in Kano are, no doubt, associated with poorly baked peace deals between over a dozen local governments in Katsina State and bandit leaders. As more and more bandits enter into the agreements without surrendering their arms to the authorities, they migrate to other states to peddle their criminal activities.  This has led to a surge in attacks in areas like Shanono and Tsanyawa, in Kano State, with multiple fatalities and mass displacement of residents.

The people of Shanono Local Government Area have been facing a dire humanitarian crisis due to attacks by bandits. Border communities have been overrun, prompting mass displacement. Entire villages such as Santar Abuja, Unguwar Kudu, among others have been deserted, with residents abandoning homes, farms, and livestock out of fear. Many have sought refuge in Faruruwa and Shanono towns, where overcrowding and poor living conditions prevail.

Displaced families, including women and children, recount harrowing experiences of fleeing in the night, sleeping in open spaces, and surviving on food donations. Some escaped barefoot with only the clothes on their backs, while others remain separated from loved ones. Makeshift shelters are overcrowded, with multiple families sharing single rooms, leading to illness among children due to cold and poor ventilation.

The psychological toll is immense, with residents living in constant fear and uncertainty. Farming activities have been disrupted, and livelihoods lost, as few dare to return during daylight to tend to crops. Community leaders describe the exodus as unprecedented, with hundreds of households displaced and more fleeing daily.

In response, security forces have intensified patrols. Kano State Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf commended the military’s efforts and pledged continued support, including the donation of vehicles and motorcycles to aid operations. Despite these measures, the situation remains fragile, and the displaced continue to hope for lasting peace and the chance to return home safely.

It has become clear that the peace deals signed between local governments and bandits in Katsina State are not genuine and cannot be sustainable. It is widely fragile and lacking the legitimacy, unlike the deal between the Federal Government and Niger Delta militants during the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Though both initiatives aim to reduce violence, their foundations, execution, and outcomes differ significantly.

The 2007 Niger Delta peace deal was a formal, government-led amnesty programme designed to address long-standing grievances over resource control, environmental degradation, and economic marginalisation. Before the deal was signed, it was obvious that the Nigerian military had overwhelmed the militants, even in the creeks. It was apparent to the militants that their resistance had become an exercise in futility. 

It was at that point that the government offered the repentant militants structured reintegration through vocational training, monthly stipends, and educational opportunities. Thousands surrendered arms in exchange for a pathway to civilian life, and the programme was backed by federal legislation and long-term funding.

In contrast, the Katsina peace deals are informal, community-level negotiations with criminal bandits. These bandits lack political ideology and are primarily motivated by profit through kidnapping, extortion, and cattle rustling. The deals often involve verbal ceasefires, with no legal framework, oversight, or reintegration plan. Such arrangements embolden criminals, undermine justice for victims, and fail to address the root causes of insecurity.

Under this condition, the bandits migrate from states where they have signed peace agreements to those where they do not have a peace deal. Kano is therefore a victim of the dubious peace deals with bandits in neighbouring states.

If Kano State falls into the hands of bandits, the consequences would be devastating both locally and nationally. As one of Nigeria’s most populous and economically vital states, Kano serves as a major hub for commerce, agriculture, and industry. Bandit control would disrupt trade routes, cripple local markets, and threaten food supply chains across the region.

Socially, the impact would be catastrophic. Thousands could be displaced, as seen in Shanono and Tsanyawa, where communities have already fled due to rising insecurity. Schools would shut down, healthcare services would collapse, and civil governance would weaken under the threat of violence. The psychological toll—fear, trauma, and loss—would deepen poverty and hinder development.

To prevent Kano from falling into the hands of bandits, the government and military must intensify coordinated security operations, reinforce border surveillance, and empower local communities. The military should establish permanent forward operating bases in vulnerable border areas to deter incursions. Intelligence gathering must be enhanced through community engagement and technology, including drones and surveillance systems. As banditry is a regional issue, joint operations with neighboring states and federal coordination will ensure Kano remains secure and resilient against infiltration.