By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd)
I begin with: May the souls of our officers and men Rest in Peace and May God comfort their families. There are moments in a nation’s life when an event occurs upon which it is difficult to speak, yet impossible to remain silent. Jilli is one of those moments. Many including journalists and media have asked me to comment. I chose to wait out of respect until all those who lost their lives both military and civilians are buried. I also waited to hear as many views as possible and for more information to come in.
I speak with two identities that do not always sit comfortably together: a former Nigerian Air Force officer who understands the pressures of combat, and a practitioner of air targeting, collateral damage estimation, and International Humanitarian Law who understands that even in war, there are rules that cannot be suspended. One knows the tyranny of time, the fog of insurgency, the weight of decisions taken in seconds. The other knows that none of these pressures remove the obligation to get those decisions right.
It is precisely because of this dual perspective that silence, in moments like this, would be the easier path—but the wrong one. This is not commentary. It is professional responsibility. To understand how these systems are meant to function and to say nothing when outcomes suggest they may not have is not neutrality. It is abdication. And in a country at war, where legitimacy is as important as firepower, that is neither responsible nor patriotic.
Let it be said clearly: the Nigerian Armed Forces are operating under extraordinarily difficult conditions. The enemy hides among civilians, exploits markets, coerces populations, and deliberately blurs the line between combatant and non-combatant. Our soldiers fight, often under-resourced, in environments most citizens will never fully comprehend. Their sacrifices are real, and they deserve acknowledgment. But it is precisely because of these realities that discipline in the use of force becomes more—not less—important.
There is now a troubling tendency to frame any call for scrutiny as disloyalty, as though asking whether an airstrike could have been better conducted is somehow equivalent to sympathy for terrorists. That is a false and dangerous equivalence. Professional critique is not opposition to the military. It is part of what keeps a military professional. War does not excuse us from standards. It tests whether we still have them.
And when over two hundred lives are lost in a marketplace, the question is not whether we support our military. The question is whether we are prepared—honestly, calmly, and professionally—to examine whether the systems meant to prevent such outcomes functioned as they should. Because in the end, a nation is not judged only by how it fights its enemies, but by how carefully it protects its own people while doing so.
WHEN A MARKET BECOMES A TARGET: THE PROFESSIONAL QUESTIONS WE MUST ASK
Let us begin with an uncomfortable but necessary concession. It is entirely plausible—indeed likely—that insurgents have used Jilli market. In the North-East, insurgents do not wear uniforms, do not isolate themselves neatly from civilian life, and have long used markets as nodes for supply, movement, and coordination.
But here is the professional point that must be made without ambiguity: the presence of insurgents in a marketplace does not convert that marketplace into a free target.
A market is, by its nature, a civilian object. Its protection under International Humanitarian Law does not disappear because insurgents pass through it, tax it, or exploit it. If anything, such conditions raise the threshold for caution, not lower it.
At even the most basic level of military training, locations such as markets, schools, hospitals, and places of worship are identified, mapped, and tracked. In air operations, they form part of what is known as the No Strike List or, at minimum, restricted targeting categories. Alongside this is Pattern of Life analysis—understanding when a location is active, who uses it, and in what density.
Available information indicates that Jilli market operates on a weekly cycle, with peak activity on Saturdays. That is not a minor detail. That is critical operational intelligence. It means that an assembly of people at that location on a Saturday is more likely to be civilians than fighters—until proven otherwise.
Now consider what has been said publicly. The Governor has stated that the market is a notorious Boko Haram enclave and that it had been officially closed for several years. That position is understandable coming from a political leader carrying the burden of a prolonged insurgency. But sympathy for that burden cannot substitute for professional analysis by a military commander contemplating a strike.
A declaration that a market was closed five years ago is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for targeting decisions. Closure in theory does not necessarily mean closure in reality. In insurgency environments, enforcement is often weak, inconsistent, or overtaken by survival. Civilians return to such places not out of allegiance, but because they must eat, trade, and live.
Indeed, available accounts suggest that the market continued to function on its regular weekly cycle, including the Saturdays preceding the incident. It opened that fateful Saturday, it opened the Saturday before it, and the Saturday after that ad infinitum. It is open knowledge that the Jilli market has been operating despite the closure directive.
That continued civilian presence cannot automatically be interpreted as proof of complicity. A civilian does not become a lawful target because he disobeyed a government directive. To argue otherwise is to collapse the IHL principle of distinction between civilian and combatant entirely.
The analogy is simple. If a swimming pool owner puts up a sign reading “Children Keep Off” but fails to erect barriers or provide safeguards, and children continue to enter, we do not say those children have forfeited protection. The inadequacy of enforcement does not convert them into legitimate objects of harm. The same principle applies here.
What matters in targeting is not what was true five years ago, or even yesterday. It is what is true at the moment of decision. Who is there NOW? What are they doing NOW? Can they be distinguished from civilians? Can the strike be delayed? Can the target be engaged elsewhere, away from civilian concentration…eg wait for the insurgents to come out of the market and hit them on their way out? Here, I am giving the benefits of the doubt that indeed on that Saturday there were indeed Boko Harm members inside that market…so far no evidence of that.
Moving to technicalities official statements say it was a “precision strike” based on “credible intelligence.” These are not casual words. They carry professional meaning. Precision is not merely hitting coordinates. It is hitting the correct target, at the correct time, with controlled and predictable effects. Credible intelligence is not rumor or historical pattern. It is timely, current (not 5 years ago) corroborated (not from a single source but from several independent credible sources), specific (not the area is a known dangerous area) , and verified information (as at time of weapon release) that allows clear identification. We do not know what “credible intelligence” but I have mapped out criteria of what qualifies as “credible intelligence” as taught in the military.
So the question is unavoidable: were those thresholds met? If they were, all good and fine but they must be demonstrated. If they were not, they must be corrected.
Because professionalism is not defined by the absence of error. It is defined by how honestly errors are confronted and how systems are improved thereafter.
And this brings us to the question that must be asked—not in anger, not in hindsight, but in professional clarity. The question of Proportionality: What concrete and direct military advantage was anticipated at the moment of decision that could justify the foreseeable risk to such a large civilian concentration?
International Humanitarian Law does not operate on body counts after the fact. It operates on judgment before action. It asks whether, at the time of the strike, the expected incidental civilian harm was excessive in relation to the definite military advantage anticipated.
Even if a market is being used for military purposes, an attack is unlawful if expected civilian harm is excessive relative to the anticipated military gain.
This is the governing equation:
“Attack lawful only if: ” “Expected Civilian Harm” /”Concrete Military Advantage” ≤”Acceptable Proportionality Threshold.”
In plain terms: If dozens or hundreds of civilians are likely to die to eliminate a handful of fighters or a low-value target, the strike is illegal.
For a strike in a crowded marketplace, on a known market day, that threshold is not routine. It is exceptionally high-almost prohibitive.
If the anticipated advantage was extraordinary, immediate, and decisive, it must be articulated. If it was not, then the question is not one of outcome, but of process – whether the standards of distinction, precaution, and proportionality were applied with the rigor that professional military operations demand.
Because in the end, proportionality is not about what was destroyed. It is about what was judged – before the weapon was released.
Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd) is a Security & Defence Analyst/Conflict Security & Development Consult Ltd