On A Purported Special Promotion: Questions, Concerns And The Imperative Of Institutional Disorder

By Brigadier General Sani Kukasheka Usman (Rtd)

In recent days, several concerned Nigerians from all walks of life, particularly serving colleagues, retired senior military officers and other well-meaning citizens, have drawn my attention to a purported correspondence allegedly emanating from the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The letter, said to be addressed to the Chief of Army Staff, reportedly conveys approval for the promotion of the Aide-de-Camp to the President and Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Nurudeen Alowonle Yusuf, to the rank of Brigadier General in the Nigerian Army.

Frankly, I find it difficult, indeed troubling, to accept that such a correspondence could be genuine. The implications for military professionalism, career management and the integrity of long-established military norms are profound, especially in an era marked by the proliferation of misinformation and information disorder. Nonetheless, given the wide circulation of the document and the understandable concern it has generated within informed security and policy circles, I consider it necessary to interrogate the matter soberly, objectively and in good faith.

This reflection represents my personal opinion alone; it does not speak for any institution, group or individual. It is neither personal nor adversarial, and it is certainly not directed against the officer concerned. Rather, it is motivated by concern for his career, his integrity and the preservation of the time-honoured value system upon which the military profession rests.

Equally troubling is the fact that a document of this nature, purportedly classified and emanating from the Office of the National Security Adviser, has found its way into public circulation. If genuine, the leakage of official security correspondence raises serious concerns about information security, confidentiality and internal control within the national security architecture, matters that are themselves injurious to institutional discipline and national interest.

At the outset, certain uncomfortable but necessary questions arise. Who, precisely, is behind this? Was the officer himself lobbying, directly or indirectly, for such elevation? Or is this the result of a well-meaning principal, pleased with the officer’s loyalty or conduct, seeking, perhaps as a gesture of appreciation, to facilitate an extraordinary promotion? Either possibility is problematic. Lobbying for promotion undermines discipline and professionalism, while patronage-driven elevation, however benevolent the intent, runs contrary to established military norms. In the armed forces, appreciation must always be expressed within the bounds of institutional order.

Closely related to this is a more fundamental procedural concern: Why would the Office of the National Security Adviser be the channel for initiating or conveying a promotion of this magnitude within the Nigerian Army? While ONSA plays an important coordinating role in the national security architecture, it is not and has never been the reporting or recommending authority for Nigerian Army officers, except those directly serving within ONSA.

This raises a critical question: who, in formal military terms, is the reporting officer for the Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief? Promotions rest on clearly defined chains of reporting, assessment and recommendation. Once these lines are blurred, institutional clarity and accountability are inevitably compromised.

More substantively, one must ask what exactly the officer in question has done, exceptionally, spectacularly and demonstrably to justify such an accelerated and unprecedented elevation. Promotion to Brigadier General is not a reward for proximity, visibility or trust; it is recognition of readiness for strategic responsibility. Under established Nigerian Army standards, several non-negotiable conditions must be met. Time-in-rank is critical. In this case, the officer has not spent the mandatory five years in the rank of Colonel, having been promoted only last year, regardless of the effective date. He has therefore not met the minimum temporal requirement, let alone exceeded it.

Equally important are professional military education and performance evaluations. Promotion to flag rank, as the Navy is wont to say, presupposes the completion of key professional courses and the accumulation of a sufficient number of Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) over a minimum of five years to demonstrate consistency in conduct, competence and leadership. These reports are not administrative formalities; they are the backbone of objective assessment in a professional military. Without them, there is no credible basis upon which suitability for flag rank can be determined.

Furthermore, promotion to Brigadier General is not effected by correspondence alone. It requires appearance before, and recommendation by, a properly constituted Promotion Board that evaluates officers against their peers, seniors and contemporaries. In the present case, the officer did not appear before any such Board. There was no comparative assessment, no competitive evaluation and no institutional recommendation process. This is not a minor procedural lapse; it is a fundamental breach of the established promotion architecture.

History and precedent further expose the weakness of the implied justification. Appointment as Aide-de-Camp to the President has never, by itself, been a basis for promotion to flag rank. Traditionally, officers appointed as ADCs are drawn from the ranks of Major, Lieutenant Colonel and, in some cases, Colonel, but not Brigadier General. In recent memory, successive Aides-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief have served creditably within these rank boundaries without being promoted outside the established system solely because of the appointment. Notably, even the immediate past occupant of the position is still undergoing the requisite professional courses required for eventual consideration for promotion. To act differently now would represent a sharp and unjustifiable departure from long-standing institutional practice.

It is also necessary to address professional preparedness. In today’s Nigerian Army, elevation to the rank of one-star General presupposes exposure to operational command, combat experience where applicable, and completion of advanced professional education such as the Army War College Nigeria (or equivalent institutions in sister services or allied countries), the Leadership Course at the Nigerian Army Resource Centre (NARC), for Direct Regular Commission officers, and ideally the National Defence College. These are not ceremonial boxes to be ticked; they are designed to prepare officers intellectually, operationally and strategically for the burdens of senior command. Rank must reflect readiness for responsibility, not the convenience of appointment or proximity to corridors of power.

Beyond the individual case lies a deeper and more dangerous issue: Morale and institutional confidence. Promotion is not merely about the officer promoted; it is about the signal sent to every other officer and soldier observing the system. Accelerating one officer outside established rules leapfrogs seniors and contemporaries who have invested decades of service, commanded troops under difficult conditions, attended demanding courses and waited patiently for their turn. Such actions breed resentment, disillusionment and a corrosive sense of injustice. Over time, they weaken cohesion and erode trust in the institution.

None of this is to deny that exceptional promotions can occur. Military history records rare cases justified by extraordinary feats, usually in wartime, under exceptional operational necessity, or following acts of uncommon gallantry and professional distinction. But such exceptions must be rare, defensible and institution-strengthening. They must be grounded in demonstrable achievement far above normal duty, not administrative convenience or symbolic appreciation. In the present case, no such extraordinary feat has been publicly demonstrated.

If the intention is to appreciate the officer, there are far more appropriate, dignified and institutionally sound avenues. He could be nominated for a national honour. He could be sponsored for advanced professional military education or specialised international courses that enhance his competence and long-term career trajectory. Such measures recognise merit without distorting the promotion system or damaging institutional credibility.

If the officer is indeed promising, the proper pathway remains clear and time-tested: Completion of requisite courses, accumulation of credible PERs, acquisition of command or operational experience, and eventual consideration by a promotion board alongside peers and course mates. This approach protects the officer’s own credibility, preserves the integrity of the military and reassures the wider officer corps and indeed Nigerians that advancement remains governed by fairness, merit and clearly established rules.

I sincerely hope that the purported correspondence is not genuine. If, however, it is found to be true, then, in the interest of institutional order, professionalism and long-term cohesion, the idea should be reconsidered and dropped for the reasons outlined above. Institutions endure not because rules are rigid, but because exceptions are rare, principled and carefully guarded.

Brigadier General Sani Kukasheka Usman (Rtd), a former Director of Army Public Relations, is known for his extensive experience in Public Relations and Strategic Communication