By Dr Joan Swart, August 18, 2025
In the shadow of South Africa’s 30-year democratic milestone, a chilling narrative has emerged: the spectre of a coup d’état.
On 16 July 2025, Minister in the Presidency Khumbudzo Ntshavheni stunned the nation by revealing that intelligence agencies had identified a coup as a potential risk in the National Security Strategy for 2024-2028. While she assured citizens that no active attempts were underway and mitigation measures were in place, the mere mention ignited debates about the fragility of our democracy. This comes against a backdrop of vocal military discontent, a beleaguered South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and a fractured political landscape reshaped by the May 2024 elections.
As a geopolitical observer, I argue that while a full-blown military coup remains improbable due to institutional safeguards and the SANDF’s weakened state, the greater threat lies in widespread civic unrest—fuelled by socioeconomic despair—that could force seismic political shifts.
In either scenario, the outcomes could range from democratic renewal to deepened division, demanding urgent reforms to avert catastrophe.
Let’s dissect the recent events that have fuelled these fears. The timeline begins in February 2025, when Lieutenant General Aubrey Sedibe, the SANDF’s Surgeon General, lambasted the force as a “Mickey Mouse operation” at the funeral of a soldier who was killed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This was no isolated rant; it echoed the deaths of 14 SANDF troops in January 2025 during a mortar attack amid the ongoing SAMIDRC (Sothern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) operation against M23 rebels. The incident exposed operational vulnerabilities, including insufficient air support and troop numbers far below the pledged 3,000 – only about 1,300 were deployed by late January.
Fast-forward to July, when SAPS Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi accused Police Minister Senzo Mchunu of corruption and interference, leading to Mchunu’s suspension and the Madlanga Commission of Inquiry. Then, in August 2025, SANDF Chief General Rudzani Maphwanya’s trip to Iran sparked outrage. Approved by Defence Minister Angie Motshekga under a 2016 MoU, the visit saw Maphwanya pledge military and political support to Iran, including anti-Israel rhetoric, prompting the presidency to distance itself and the Democratic Alliance to call for his court-martial. These episodes, clustered within months, paint a picture of eroding trust between security forces and political leaders.
Politically, South Africa is a powder keg. The African National Congress (ANC) lost its outright majority in the 2024 elections, securing only 40% of the vote, a seismic shift after three decades of dominance. This forced the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) with the Democratic Alliance (DA) and others, but tensions simmer. The rise of Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party, which captured 14.6% nationally and dominated KwaZulu-Natal, has exacerbated ANC infighting. MK’s populist left-wing agenda, coupled with defections from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – including high-profile figures like Floyd Shivambu – signals a radical opposition bloc challenging the GNU’s centrist reforms.
Socioeconomic woes amplify this: unemployment hovers at 33%, inequality remains the world’s highest, and service delivery failures – load shedding, water shortages, crime – breed public fury. Protests supporting Mkhwanazi in July 2025 hinted at how security grievances could intersect with political opportunism, with the MK Party and Economic Freedom Fighters rallying crowds. As one X post quipped, “We have to pick our favourite coup-ees now,” reflecting a mix of cynicism and anxiety in public discourse.
At the heart of this instability is the SANDF’s dire state, a force hollowed out by chronic underfunding. The 2025/26 defence budget stands at R57 billion, up slightly but still facing a R41 billion shortfall that cripples operations. Budget cuts over two decades have slashed capabilities: ageing equipment, poor maintenance, and troop withdrawals from the DRC accelerated due to financial constraints. Motshekga admitted in June 2025 that these cuts are “crippling” the SANDF, yet National Treasury denies sole responsibility, pointing to broader fiscal pressures. The January DRC deaths underscored this: soldiers lacked adequate air cover, turning a regional peacekeeping role into a deadly liability. Analysts like those from Good Governance Africa warn the SANDF is “stretched to its limits,” with deployments supporting SAPS domestically while battling rebels abroad. This degradation not only erodes morale but also questions the force’s ability to defend sovereignty, or, cynically, to execute a coup.
Is a coup truly imminent? Ntshavheni’s warning, echoed in social media speculations like political analyst Lukhona Mnguni’s claim that “South Africa is ripe for a coup” because “generals have lost confidence in their commander-in-chief,” draws parallels to African coups in Mali and Niger. Public statements from generals signal a “creeping” erosion of civil-military relations, as one X user noted: “We are entering a high coup risk period.” Yet experts dismiss this as unrealistic. Dr. Jakkie Cilliers of the Institute for Security Studies called it a “gaffe,” arguing South Africa’s constitutional framework, independent judiciary, and civil society make a military takeover improbable. The SANDF’s weaknesses – budget-starved and professionally oriented – further deter such action. Deputy Defence Minister Bantu Holomisa emphasized readiness for “civil disobedience” over conventional coups.
If attempted, a coup might stem from disgruntled SANDF elements or political factions like MK exploiting unrest, but success is doubtful. Outcomes could include swift international condemnation, civil war amid racial and tribal divisions, or a failed putsch leading to purges and stronger GNU cohesion.
More plausibly, widespread civic unrest poses the real danger. The July 2021 riots, triggered by Zuma’s arrest, killed over 350 and cost R50 billion, showing how grievances can explode. With 2025’s economic stagnation—poverty at 55%, youth unemployment at 45%—protests could escalate, as seen in MK-backed demonstrations. Social media buzz, like posts warning of a “time bomb of anger,” amplifies this. If unrest spreads, it might force ANC-DA GNU concessions on jobs and corruption, or fracture the coalition, paving the way for radical parties in the 2029 elections.
Positive outcomes: policy reforms like alternative SANDF funding models.
Negative: Escalation to violence, economic collapse, or authoritarian crackdowns eroding freedoms.
In conclusion, South Africa’s democracy teeters not from tanks in Pretoria but from unchecked discontent. The SANDF’s woes and military murmurs are symptoms of deeper failures in governance.
The GNU must take bold steps to mitigate these risks:
- Address corruption decisively and without prejudice.
- Restore diplomatic relations with key trade partners like the US amid 2025 tensions over perceived anti-Western alignments.
- Reaffirm a truly non-aligned foreign policy that prioritizes South Africa’s interests.
- Combat waste and cronyism by scrapping BEE policies in favour of merit-based appointments and resource allocations in an environment conducive to economic stimulation—leading to broad-based empowerment in a much more natural and sustainable manner.
- Eliminate risks to trade and investment such as uncompensated expropriation under the 2025 Act.
- Tackle crime and human rights issues by modernizing the SAPS through its 2025-2030 plan while exploring devolution of powers to capable provinces.
Ignoring these invites unrest that could redefine our politics and social landscape, with a real risk of chaos and destruction unless channelled toward equitable resolutions. As one pollster noted, voters—and society at large—punish governance lapses; leaders must heed the warning before whispers become roars.
Dr Joan Swart is a psychologist, author, politician, and researcher who is currently serving as the Chief of Staff of the Referendum Party (RP). She is an exco member of the Cape Independence Advocacy Group (CIAG)